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THE Kholm QUESTION: A CASE STUDY OF DUMA POLICY
WITH RESPECT TO NATIONALITY

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

by

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled, "The Kholm Question: A Case Study of Duma Policy With Respect to Nationality," submitted by Stanley Humenuk in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

THESIS ABSTRACT

As a first premise it is asserted that the Russian Empire was a multinational state. It is then stated that at the time of the Russian Duma there was an active Russian Nationalist political party which considered the Russian nationality among all of the other nationalities to be the sole beneficiary of that state. As a second premise it is asserted that there was a close ideological relationship between this party and the Russian government at the head of which was P. A. Stolypin. Then it is added that in the Duma there was a political alliance of three factions so that together they could form a bloc with a majority of seats. The Russian Nationalists were included in that bloc along with the reactionary Rightists and the somewhat moderate Octobrists.

In view of this political situation, the Kholm question is taken as a case study of Duma policy with respect to nationality. The nationality problem in Kholm is outlined and the attitude of each of the political factions concerned with this matter is given. Each faction's position on the problem of nationality is inferred from its political platform and from its participation in the debates on the Kholm bill. The Kholm bill was sponsored originally by Stolypin and guided through the Duma by the Russian Nationalists to its ultimate adoption.

That bill is shown to be a very reactionary nationalistic measure which actually aggravated the nationality problem rather than solve it. By taking this unfortunate resolvment

of the Kholm question as a case study indicating the Third Duma's policy with respect to nationality, it is concluded that a more lenient attitude toward the non-Russian nationalities of the Russian Empire might have prevented the violence and the political and social chaos which has marked the history of the area since that time. It is further concluded that it is not possible to change the national allegiance of a people by legislating compulsory measures against their nationality.

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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION: THE KHOLM BILL IN THE THIRD DUMA

CHAPTER 1

THE KHOLM QUESTION: ITS NATURE AND RELATION TO DUMA NATIONALITY POLICY

Every school boy can easily discover for himself that the great Russian Empire has been formed in the thousand years of its history by the fact that the Slavic tribes within it have gradually swallowed, by force and by other methods, an immense number of other nations, and therefore, strictly speaking, there is no Russia, but only the Russian Empire. Now, after we have swallowed a mass of foreign nations and have seized their territory, a new and rather absurd national party has made its appearance in the Duma . . . and declared that Russia must be for the Russians, that is, for those who belong to the Greek Orthodox Church and whose name ends in "ov."

These derisive words were written by S. Iu. Witte¹ in reference to the ideological platform of the Russian Nationalist Party. The Nationalists along with the party officially known as the Union of October 17 (Octobrists) often have been associated with the reforms of P. A. Stolypin in the period of reconstruction following 1907.² It is a fact that Stolypin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs could not have had a number of his proposed legislative bills accepted by the Third Duma (1907-1912) without the support of these two parties which together held a majority of seats in the assembly for three out of five of its sessions.³

¹This is a free translation from the memoirs of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers for the Russian Empire for the period 1905-1906. See S. Iu. Witte, Vospominaniia: Tsarstvovanie Nikolaia II (Berlin: Slovo, 1922), I, 116.

²S. G. Pushkarev, Rossia v XIX Veke (1801-1914) (New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1956), p. 439.

³See Appendix II, infra, p. 278.

One of Stolypin's bills supported by these two parties in an alliance with the Rightist faction in the Duma concerned the apportionment of the eastern sections of the Lublin and Sedlets provinces from the Kingdom of Poland. From that area a single province was to be established and named after its capital city, Kholm. This province was to be governed according to laws similar to, if not the same as those found in force in the provinces of the Governor-Generalship of Kiev. With the passage of this bill, Kholm would be included among the central provinces of the Russian Empire. The area therefore no longer would be considered a part of the borderland Kingdom of Poland.⁴

In its legislative course in the Third Duma the Kholm bill raised a number of questions pertaining to the nationality problem in the Russian Empire. Among those questions were: (1) What constitutes a nationality? (2) To what extent should the definition for a nationality be allowed to affect the political administrative organization of the Russian Empire? (3) What should the political administrative policy be in order to cope with the problem of nationality best? (4) What exactly were the problems of nationality in the Empire that caused so much concern in the Duma; and more specifically, what were the particular problems of nationality in the Kholm area that

⁴The text of the bill as presented to the Duma by Stolypin as Minister of the Interior is found in Prilozheniia k Stenograficheskim Otchetam Gosudarstvennoi Dmy: Tretii Sozyv, Sessia Chetvertaia, 1910-1911 gg. (St. Peterburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1911), Vol. V, Bill no. 440, pp. 1717-84.

prompted immediate legislative action? The answers to these questions were fundamental to the establishment of those principles which were necessary to form a policy with respect to nationality by the Third Duma. The passage of the Kholm bill is documentary evidence of such a policy.

It is the purpose of this paper therefore to present the debates in the Third Duma on the Kholm question as a case study of Duma policy with respect to nationality. This study further is intended to present the distinctive principle contributions toward the development of that policy by the various political factions in the Third Duma. Even if certain factions or groups had seats too few in number to exert any great influence on the over-all nationality policy of the Duma, their point of view on the matter is given in this study as a contribution toward a better understanding of the nationality problem in the Russian Empire.

Kholm as a political entity provides an excellent case study of the nationality problem for several reasons. The area was not settled by a homogeneous population but rather by three distinctive peoples, Ukrainians, Poles and Jews. The Ukrainians constituted the most populous group but were divided on matters of religion. Those who were Orthodox were claimed by the Russian Orthodox Church to be Russians. Those who were Roman Catholic were claimed by the Polish Roman Catholics to be Poles. A small number who regarded themselves Uniats (Greek Catholics) were not allowed to profess their faith freely and

were therefore claimed by both the Roman Catholics and the Russian Orthodox. The Roman Catholics made their claim on these people because the Uniats recognized the Pope of Rome as the head of their Church. The Russian Orthodox claimed them because they performed their religious services in the Eastern Rite and used Church Slavic rather than Latin for their ritual language.⁵

While the Ukrainians were mostly small landowning peasants and hired helpers on the large estates, it was the Poles who owned most of these large estates. Of course there were Polish peasants and workers also in Kholm but they were not as numerous as were the Ukrainians. The Jewish population in Kholm was largely mercantile and resided in most cases in the larger towns and villages. In most of these towns the Jews inhabited dwellings in separately segregated sections. Thus, with three major national groups, three or four major religions and three or four major economic classes, the area indeed had the potential of presenting a very complex social problem to any political system lacking a sound nationality policy.⁶

⁵See V. Svatkovskii's untitled editorials on Kholm published in the years 1905-1906 in the newspaper Rus' and republished in Materialy k Voprosu ob Obrazovanii Kholm'skoi Gubernii: Sobrannye A.3 (Warsaw: Tipografia Akts. Obsch. S. Orgel'branda Synovei, 1908), pp. 59-74.

⁶The national, religious and economic class complexity of Kholm is covered best in Oskar Kolberg, Chelmskie: Obraz Etnograficzny (Krakow: Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1890-1891), Vols. I-II. See specifically Vol. I, pp. [iii]7-vii and 1-2.

The situation in Kholm was even more complex if its political history were to be considered. Before Kholm became a part of the Russian Empire along with the Kingdom of Poland in 1815 (according to one of the provisions of the Congress of Vienna) the area was governed successively by a number of princes whose nationality or national allegiance varied from time to time. Nonetheless Kholm was subjected to Polish authority for the greatest period of time in its recorded history.⁷ Furthermore, because Kholm was included in the Kingdom of Poland at the time the Kingdom was established within the Russian Empire the Duma was obliged to prove that the area in fact was not an integral part of the national homeland of the Polish people. This proof was required if the Duma was to pass the Kholm bill with justification. For this reason the history of Kholm became a factor in the consideration of the bill. Although history as an element in the definition of nationality was a seriously questioned matter by some, nevertheless it became a definite part of the Kholm question.⁸

The search for evidence of national allegiance as a common denominator throughout the history of Kholm made the historical element in the definition of nationality extremely complex. How does one apply the modern concept of allegiance

⁷For a short survey of the history of Kholm see National Polish Committee of America, Polish Encyclopaedia, Vol. II: Territory and Population of Poland (Geneva, 1924), pp. 722-49.

⁸Infra, pp. 36, 40-41, 53-58, 64-66, 84-85, 87-90, 143, 161-63, 177-78, 180, 207, 234-37.

to a national state to a period of history where allegiance was to a prince, a church, a landlord or to a social class? Does the nationality of your prince or landlord determine your nationality? Does your faith determine your nationality? Or is it the language you speak and the songs that you sing that should be the criteria used to determine your nationality? If your prince's lands are claimed to be a portion of a kingdom but your prince is ruling his lands independently of the king and often even engages in warfare against your king's military forces, is your nationality that of the king or that of the prince, if their nationalities should differ? Complexities of this nature in the history of Kholm only added to the complexity of resolving the nationality problem in the Duma.

The study which follows exemplifies the way in which these questions were raised in the Duma in application to the specific problems of nationality found in Kholm. As a case study the Kholm question is only one example among many which together combined to create the overall nationality problem of the Russian Empire. Similarly, the passage of the Kholm bill demonstrated only one example of the application of Duma policy toward the nationality problem in the Empire. But that policy as in the case of Kholm unquestionably can be associated with the nationalistic policies of Stolypin and his political allies the Nationalists and the Octobrists and their allies the Rightists in the Duma. The Duma's nationality policy therefore followed the principles implied in Witte's phrase that "Russia must be

for the Russians."⁹ The following chapters will show how this was so.

⁹Witte, op. cit., I, 116 and supra p. 2.

CHAPTER 2

TECHNICAL PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE KHOIM BILL

At 11:15 a.m. May 19, 1909 V. M. Volkonskii, a Vice-Chairman of the Third Duma, opened its 114th meeting of its Second Session. He called upon I. P. Sozonovich, a Duma Secretary, to read a list of bills that were being presented for approval to the Duma by various government ministers. Among the bills was one concerning the apportionment of the eastern portions of the Lublin and Sedlets provinces from the Kingdom of Poland. The area so apportioned was to be organized into the so-called Kholm province and annexed to the central provinces of the Russian Empire. This bill was presented to the Duma for approval by the Minister of Internal Affairs, P. A. Stolypin, who was also the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Appended to the bill was the request of the Council of Ministers that the bill be studied by two of the Duma's committees, the Committee for Directing Legislative Bills and the Committee for Matters of Local Self Government.¹

The Kholm bill was only one out of sixteen bills which were presented to the Duma at this time, yet it was the only bill that received an interested response from the floor of the Duma assembly. The response was indicative of the sensitivity it effected on those deputies conscious of the

¹Russia, Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Stenograficheskie Otchety (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1906-1912), Third Duma, Second Session, Part 4, Meeting 114 (May 19, 1909), cols 1441-42. Hereinafter this source will be cited in the following abbreviated form: S. O., 3D., 2S., Pt. 4, M. 114 (May 19, 1909), cols. 1441-42.

nationality problem in the Empire. The parties opposed to the bill launched an immediate attack. Two specific approaches were taken in this attack. One approach was of a straightforward social political nature whereby the Duma deputies denounced the bill and appealed to the assembly to oppose it. The other approach concerned a question of procedure. Let us follow the procedural aspect of the Kholm bill here.

Because the Kholm bill was appended with the ministerial suggestions that it be studied by two Duma committees, some deputies interpreted the appended suggestions as part of the bill. By this interpretation they hoped to dispose of the bill merely on a vote of procedure. They proposed that the bill could be sent according to the vote of the Duma to the two committees mentioned or to no committees whatsoever. If the Duma should vote in favor of sending the bill to neither of the committees suggested, and further if the Duma would not take any initiative to send the bill to any other committee or list of committees, then the Kholm bill would be dead by a procedural vote. But when the vote was taken however, the majority of the Duma favored the ministerial suggestion of sending the bill to the two committees, the Committee for Directing Legislative Bills and the Committee for Matters of Local Self-Government. These committees were to study the bill and report their findings on the matter to the Duma as a whole.²

²Ibid., col. 1444.

The Kholm bill remained with these Duma committees until March 28, 1911 when another procedural matter concerning this bill came before the Duma assembly. Once again, just as at the time of its introduction to the Duma in 1909, the Kholm bill was brought before the assembly for a procedural vote. It was inserted in a list of procedural matters as though it was an insignificant item among others of which all seemed to require only a hurried formal consent by the Duma which was already overburdened with legislative work. The vote was taken quickly in the Duma upon a petition from the chairmen of the two committees which were required to study the Kholm question. The petition that was accepted by the Duma read as follows:³

The chairmen of the Committee for Directing Legislative Bills and the Committee for Matters of Local Self Government forward a notification with a petition to relieve the latter committee from presenting its decisions on the bill concerning the apportionment from the aggregate provinces of the Kingdom of Poland the eastern parts of the Lublin and Sedlets provinces to make from them a separate Kholm province.

But the opposition to the Kholm bill did not allow the sudden passage of this petition to go unchallenged. Two days later the Duma assembly was faced with another petition. This time 37 deputies called for a restudy of that earlier procedural petition because it was passed by the Duma without debate.⁴ A petition of this kind, when presented by several

³S. O., 3D., 4S., Pt. 3, M. 91 (March 28, 1911), col. 1815.

⁴Ibid., M. 92 (March 30, 1911), cols. 1924-25.

deputies was sufficient by itself to compel the Duma Chairman to put the item requested on the agenda for restudy at one of the general meetings of the Duma assembly. The secretary of the Duma notified the assembly of this procedural compliance on March 30, 1911 and included on May 7, 1911 the Kholm bill itself on the agenda for debate by the Duma.⁵ Yet neither the petition to relieve the Committee for Matters of Local Self-Government from studying the Kholm bill nor the Kholm bill itself came before the Duma for debate during that session. It was not until the final session of the Third Duma that the bill came before the house.

The long delay in bringing the Kholm bill to the Duma assembly of the whole for debate was due to a number of factors. One of these factors was the great deal of work the Duma had to do in this period. For example, the thirty-two-man Committee for Directing Legislative Bills reported at the end of 1910 that it was given 122 bills to study. Between October 20, 1909 and June 3, 1910 the committee met 20 times, studied 89 bills, and deliberated on 82 of them before the Duma. It forwarded 11 bills to other committees for study, and was left with 22 bills, one of them the Kholm bill, not yet studied.⁶ It did not complete its study of the Kholm bill until October 28, 1911. Because this study was not expected to be completed by

⁵Ibid., M. 106 (May 7, 1911), col. 3509.

⁶Russia, Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Obzor Deiatel'nosti Komissii i Otdelov: Tretii Sozyv, Sessia III., 1909-1910g. (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1910), pp. 198-232.

the Committee for Directing Legislative Bills until this late date, it was anticipated that there would not be sufficient time for the other committee, the Committee for Matters of Local Self-Government, to study the Kholm question also before the Duma's scheduled dissolution. It was for that reason that this latter committee requested the Duma on March 28, 1911 to relieve it of its task regarding the Kholm bill.⁷

Of course part of the prolonged study of the bill in committee was due to the obstructionist delaying tactics that were launched by the parties opposing the bill. They hoped to prolong the study in the committee stage until the Third Duma would be dissolved. In this way there was a chance that the bill might not be raised again in the next Duma. The parties promoting the bill therefore had to overcome these delaying filibuster tactics. To do this they did not hesitate to use irregular procedural means. For example, when the chairmen of the two committees that were delegated to study the Kholm bill, presented their petition to the Duma in March, 1911 to relieve one of their committees from making the required study, this petition was made on the initiative of only the two chairmen, N. I. Antonov and P. N. Balashov, without either of these men seeking the approval of their intended action before the Duma from the members of their respective committees. Furthermore, their petition came into the Duma without advance notice of its presentation and it was signed by the two men

⁷S. O., 3D., 4S., Pt. 3, M. 91 (March 28, 1911), col. 1815.

in conjunction with their titles as committee chairmen.⁸ Their petition worded and read in this way gave most of the Duma deputies the impression that it was a petition of the committees named rather than a petition of their chairmen only. When this petition was presented to the Duma during a rush period and without advance notice, the opposition was caught unawares and unprepared to filibuster it. Once the opposition realized what had happened and requested a restudy of the petition,⁹ the parties promoting the Kholm bill kept the Duma agenda full of other matters, leaving no time for a restudy of the procedural petition until they were ready to hear the committee report on the bill and to proceed with its debate and final readings.

Faced with the Kholm bill in the Duma at a time on the agenda before their requested restudy in the Duma of the March 28th procedural petition concerning this bill, the opposition parties resorted to call the bill on the agenda illegal on the grounds that it reached the Duma by illegal procedures. It was said that its legal procedure ended with the initial Duma vote on May 19, 1909 when it was decided that two committees study the bill. On the basis of this interpretation of procedural matters it was requested that the Duma return the Kholm bill to the same position in which it was found on May 19, 1909. This would mean that the bill would have to be restudied by the above mentioned committees; because their action since that time made the committee report, which was about to

⁸Ibid. See also supra, p. 11.

⁹S. O., 3D., 4S., Pt. 3, M. 92 (March 30, 1911), cols. 1924-25.

be presented to the Duma an illegal report. In connection with this proposal to return the bill to its position in 1909 it was also requested that additional committees besides the two mentioned study the bill since it was a very important bill and since many insignificant bills were often given to two or three committees for study.¹⁰

By raising the issue of involving additional committees to restudy the Kholm bill, the opposition parties were able to delay the debate of the bill still further. Conveniently they disagreed over which committees should be given the task. Even some of the parties supporting the bill became involved in the resulting procedural debate which only helped the opposition parties in their filibustering tactics.

These tactics were not very successful however because they only delayed the opening of the actual debate on the bill from November 23, 1911, when the debate was scheduled to begin until November 25, 1911, when the parties favoring the bill conceded the opposition's right to have the Duma restudy the petition of March 28, 1911. Once this restudy was granted and the opposition made a motion to revoke the Duma decision of that date, the parties favoring that decision carried the vote once more with a majority of 174 to 95. Following this vote, Dmitrii Nikolaevich Chikhachev, a Russian Nationalist, and the speaker for the Committee for Directing Legislative Bills gave the Duma his Committee's report on the Kholm bill.

¹⁰S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 28 (November 23, 1911), cols. 2522-28.

With this report the Kholm question debate was launched.¹¹

The Kholm-bill debate continued until January 20, 1912 when the first reading of the bill was put to a vote. The bill was passed by a count of 154 to 107. The deputies advocating the bill certainly were in the majority yet the opposition was not at all weak. The opposition deputies continued filibustering tactics against the bill, even during its debate. They provoked those supporting the bill to take all the procedural measures which the rules of the house allowed in order to hasten the debate to a conclusion so that a vote could be taken.¹²

To hasten a debate in the Duma, there were several rules employed. One rule called for a vote in the Duma to give the urgent bill a priority position on the Duma's agenda. Another rule called for the Duma's consent to fix a termination date for the bill's debate and to have a house-vote taken on the bill on that date. One other way of speeding legislation was to have the chairman of the Duma stop scheduling additional speakers for the debate on the bill before the house. His registry of speakers would be terminated at the time the Duma consented to this procedure by a majority vote. The order of speaking before the house for those deputies already registered

¹¹S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), cols. 2571-91.

¹²S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 50 (January 20, 1912), col. 722.

at the time of a procedural vote of this nature was determined on the order in which they registered themselves as deputies intending to speak. A final rule which was utilized by the Duma to hasten the conclusion of debates was to establish time limits on the speeches to be made by the scheduled speakers. A majority vote in the Duma was required in all cases of adopting any of the rules of procedure. As a matter of fact even procedural motions could be debated by at least one speaker for and one speaker against the motion, unless of course there was no challenge to the motion or if there was unanimous consent in the Duma to vote on the motion. On occasion the Duma chairman allowed a deputy to speak out of order in the course of a Duma meeting, but such action was taken only upon special circumstances at the discretion of the chairman. Very seldom would the chairman allow speeches out of order during a debate where filibustering tactics were being utilized by any party or parties in the assembly.¹³

In the case of the Kholm bill debate, it was scheduled to end on January 20, 1912 in order that a vote on its first reading could be taken before the meeting of that day was to be

¹³The rules of the house in the Duma were known as the Nakaz. Yet these rules were not included in the Ukaz of February 20, 1906 which provided the Duma with its fundamental laws. The rules of the Nakaz were compiled by the Duma deputies themselves within the framework of the Ukaz. While most of these rules of procedure were formulated in the First Duma, the traditions they established were perpetuated and abided by in all the subsequent Dumas. For a publication of the Ukaz see "Uchrezhdenie Gosudarstvennoi Dumy" in F. I. Kalinychev (ed.), Gosudarstvennaia Duma v Rossii v Dokumentakh i Materialakh (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Iuridicheskoi Literatury, 1957), pp. 115-23.

adjourned. The speakers were already limited to five-minute speeches. But twenty minutes before the meeting was to adjourn there were another seven deputies still scheduled to speak on the Kholm bill before the debate period for its first reading would expire. Then there were an additional three speakers scheduled to speak on their factions' voting motives for the scheduled vote according to the Duma chairman's register of speakers. At this time the Duma chairman proposed that the Duma take appropriate procedural action because the ten speakers scheduled to speak required fifty minutes and not just twenty in order to end the debate. The Duma decided to extend the meeting another hour by a vote of 147 to 110.¹⁴ This vote was indicative of the strength of the deputies favoring the Kholm bill. Had the opposition deputies been able to carry this procedural vote to adjourn the meeting at its scheduled time, their filibustering tactics would have been successful because no vote on the bill could have been taken without giving every faction an opportunity to express its stand on the bill before the Duma.

On February 8, 1912 the debate for the second reading of the Kholm bill was opened once again by Chikhachev, the speaker for the Committee for Directing Legislative bills.¹⁵ The second reading of the bill called for a paragraph by

¹⁴ S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 50 (January 20, 1912), col. 708.

¹⁵ Ibid., M. 63 (February 8, 1912), col. 1745.

paragraph or even an item by item reading of the bill. A debate was held concerning each specific paragraph or item as the case might have been at any particular time. Whereas the debate speeches most often were of a political and social nature, some debate took place however over the procedure to be used in the reading of the bill. Most of the procedural debate took the form of concern over which paragraphs or items of the bill could or should be considered together with other paragraphs or items as related laws. The parties favoring the Kholm bill most often desired to include several items or paragraphs at once for every fragmentary reading of the bill in order to hasten the passing of that legislative measure. On the other hand, the opposition parties desired to fragment the bill into as many readings as possible.¹⁶ They had two motives for a highly fragmented procedure. One motive was to delay the bill's passage simply by utilizing time-consuming procedure. The other motive was to try actually to alter the bill in as much of a compromising way as was possible, considering the minority strength of the bill's opposition deputies in the Duma. If any particular item could be altered by the opposition parties, there was a possibility that its relationship to any of the other items in the bill might be

¹⁶In the initial opening of the second reading Chikhachev proposed that paragraphs I and II be considered simultaneously by the Duma, whereas L. K. Dymsha who led the opposition to the Kholm bill proposed that the readings be conducted item by item rather than by complete paragraph sections. See S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 63 (February 8, 1912), col. 1745.

significant enough to require a great deal of reconsideration by the Duma of entire series of items or even paragraphs in the Kholm bill. With a large body of deputies in the Duma, it was conceivably hoped by the opposition that a prolonged debate might still be incited. These deputies hoped that their filibustering tactics might yet succeed in having the Kholm bill unresolved by the time the Third Duma was scheduled to be prorogued.

When the Duma agreed to consider any particular item or number of items at any one time, it still voted separately on each amendment motion to any specific item in the Kholm bill. Whether any amendments to these items were adopted or not, the Duma was still required to vote on each item one more time to approve its text before forwarding it to the Duma Editing Committee. Yet this additional ballot in the second reading did not substitute the requirement for a final third reading of the bill.

The second reading of the Kholm bill was completed on February 24, 1912. Immediately after the final vote was taken the chairman of the Duma asked the assembly to fix a time limit on the bill's third reading. He suggested a three day limit, while the opposition deputies called for five days. Even for the final third reading of the Kholm bill the opposition intended to continue its filibustering activities against the passage of that bill. But in this procedural matter, as on numerous occasions before, they lost out in the

vote to the deputies promoting the bill. The limit for the third reading was set at three days.¹⁷

However the opposition did manage to win a vote in the Duma to postpone the debate for the third reading of the Kholm bill. This vote was won on April 11, 1912 when some of the deputies who were interested otherwise in seeing the bill resolved in the Duma quickly were faced at this time with other more pressing matters requiring immediate attention. They joined the opposition therefore to vote for the postponement of the Kholm bill debate.¹⁸ It was only under unusual circumstances such as this that their interest coincided with the interests of the opposition. It was not long after this postponement therefore that on April 18th the Kholm bill was again on the agenda for the day in the Duma. Yet the opposition continued its filibuster by presenting the Duma chairman with a signed petition to return the Kholm bill to the Editing Committee because that committee failed to study all the corrections that were submitted to it by some of the Duma deputies. This petition was based on the charge that by failing to study all the proposed corrections the committee violated the rules of the Duma Nakaz. The petition was accompanied by an additional charge against the chairman of the Duma for violating other rules of that same Nakaz. He

¹⁷S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 75 (February 24, 1912), col. 2891.

¹⁸S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 3, M. 101 (April 11, 1912), cols. 1927-30.

made the violation when he announced a motion at the outset of opening the third reading for the Kholm bill to the effect that his register of deputies intending to speak be closed. In the case of the petition, the rules that the committee violated concerned the requirement that it vote individually for each correction to the bill submitted by the Duma. The committee voted down entire series of corrections at once to save time, whereas the opposition parties managed to find some 131 corrections required in one of the main initial paragraphs and a total of some 300 corrections in one of the other crucial paragraphs. To quote indirectly Bishop Evlogii, the leader of the deputies favoring the bill, if the opposition had submitted corrections for each letter of every word rather than for individual words they might have increased the required number of votes to be taken by the committee to 1,000.¹⁹ Obviously this was a filibuster tactic by the opposition, but the second charge against the Duma chairman was quite legitimate. The deputies promoting the Kholm bill anticipated a filibustering debate from the opposition, but they wanted to reduce that debate to a minimum. Therefore they submitted the motion to close the register of deputies intending to speak even though the Nakaz rules required the debate to be in progress before a motion of this kind could be made. Of course, because the majority ruled and because the deputies who favored the Kholm bill had the majority in the Duma they outvoted the petition

¹⁹Ibid., M. 109 (April 18, 1912), cols. 2551-2555.

and the objections of procedure by the opposition. The third and final Duma reading of the Kholm bill continued to be debated that very day, even if the debate was delayed by the opposition for a number of hours.²⁰ The debate was concluded along with the final reading of the bill on April 26, 1912. The Kholm bill in its entirety was passed by a vote of 156 to 108. The final text was sent to the Editing Committee once more for its publication before it was to be sent to the upper house, State Council, for that body's approval.²¹

On May 4, 1912, P. G. Matiunin, the speaker for the Duma Editing Committee, gave that committee's report to the Duma assembly. The text of the Kholm bill as adopted by the Duma on April 26th was altered somewhat in its wording but not in its implications. His report and his committee's reworded text of the bill was adopted by the Duma without any further debate.²² The bill was then forwarded to the State Council. After its approval in the State Council on June 23, 1912 the Kholm bill was sent to the Russian Emperor for ratification. On July 7, 1912 the bill was ratified by Tsar Nicholas II; and on September 1, 1913 Kholm officially became a province in its own right among the central Russian provinces.²³

²⁰Ibid., col. 2567.

²¹Ibid., M. 117 (April 26, 1912), col. 3415.

²²S. o., 3D., 5S., Pt. 4, M. 123 (May 4, 1912), cols. 391-396.

²³Kholmskaia Guberniia, 1914 g. (Kholm City: Tip. Kholmsk. Gub. Pravl., 1914), pp. 43-56.

CHAPTER 3

THE THREE VERSIONS OF THE Kholm BILL

When the Kholm bill was presented to the Duma on May 19, 1909 it was more than a simple government proposal. The bill was delivered in the form of a detailed outline of laws. Some of the laws in the bill were new, while the others which were selected from among those laws of the state which were in force already in one part of the Empire or another were simply enumerated. Their numbers coincided with a list of laws published in detail and appended to the main body of the bill. The bill therefore demonstrated the extensive thoroughness with which the Ministry of the Interior studied the nationality problem in Kholm.¹

At the initiative of the Duma a second study of Kholm was made by the Duma Committee for Directing Legislative Proposals.² This committee, like the government, presented its own detailed version of the Kholm bill based on its own independent study of the nationality problem in the area of the proposed province. Furthermore, this Duma committee undertook the task of comparing its own version of the bill with that of the government. It then presented both versions

¹Prilozheniia k Stenograficheskim Otchetam Gosudarstvennoi Dumi: Tretii Sozyv, Sessia Chetvertaia, 1910-1911 gg. (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1911), Vol. V, Bill no. 440, pp. 1717-84. Hereinafter this will be cited as Bill 440.

²Supra, p. 12.

in a comparable published form to the Duma assembly as a whole for debate. While the texts of both versions were before the Duma assembly, only the proposed committee version was subjected to Duma ratification. Of course the Duma assembly was free to adopt the government version of the bill in its entirety or any parts of it. These adoptions could be made in the form of amendments or alterations to the committee version of the bill. Yet entirely on its own initiative the Duma was also free to make amendments to the bill from the floor. It was on this assembly's right of initiative that the parties in opposition to the bill were hoping to make their stand, because both the government bill and the Duma committee's altered version of it were nevertheless strongly in favor of the Kholm project. Whereas the government and the committee versions of the bill differed in a number of points, these differences were largely over matters of administrative procedures for the proposed Kholm province. The differences however were not over the spirit of the bill toward this particular nationality question. Upon comparing some of the points of interest to this study of the nationality problem that are found in the government and the Duma committee versions of the Kholm bill, the following items are important.³

³The two versions of the bill, the one by the government's Ministry of Internal Affairs and the other by the Duma Committee for Directing Legislative Bills, are found published in columns side by side in a comparable form in Bill 440, pp. [171]-84. The laws of the state that could be incorporated by the Kholm bill to be effective in the proposed province are found appended to the bill on pp. 209-323 and 327-422. Other state laws applicable to the Kholm bill which were

The first main difference between the government and committee versions of the Kholm bill was over the question of boundaries between the Kingdom of Poland and the proposed Kholm province. This difference was not separated from the differences between the two proposals over the number of districts that should exist within Kholm province. While the government proposal included Belgorai, Bela, Vlodava, Grubeshov, Tomashov and Kholm to be the capital cities for the six districts that would be included in Kholm province, the committee proposal added an additional two cities, Zamost' and Konstantinov, to the list to enlarge the number of districts to eight as well as to enlarge Kholm province somewhat at the expense of the Kingdom of Poland. Obviously there was very little difference between the Duma committee and the government in their attitudes toward advancing the boundaries of central Russia westward. With the greater advance into Poland as proposed by the committee it can be assumed merely that the committee perhaps was somewhat more ambitious than the government.⁴

Another difference between the two versions of the bill was the proposed subordination of Kholm province. The government proposed that the province be subject to the Governor-General of Kiev while the committee proposed that Kholm be subject directly to the Minister of Internal

never before published but for the sake of the Duma study of the bill were withdrawn from the context of the various ministerial committee meeting journals from periods as early as 1881 are found also on pp. 425-26.

⁴Bill 440, pp. [171]-73.

Affairs.⁵ The committee proposed that the courts of Kholm belong to the appellate of Kiev in agreement with the government proposal but advocated that the same laws and rules of court practice that were in effect in the Kingdom of Poland continue to be maintained in Kholm province although the appointments to the courts were no longer to be included in the elective system emitted from Warsaw.⁶ In effect this committee proposal would see the adoption of a unique system of provincial government for this part of the Empire. First of all Kholm would be a province in its own right with its governor not accountable to a governor-general but accountable directly to the Minister of the Interior. This unusual administrative arrangement for Kholm would become even more unusual for a central Russian province by having the Code Napoléon introduced into its courts. Yet those very same unique Russian courts of Kholm would become tied to the regular courts of the Governor-Generalship of Kiev which did not utilize the Code Napoléon as a practise. This unusual system of law and government proposed for Kholm might be indicative by its complexity how influential the unique nationality problem was on the compilers of the bill.

The government and the Duma committee however were in agreement on the following two points. Both proposed to tie the affairs of agriculture in Kholm to the same laws which were

⁵Ibid., p. 174.

⁶Ibid., p. 176.

in effect in Volynia.⁷ Both also proposed to unite the province's education system to the Kiev region. Both agreed also that the Russian language be used in the schools as the language of instruction for all subjects. But the government wished to allow exceptions to be made at the discretion of the Minister of Education in cases where Polish or Lithuanian would be taught as supplementary subjects in the secondary and city schools should there be a sufficient demand for these courses. The Duma committee, however, wished to make no such concessions.⁸

Also both the government and the committee versions of the bill would have dramatic performances in the non-Russian languages censored. But the government would grant the censorship powers to the Governor-General of Kiev, while the Duma committee would grant those powers to the Governor of Kholm.⁹

Obviously then, there were some differences in the approach to the nationality problem in the two versions of the proposed bill, but very little difference in matters of policy could be noted except that the Duma committee was perhaps somewhat more reactionary and ambitious than the government. This more reactionary spirit inherent in the committee report was passed on to the Duma assembly where the following ultimate version of the bill was adopted:

⁷Ibid., p. 177.

⁸Ibid., pp. 177-79.

⁹Ibid., p. 183.

THE SOVEREIGN'S RATIFICATION OF THE BILL OF JUNE 23, 1912 FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE EASTERN SECTIONS OF THE LUBLIN AND SEDLETS PROVINCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING A SEPARATE Kholm PROVINCE WHICH WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF WARSAW.

I. Apportion the eastern sections of the Sedlets and Lublin provinces and establish therein a province called Kholm. Locate in that province a capital in the city of Kholm.

Articles II, III and IV defined in detail the western border of Kholm province and listed all the local units of government to be included in that province.⁷

V. Divide Kholm province into the following districts: Belgorai, Bel'sk, Vlodavsk, Grubeshov, Zamost', Konstantinov, Tomashov, and Kholm. . . .

Article VI concerned the establishment of a single Lublin province out of the unapportioned parts of the former Lublin and Sedlets provinces. Article VII concerned itself with the reshuffling of personnel in the reorganization proposed by the bill, while article VIII listed the local authorities to be notified about the new rearrangement of governments and those appointed to promulgate that rearrangement.⁷

IX. Transfer the existing local Kholm educational section into the government of the newly established Kholm province and give to it the authority to direct the province's education.

X. Transfer the line of subordination for Kholm province from the Governor-General of Warsaw to the Minister of Internal Affairs.

XI. Maintain in Kholm province those civic rights, court organizations and local codes currently in existence in the Kingdom of Poland except for the following exceptions and amendments:

1. This subsection listed by number and date only those laws of authority held by the Governor-General of Warsaw which were to be transferred to the Minister of the Interior and to the other ministers of the Empire's central government in the case of Kholm province.⁷

2. Attach Kholm province to the regional court system of the Kiev Chamber of Law.

3. Divide the municipalities of Kholm into wards for purposes of electing the district court officials and set the election dates and procedures without any ties whatsoever with the election machinery operating in the provinces of the Kingdom of Poland.

4. Appoint, transfer and dismiss from service the village judges and the chairmen of the village assemblies in Kholm province through the supervision of the Minister of Justice.

5. Assign by written notice the permanent residences for the new village judges upon the confirmation of the Minister of Justice.

6. Establish village court regions and into each region establish a higher state court with the officials for each court in the province appointed by the Minister of Justice.

7. Assign the educational system controlled by the Ministry of Education for Kholm province to the trusteeship of the Council for the Kiev Educational Region.

8. Assign the control of state property in Kholm province to the Volynia Authority for Land Apportionment and State Property and give to it the new name of Kholm-Volynian Authority for Land Apportionment and State Property.

9. Appoint the Kiev Controlling Chamber to revise the taxation accounts in relation to the new redistribution of authority.

10. The laws of paragraph 1673 and part 3 of paragraph 3000 of the Statutes for Educational Institutions and Educational Systems (Vol. XI, p. 1, issue of 1893) shall not apply to Kholm province.

11. The following laws are not to be applicable to Kholm province:

(1) The Act ratified by the Sovereign on May 15, 1881 and proposed by the Committee of Ministers permitting the Catholic feast days to be regarded as official holidays in those provinces of the Kingdom of Poland where the new style calendar is observed.

¹⁰These laws were not published in full in the Duma committee report. But a 1916 amendment to paragraph 3000 read as follows: "In the nine Western provinces it is permitted to teach the Lithuanian and Polish languages in those educational systems of the area with the two class primary education programs or in the city schools as well as in the junior high schools in those localities where a majority of the students are of Polish or Lithuanian nationality." See Bill 440, p. 275.

(2) The Act adopting the amendment to paragraph 464 of the Statutes of Court Procedures (Vol. XVI, p. 1, issue of 1892).¹¹

Points (3) and (4) concerned laws such as lotteries without significance to the question of nationality.⁷

12. The following Acts are applicable to Kholm province:

(1) The Act establishing the State Land Bank. . . .

(2) The Act concerning the land credit institutions operating in the provinces of the Kingdom of Poland.

Points (3) and (4) concerned Acts such as those limiting the right to conduct census and other statistical surveys to the local governor.⁷

(5) The Act . . . to abolish the payment of servitude taxes when property is transferred from the title of Polish landlords to people of Russian descent. . . .

(6) This act prohibited the import of lottery tickets into Kholm from Warsaw.⁷

XII. Enact the following changes and amendments to the laws mentioned:

1. The peasants of Kholm province have the right to make loans from the Peasants Land Bank according to the Sovereign's law of February 19, 1864 providing they are able to work the land for which the loans will be made. This criteria will be applied when the request for the loan is studied by the local commissar for peasant affairs.

2. In the village and municipal court establishments the people and their representatives (guardians, trustees, etc.) also the jurors appointed by law, the state and private prosecutors and the defence councils are permitted, in the event that they do not know the Russian language, to plead and to express themselves in the language spoken locally providing the village or municipal judge is given a translation of the discourse by a translator. . . . Those locations where the use

¹¹This amendment reads as follows: "In the hearings on difficult and important matters in the municipal courts it is permissible to use, in addition to the Russian language, those languages popularly spoken in the given localities provided the parties involved in the court case cannot speak Russian." See Bill 440, p. 319.

of local languages are to be allowed will be determined by the Minister of Justice upon the consideration of the national composition of their village assemblies.

3. In Kholm province the immunity of the person, the privileges and the rights of the individual and the fairest treatment before the law is to be given to every person of Russian descent and to those of Russian descent who were born locally without distinction to be made because of his religious faith. An amendment to this subsection was appended forbidding the extension of this law to those living in the provinces of the Kingdom of Poland.⁷

4. Appoint personnel of Russian descent to the administrative authorities of Kholm province. In the event of discord among them, appeals should be made to the First Department of the Governing Senate.

5. In the schools for girls in Kholm province it is permissible to teach the Polish language to those requesting such courses.

6. Dramatic plays not using the Russian language in the theaters of Kholm province . . . shall be performed only upon having the permission of the local Governor.

XIII. This section of the bill dealt with seven laws relating to the peasants land bank.⁷

Signed by the Chairman of the State Council, M. Akimov.¹²

The above version of the Kholm bill was promulgated into law upon the Emperor's ratification of it on July 7, 1912. By September 1, 1913 Kholm province was both a political geographic and a functioning reality. But apart from its official designation as a Russian province in accordance with

¹²These selectively reproduced portions of the Kholm bill were translated from a condensed version of the bill as published in Kholmskaia Guberniia, 1914 g. (Kholm City: Tip. Kholmsk. Gub. Pravl., 1914), pp. 43-50. Some of the sections which referred to specific state laws were elaborated upon in the footnotes above by quoting directly from those laws located in Bill 440, pp. 2057-426.

the Russian nationalistic spirit which motivated its establishment, Kholm was not in reality nationally Russian. That the province was not nationally Russian and that it was regarded as such only because of the Duma's reactionary nationality policy will be evident in the following sections where a study of the Kholm bill debates is made.

SECTION II

THE PROMOTERS OF THE Kholm BILL

CHAPTER 4

GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN THE DUMA

DEBATES ON THE Kholm BILL

The Kholm bill was initiated by P. A. Stolypin, the Empire's Minister of the Interior and Chairman of the Council of Ministers. But Stolypin himself never once entered the Duma to expound personally on his bill, to speak of its merits nor to speculate on its future impact on the nationality problem in Kholm. By the time the bill was ready for its debate in the Duma, Stolypin was no longer alive. He died from the wounds of an assassin on September 1, 1911. When the Kholm bill debate was opened on November 25, 1911 it was Stolypin's successor to the Ministry of the Interior, A. A. Makarov, who presented the government's motives for the bill. Makarov was appointed Minister of the Interior on September 14th and one of his most important speeches before the Duma in his new ministerial capacity concerned the Kholm question.¹

Discourse

Near the beginning of his speech Makarov asserted that the Kholm bill was only a part of a greater problem of reorganizing the internal structure of the Russian Empire. Since the bill was an internal matter of administration he

¹Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokovtsov, Out of My Past: The Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov, H. H. Fisher, ed., Laura Matveev, tr. Stanford University Hoover War Library Publications, No. 6 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1935), p. 277.

flatly rejected all protests against the bill that came from abroad. The critical newspaper editorials abroad, the protests of the Lvov and Krakov Polish political parties, the accusations that the bill violated the Congress of Vienna, and the cliché regarding the bill as the fourth partition of Poland, all were rejected by Makarov as nothing more than political agitation having nothing to do with the realities of the Kholm bill. The motive behind the bill was that it was necessary before any further reform legislation could justifiably go into effect in Kholm. He had in mind such legislation as the impending zemstvo bill or the proposed bill for city and local self-government.²

He then went on to discuss the national composition of Kholm. In its early history the area was populated by tribes of Khorvaty and Dulaby who in 907 formed a part of the Great Scythian state according to the chronicles, said Makarov. As further proof that the people of Kholm were Russians, he showed where the towns and buildings in Kholm had been named after Russian rulers and heroes. Even paintings had been exchanged by the cities of Kholm and Kiev. He then cited further sources to prove that the population there was still Russian. Makarov named Shafarik and the Emperor's Geographical Society as having

²Russia, Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Stenograficheskie Otchety (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1906-1912), Third Duma, Fifth Session, Part 1, Meeting 30 (November 25, 1911), cols. 2608-10. Hereinafter this source will be cited in the following abbreviated form: S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), cols. 2608-10.

stated that the people of Kholm were Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians).³ He cited Sobolevskii's Ocherki Russkago Dialektologii (Essays on Russian Dialectology) as saying that the people of the area spoke two Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) dialects. The northern most of the two dialects was that of Poles'e while the southern dialect was known as the Ukrainian-Galician dialect⁴ which was not unlike the language spoken in Galicia and Bukovina. Other sources cited by Makarov included an ethnological collection of songs of the 1880s. This collection in Zustsinskii's Ocherki Byta Krest'ian Kholmskoi i Podliaskoi Rusi (Essays on Peasant Life in Kholm and Podliash) recorded 130 songs from Grubeshov district, 60 songs from the other Lublin districts and 60 songs from Sedlets province all of which were written in the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) language in a manner that was sufficiently clear to anyone let alone the linguist specialists, asserted Makarov.⁵

The boundary that was drawn between Poland and Kholm province, said Makarov, was based on Shafarik's, Slavianskoe Narodopisanie (Slavic National Delineation) (1842), which drew

³For Makarov there were no nationality differences between the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) and the Russians. If he could prove that the people of Kholm were Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) then to him this was proof enough that they were Russians.

⁴Makarov did not normally use the term Ukrainian except in quoting other sources. He preferred to call the Ukrainians by the term Little Russians or simply Russians in the sense that all the East Slavic peoples were Russians.

⁵S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), cols. 2611-13.

the division between the Polish and the Russian (i.e. East Slavic) settlements. This division was in agreement with the Emperor's Geographical Society's 2nd volume of its 7th work which based its study on an expedition into Kholm in 1869-70. A more recent source in agreement with Shafarik, as noted by Makarov, was Professor Frantsev's Karta Russkago i Pravoslav-nago Naseleniia Kholmskoi Rusi (Map of the Russian [i.e. East Slavic] and Orthodox Settlement of Kholm Rus') published in 1909 by the Warsaw University. This source also regarded the population of Kholm to be Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian), said Makarov. To further justify the government's proposed division between the Poles and the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) populace of Kholm, Makarov compared the studies made on Kholm by Chubinskii, Sobelevskii and Shafarik. He said that Sobelevskii tried to show a unity between the Galician-Podolian and the Ukrainian ethnographic classifications while Chubinskii tried to deny a Ukrainian entity therefore divided his classifications into the forest men of Poles'e, and the steppe men i.e. the northerners and the southerners. But neither Sobelevskii nor Chubinskii were at variance over their distinctions between the Poles west of Kholm and the Russian (i.e. East Slavic) population there. On this division both were in agreement with Shafarik.⁶

Next Makarov expanded on the government's statistical figures for the national composition of Kholm. He flatly denied L. K. Dymsha's charge in his book Kholmskii Vopros (The Kholm Question) that the government figures were falsified because

⁶Ibid., cols. 2613-14.

they did not agree with the statistics published by Vertinskii or Dzevul'skii or even Professor Frantsev. Makarov said that the various discrepancies pointed out by Dymsha could be explained by the fact that each compilation of statistics was made for a different area of the Sedlets and Lublin provinces and that some of these statistics covered the entire provinces rather than specifically that area which the bill intended to apportion from the Kingdom of Poland.⁷ He then made a quick calculation in verification that the government figures were about right. From Colonel Rittikha's 1864 census in the Sedlets and Lublin provinces there were 457,000 Russian (i.e. East Slavic) people of whom some 400,000 were Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians). According to the 1897 census there were 372,537 Russian (i.e. East Slavic) people in the two provinces, while P. P. Semenov's Statisticheskii Slovar Imperii (Statistical Dictionary of the Empire) gave a more recent figure of some 440,000 Russian (i.e. East Slavic) people there, said Makarov. If one considered the yearly increase in population to be 1.7% for Lublin and 1.8% for Sedlets then the government figures of 500,000 Russians (i.e. East Slavs) in the two provinces was about right for 1910. The breakdown stood at 211,676 Russians (i.e. East Slavs) in the Sedlets and 294,356 in the Lublin provinces. Of these people, 98,910 in Sedlets and 241,506 in Lublin were of the Orthodox faith, said Makarov.⁸

⁷Cf.: L. Dymsha, Kholmskii Vopros (St. Peterburg: Obshchestvennaia Pol'za, 1910), pp. 38-51 and the statistical appendix p. 122 et seq.

⁸S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), cols. 2615-16.

Then Makarov outlined how a process of Latinization in faith and Polonization in nationality was taking place in Kholm. He began his outline with the year 1569 when Kholm became a Polish crown possession as a result of the Union of Lublin. From this year on, an intense policy of Polonization was conducted in Kholm, he said. After only 27 years of direct Polish rule there, the union of religions was initiated in 1596. Just over 100 years later in 1720 in the Zamost' Sobor of the Uniat Church the "filioque"⁹ was introduced as well as the Roman Catholic method of Christening. The Roman Catholic formula for the Eucharist was introduced¹⁰ and the church ikonostas¹¹ began to be done away with. The bishops were then required to shave themselves and to become tonsured. Makarov then asked the Duma if these were not steps toward a Latinization of the Russian people beyond the Bug River?¹² This process went

⁹The "filioque" clause has been a theological point of contention between the Eastern and Western Catholic Churches since 867 when Photius, the Bishop of Constantinople excommunicated Nicholas I, the Bishop of Rome for having corrupted the Christian Creed with its insertion. This clause contains the words "and the son" following the portion of the Creed which reads as follows: "And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and the Life-giver, that proceedeth from the Father." See "The 'Nicene' Creed" in Henry Bettenson (ed.), Documents of the Christian Church (London, New York and Toronto: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 36-37.

¹⁰The Roman Catholic formula for the Eucharist included unleavened bread whereas the Orthodox formula included leavened bread. Bettenson, op. cit., p. 134.

¹¹An ikonostas is an elaborate framework of gates and icons separating the nave from the altar in Orthodox churches.

¹²The eastern boundary of the Kingdom of Poland ran along the Bug River prior to the establishment of Kholm province. See map infra p. 284.

on, he said, until in 1905-06 the population there became seriously divided. The Roman Catholic fanatics called upon all to join them and called forth slogans against the Orthodox. When some of the populace did not join the Catholics they were chased out of their villages, their homes were violated, and their churches and crosses¹³ were destroyed. The Kholm bill was intended to end these violations. It was designed to harbor the Russian populace from violent incitement by an overly zealous minority. At the same time, said Makarov, the bill endeavored to give those minorities certain religious and national rights and privileges.¹⁴

Makarov concluded his speech with the reminder to the Duma that the Roman Catholic priests adopted in 1905-06 the slogan: "Will there be a Poland? -- Of course there will be a Poland! There will be a Poland that will extend nearly to Moscow!"¹⁵ By implying that the Poles had some very ambitious separatist political intentions, Makarov wished to convince the Duma that the Kholm bill was part of a very reasonable policy by the government vis-à-vis the Poles because, he

¹³Among many kinds of crosses for both the Western and the Eastern Catholic Churches, St. Andrew's Cross (a diagonal cross) became symbolic of the Orthodox Church particularly in those areas where both Roman Catholic and Orthodox parishes were found in the same towns or villages. It is likely that it was the St. Andrew's crosses which Makarov referred to in his speech as having been destroyed. Where a regular cross might not be destroyed by a fanatic Roman Catholic for reasons of religious conscience, the diagonal cross of St. Andrew might not arouse any conscientious restraints whatsoever over any such activity.

¹⁴S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), cols. 2616-19.

¹⁵Ibid., col. 2620.

asserted, there already was a Poland within the framework of the Russian Empire and that the Poles like all the other non-Russian nationalities were given every consideration by the government which made it its policy to look after all its nationalities very well.¹⁶

While Makarov was the only Minister to participate in the Kholm bill debates, there were other representatives of the government who joined in those debates on behalf of some of the special aspects of the bill. Verevkin, an Assistant to the Minister of Justice spoke to the Duma on two occasions to clarify the government's position on some of the legal questions raised by the Kholm bill. On February 16, 1912 he explained why the government decided to retain the same legal procedures and laws in Kholm as were in practice in the Vistula Lands.¹⁷ At the same time, he explained why the court of the second instance for Kholm was recommended to be located in Kiev rather than in Warsaw even though it was the Warsaw court that was most familiar with the laws to be in effect in the new province.¹⁸

Verevkin said that the people of Kholm had become accustomed to the legal system in practice there. The Code

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷It was common practice among those who refused to acknowledge the existence of a separate national Polish entity to use the terms "Vistula Lands" and "Provinces of the Warsaw Governor-Generalship" rather than the term "Kingdom of Poland."

¹⁸S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 70 (February 16, 1912), cols. 2357-62.

Napoléon, the state codes of 1825 and the hypothecary laws would continue to be utilized in the circuit courts of Kholm, but he wanted to emphasize to the Duma that this measure was temporary only. It was temporary because the Ministry of Justice intended in the near future to make vast legal reforms throughout the Empire. The ministry hoped to establish uniformly the same legal system and code of laws for all its component parts. This would be a great step toward the political unity of the Empire, he said. As for Kholm, any change in legal system there now would only entail one more change in the near future. Such frequent changes in laws, he warned, might only cause confusion among the populace.¹⁹

Yet, Verevkin said, the government recommended that the courts of appeal for Kholm be held in Kiev rather than Warsaw. It was not that the government lacked confidence in the court at Warsaw that this change was suggested. There were other reasons. The judges in Warsaw were as loyal to Russia and as fair as anywhere. Out of the 32 members and of the 6 chairmen of the court there, 9 were Lutherans, 1 was a Mohomedan and the rest were all Orthodox Russians. There were no Catholics among them. With this account of the court at Warsaw by Verevkin, loud cheers resounded from the rightist seats of the Duma.²⁰ Verevkin then continued to outline the

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰The Duma seated its deputies by factions from right to left with the most conservative factions on the right side and the most revolutionary factions on the left. The deputies therefore sat in the rightists seats, the leftists seats or the seats of the center, according to the terminology used.

reasons Kiev was chosen rather than Warsaw as the seat of the court of the second instance for Kholm. In Warsaw there were no Russian practicing lawyers. The Polish lawyers there, for political reasons in the past either refused to defend cases brought to them by Russian clients or had not made any sincere efforts to defend such clients whenever on occasion they did take on the Russian cases.²¹

As for the charges, Verevkin continued, that the court in Kiev was not familiar with the Code Napoléon and therefore would not be able to handle cases from Kholm effectively, there was in St. Petersburg a whole contingent of men who were able to fill any such needs.²²

At this point someone from the leftist seats interjected a comment to the effect that, "Yes, there always were contingents ready in Peterburg for whatever the needs."²³

But Verevkin continued his speech. This time he rejected the criticism that Kiev was too far from Kholm to be the seat of the province's court of appeal. It was argued that because of the distance factor involved, Warsaw should remain the seat of the court of appeal for Kholm. To this argument, Verevkin stated that in numerous cases the seat of the court of the second instance was as far away from its outlying areas

²¹S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 70 (February 16, 1912), col. 2359.

²²Ibid., cols. 2361-62.

²³Ibid., col. 2362.

as Kholm was from Kiev yet no complaints were ever heard because of this reason. He named St. Peterburg as an example of such a court district. All of the Baltic provinces were subject to the St. Peterburg district court, he said.²⁴

In every aspect of the legal recommendations for the Kholm bill, Verevkin did not offer any changes to the applicable parts of the bill that were under discussion. He could not see the necessity for any changes except, if the Duma wished, to change the words "in the provinces of the Kingdom of Poland" to read "in the provinces of the Vistula Lands."²⁵ Among other anti-Polish implications throughout his speech, this substitute of a regional geographic name for the Polish national political entity within the Empire was a calculated gibe unquestionably indicative of his personal convictions regarding the course that the nationality policy of his government should take.

It was with a similar attitude that Verevkin spoke a second time in the Duma on the Kholm bill. This time however he was not merely presenting the motives behind the government's proposals concerning Kholm, he was concerned with defending them. In the course of the Duma's study of the bill an amendment was passed concerning the language that could be used in the courts of the first instance in Kholm. The amendment would allow the courts to use the language that was predominant in the district in which they were located. But an amendment of this kind would

²⁴Ibid., cols. 2361-62.

²⁵Ibid., col. 2359.

compromise the purpose of the Kholm bill, according to Verevkin. If the Kholm bill was to tie Kholm to the central provinces of Russia then one of the methods that would make this possible, he asserted, was to have the courts of Kholm use the Russian language.²⁶

If this was not done, Verevkin said as he gave another argument, then it would become possible too easily for local people to become justices-of-the-peace. Of course this would not be bad, he said, in the Kazan or Ufa provinces, but in a strife torn area like Kholm where religious and racial hatred prevailed, local justices of the peace might not be able to maintain impartiality. It has been known, he said, that the religious hatred between Catholic and Orthodox families had been carried into the population's everyday life. An Orthodox family's home was afire once, yet a Catholic family living next door refused to help its neighbors in distress.²⁷

Similar extremes of hatred had been nourished over economic reasons among the Poles and the Jews, continued Verevkin. The Poles had become so self-concerned that they launched a campaign for setting up cooperatives in order to become self-sufficient in all their commercial needs. The Poles no longer did business with the Jewish merchants and shopkeepers, even if this meant bankruptcy and starvation for

²⁶S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 73 (February 22, 1912), col. 2719.

²⁷Ibid., cols. 2719-22.

the Jews. In other words, economic factors contributed also to the political, racial and religious strife in Kholm. The Kholm bill was designed to end that strife. The language used in the courts was important to make the bill effective, he said. That language unquestionably should be Russian.²⁸

Yet Verevkin's pleading with the Duma was only partially headed. The resulting language clause for the courts of Kholm allowed the participants to present written statements to the courts in their native language if they did not know the Russian language. They could even speak their own language in court, however they had to provide the court with an interpreter to translate their oral statements into the Russian language. This meant that the courts indeed had to be conducted in the Russian language, but special procedures could be utilized when a person in court was not able to speak that language providing special permission to do so was secured from the proper authorities.²⁹

Baron Taube, an assistant to the Minister of Education, was another representative of the government who spoke in the Duma. He spoke in defence of the government's proposed education policy in the Kholm bill. Taube's main concern was the languages to be taught and the language of instruction in the schools of

²⁸Ibid., cols. 2722-23.

²⁹Supra, pp. 31-32. Also see Kholmskaia Guberniia, 1914 (Kholm City: Tip. Kholm. Gub. Pravl., 1914), pp. 47-49.

Kholm. Just as Verevkin had complained that the Duma amendments to the Kholm bill were compromising the purpose of the bill, Taube also complained of the same treatment being given that portion of the bill that was of interest to him. He said that the principle mutatis mutandis (with due alteration of details) was most applicable to what the Duma was doing. Taube could not see why the Duma would allow Polish and Lithuanian to be taught in the schools of Kholm if the purpose of the Kholm bill was to put an end to foreign influence on the province's people. Why was it, he asked, that the Duma was applying those laws of the state which were applicable to the borderland regions of the Empire when Kholm was intended to become an integral part of the central provinces of Russia? Taube therefore concluded his defense of the government-proposed education clause by asking the Duma to use its logical reasoning in view of the motive behind the Kholm bill.³⁰ His request was fulfilled when in the final version of the bill the Duma allowed only the private girls schools to teach the Polish language. The regular public schools could teach only the Russian language.³¹

A final speaker on behalf of the government in the Duma was Makarov's ministerial assistant, Kharuzin. His speech was short. He made the point that by uniting Kholm to the

³⁰S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 73 (February 22, 1912), cols. 2681-84.

³¹Supra, pp. 30 and 32. See also Kholmskaia Guberniia, 1914, pp. 47 and 49.

provinces of the Western Land³² the Duma should not regard this union as a mechanical thing. He said that the government considered the union to be a limited union. When this was to be applied to the population of Kholm it meant that the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) people there were to be placed on an equal status with the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) people in the Western Land.³³

From this speech it can be implied that because the people of the Western Land were not "Great Russians" but merely Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) their status in the state was limited. Therefore, if any of the Duma deputies considered that a union with the Western Land for Kholm, being at the same time a union with Russia, meant that the people of Kholm were to have the same status as the "Great Russians," this was a mechanical error on their part. The people of Kholm were not to enjoy that status given the "Great Russians" but only that status given the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) of the Western Land.

³²The Western Land was the term used for the Ukrainian lands acquired by Russia from the former Polish Republic. The state laws in this area were not the same as those found in the provinces of former Moscovy. Local historical political traditions and the distinctively different cultural and ethnic conditions had to be considered by the law-makers for this area. Kharuzin therefore used this term to remind the Duma of the different status given the Western Land when compared with the more central areas of the Empire. To study the different laws found in the various regions of the Empire such as the Kingdom of Poland, the Western Land, the Baltic Provinces, etc., see Prilozheniia k Stenograficheskim Otchetam Gosudarstvennoi Dumi: Tretii Sozyv, Sessia Chetvertaia, 1910-1911 gg. (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1911), Vol. V, [Bill] no. 440, pp. [209]-426.

³³S. o., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 75 (February 24, 1912), col. 2819.

Inferences

From the speeches of the four representatives of the government outlined above, it can be concluded that the government had no intention of treating all the nationalities of the Russian Empire with equality. A facade of logic and fairness was utilized to camouflage the government's otherwise reactionary policies. In the understanding of the government, the nationality problem was not to be solved by considering the aspirations of the various nationalities. The government ministers were to make their policies only to appear to be fair considerations of the needs of these nationalities. Some of these men did not even do a very good job of that. Nonetheless their actions were based unquestionably on the policy of advancing the Russifying programs of the Great Russians to the detriment of the national interests of the non-Russian peoples of the Empire.

This policy was not unlike the policies of the pro-government factions in the Duma. The following chapters will demonstrate how those factions expressed their views on nationality policy in the case of the Kholm question.

CHAPTER 5

THE RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS

Ideology

The very name of the Duma faction known as the Russian Nationalists suggests that the group had its primary political platform based on a concept of nationality. Indeed this was the case. Most of the faction's deputies were members of the Party of Russian Nationalists. The Party's most active branch was in Kiev. On December 22, 1911 the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists held a meeting and adopted an ideological program for its members. This ideology was saturated with nationalistic dictums on the nationality problem in the Russian Empire. The first five ideological points in the program were as follows:¹

1. The Russian nationality--because of its efforts, perseverance and spilling of blood for the great Russian state--deserves a national law in Russia to establish its relationship to the other component nationalities of that state.

2. No nationality should be given any kind of autonomy, because that would be the first step toward dismembering Russia into parts.

3. Finland is an indivisible part of the Russian Empire belonging to us Russians by right of conquest.

4. The Southwestern Land is a primordial and purely Russian land.

5. There exists only one Russian nationality. There is no Little Russian or "Ukrainian-Rus'" nationality, but only a Southern-Russian branch of the one and only Russian nationality. The Ukrainophil movement presents itself to be harmful to the same degree that it is without foundation.

¹Sbornik Kluba Russkikh Natsionalistov: Vypusk Chetvertyi i Piatyi (Kiev: Tip. S. V. Kul'zhenko, 1913), p. 220.

The paragraph that followed this last point stated in general terms the Club's ideology with respect to furthering in a peaceful way the political and cultural development of Russia. The Club was against the harmful influences of cosmopolitanism, against the teachings of the anti-Russian elements, and against those who were hostile to the state and its society in general. The Club intended to use legal means toward furthering its ideological endeavors and would contest all elective institutions with its candidates.²

With an ideology of this nature, it is not surprising that the Russian Nationalists took a leading part in promoting the Kholm bill. The part that they played is portrayed through the selection of speeches summarized below.

Discourse

The Duma deputy, who had more to do with the Kholm bill than any other Duma member, was a member of the Russian Nationalist faction. This man was Dmitrii Nikolaevich Chikhachev. He was the spokesman for the Duma committee which studied the Kholm question. In his capacity as spokesman, Chikhachev not only gave the report of the Committee for Directing Legislative Bills to the Duma, but he also guided that committee's version of the bill through all three of its readings in the Duma assembly. It was largely due to his efforts that the bill was ultimately accepted by the Duma. His personal efforts toward seeing the

²Ibid., pp. 220-21.

bill passed exceeded by far the efforts that his position as spokesman demanded of him. Through his nationalistic convictions he became dedicated to the cause.

His first speech to the Duma on the Kholm bill constituted the report of the committee for which he was spokesman. Chikhachev began this report with the fundamental assertion that the proposed Kholm province was to comprise that area immediately west of the Bug River that was called by its residents "Kholm" and "Podliashe."³ As for this area's history, Chikhachev told the Duma that the lands were governed by Russian rulers at the time of Vladimir the Great. Following the shining epoch of Daniel of Galicia, he continued, wars in the fourteenth century were fought over the patrimony of Galicia. In 1377 the Kholm and Belz districts were annexed by Poland. Kholm was different from Podliashe, Chikhachev said, by the fact that the oblasts of Vladimir, Lutsk and Berest'e were annexed by Lithuania, and by the fact that in 1462 Kholm became politically independent.⁴ In 1569 the Lublin Union between Lithuania and Poland transferred Podliashe to Poland. Following this union, the administrative

³S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), col. 2591.

⁴It is questionable whether one could regard Kholm politically independent in 1462. In that year the last of the Polish family of Mazovetskii died leaving Kholm which they ruled to become absorbed into the so-called Rus' Palatinate. But this palatinate nevertheless still was subject at least nominally to the Polish Crown. Cf. Kholmskaia Guberniia, 1914 g. (Kholm City: Tip. Kholmsk. Gub. Pravl., 1914), p. 19. Also see map infra, p. 285.

borders of Kholm and Podliashche remained unchanged until the partitions of the Polish Republic. Throughout the entire history of the Republic, the area of which Kholm was an integral part was known officially as a Rus' palatinate. This palatinate consisted of three lands known as Lvov, Galicia and Kholm. The Ratnen and Liuboml districts east of the Bug River were included as a part of Kholm. Moreover, Podliashche, explained Chikhachev, by virtue of its name denotes the nature of its political character. It is the land next to (Pod) the Poles (Liakhani) and therefore could not be considered a part of native Poland. Nor could today's Bel'sk and Vlodavsk districts be considered native Polish lands since they belonged to Lithuania as part of the Berest'e Palatinate.⁵

Chikhachev presented his version of part of Kholm's religious history also. He stated that the aim of the Berest'e Union was to transfer the Orthodox people into Catholicism. He noted its compulsory nature with respect to the population and that the union was promoted by the Polish Republic. A weakening factor in Kholm's resistance to the religious union was Kiev's union with Moscow. With this latter political union, Chikhachev asserted, Kholm became isolated from Kiev, the cultural center of the south.⁶

As Chikhachev continued with his historical survey,

⁵S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), cols. 2591-92.

⁶Ibid., cols. 2592-93.

he pointed out that the Bug River became a border for the first time in 1795 when the third partition of Poland saw the Liuboml and Ratnen districts of Kholm united with Russia while the remaining districts of Kholm fell to Austria. He then outlined how Napoleon I set up a Grand Duchy of Warsaw. After compelling the Peace of Schönbrunn on Austria in 1809, Chikhachev said that Napoleon saw to it that Austria surrendered to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw the lands of Sandomir, Lublin and Podliashche. But when Napoleon was defeated during the Napoleonic wars, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, including the above annexed lands, fell to Russia by conquest. By virtue of that conquest, both Austria and Prussia agreed to give Poland to Russia at the Congress of Vienna. When Alexander I of Russia decided to establish Poland as a kingdom he allowed Kholm and Podliashche to form a part of that kingdom. As to why Alexander did this, Chikhachev explained that the Tsar had a lack of knowledge of the history of the area. As a matter of fact, Chikhachev said, Alexander was prepared to give to Poland even more lands that were native to Russia had not the historian Karamzin convinced him not to take such steps.⁷

Chikhachev's nineteenth-century history survey was largely concerned with religious history. He said that the Poles were given dominance over the affairs of the Kingdom of Poland. To participate in the activities of that dominant group most of the wealthier and more intelligent Uniats became

⁷Ibid., cols. 2593-94.

Roman Catholics and therefore Poles in the Kholm area. But finally a national movement spread over the country, continued Chikhachev. In 1862, this was reflected in a letter to Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich by Uniat priests who were seeking a reconciliation with their Orthodox brothers. The Uniat Bishop for Kholm, Mykhailo Kuzemskii, and the Director of the Committee for Internal Affairs and Religions, V. A. Cherkasskii, combined their efforts to institute reforms to prevent further Polonization of the populace of Kholm. They abolished the right of the gentry to appoint priests. Prior to this reform the great landowners had that right because of their patronage to their parishes which was possible by virtue of their great wealth which was unmatched by the combined wealth of the free-holding peasants. But more important was the fact that they appointed either Roman Catholic or Uniat priests regardless of the religious composition of their communities. This reform was introduced without the use of force or police methods. But with the passing of these two men, said Chikhachev, new forces from St. Petersburg took action toward uniting the Uniats with the Orthodox. When that union took place in 1875, a number of kalakuty (inciters of turbulence) appeared, admitted Chikhachev, who refused to go to either the Orthodox or the Roman Catholic churches. Police activity often compelled these people to choose one religion or the other. While many of these kalakuty were inclined toward the Orthodox Church, the Poles made a great endeavor to influence them into becoming Roman Catholics. The

Roman Catholic Bishop of Lublin announced in his circular No. 141 on May 10, 1905 that all Uniats were to be regarded as Roman Catholics, even though they nor their ancestors were ever Catholic, insinuated Chikhachev.⁸

However, insinuations were not explanations, and Chikhachev had to explain why ever since 1905 large numbers of Orthodox were becoming Roman Catholics in Kholm. From the date of the famous Supreme Manifesto of October 17, 1905, which was issued to pacify the revolutionary current at that time in the Russian Empire, a number of citizens interpreted a section of the Manifesto to mean that thereafter it was legal to choose whatever religion one desired and still not suffer any inequality of citizenship or other civil rights or status. That section of the Manifesto read as follows:⁹

1. Grant the populace a firm establishment of citizens' freedoms based on the fundamentals of actual inviolability of the personal being. [Grant them] freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.

As a result of this clause and the revolutionary times, a great many people in Kholm left the Orthodox Church to become Roman Catholics. Chikhachev felt obligated to explain that sudden mass conversion in Kholm.

He began this part of his speech by saying that very few in 1905-06 voluntarily became Roman Catholics in the upper

⁸Ibid., cols. 2594-96.

⁹F. I. Kalinychev (ed.), Gosudarstvennaia Duma v Rossii v Dokumentakh i Materialakh (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Iuridicheskoi Literatury, 1957), p. 90.

Bug area. In Podliashia, however, considerably more became Catholics because of the greater dependence there of the small land tillers upon their Roman Catholic gentry and upon the family of Count Zamoiskii which controlled four districts. The use of two calendars there also was influential in making the population choose religions, added Chikhachev. While the Orthodox Church had a calendar whose holidays did not coincide with the holidays in the Roman Catholic calendar, quite often the employees chose the religion of their employer in order to have their religious holidays coincide with their days off from work. Employment itself was a factor affecting the employee's religion, said Chikhachev. The insemination of pamphlets written by Reimond and Kuchinski contributed to this situation. These men wrote that the Union of Russian People was an evil organization and that the Russians and the Orthodox of Kholm were equated synonymously with that organization. Therefore these writers called upon the gentry not to hire the Russian and the Orthodox people who were seeking employment. Only Poles and Roman Catholics should be hired.¹⁰

It was because of the above-mentioned influential factors that 168,000 people were becoming Roman Catholics yearly in Kholm according to statistics, yet the correct figure was more likely around 180,000, said Chikhachev. It was certain that in 1905-06 some 180,000 Uniats became Roman Catholics.

¹⁰S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), cols. 2596-97.

Recent statistical publications showed that there were 304,000 Orthodox and 310,000 Catholics in Kholm according to the government's figures. According to Polish sources, Vartenskii said that there were only 294,000 Orthodox there, while Zakrzhevskii said that there were but 277,000. The statistical discrepancies, explained Chikhachev, were due to the unreliability of the Catholic and Orthodox priests of Kholm to give any accurate statistical accounts of their parish members. But the Duma committee, which studied the problem, did not consider the religious statistics significant, said Chikhachev, because the problem in Kholm was one of nationality and not of religion.¹¹

Just because one switched religions, argued Chikhachev, it did not mean that his nationality had become changed. It took many generations for that to happen. Even with the use of secret Polish schools it would take several decades before a complete Polonization of the area could be accomplished, because Kholm was far from becoming Polonized, asserted Chikhachev. To prove this he dwelt on the ethnographical studies on the area by Sobolevskii and Zhitetskii. These men concluded that the language spoken in the area was of the following dialects: Volynian-Galician, Northern Little Russian (i.e. Northern Ukrainian), Podliashian-Little Russian (i.e. Podliashian-Ukrainian), and Polish-Little Russian (i.e. Polish-Ukrainian). Yet the latter dialect, said Chikhachev was spoken in the districts around Sedlets City which were not being included in the

¹¹Ibid., cols. 2597-99.

area proposed to form Kholm province. If in 1897, continued Chikhachev, there were 368,000 people in the area who spoke Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) regardless of their religion whether they were Orthodox or Catholic then by the natural increase in population there should be around 450,000 people there to-day of Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) nationality. The 1907 census however did not coincide with this estimate because of the effective influence that Polonization had on the population. Yet the 450,000 figure could justifiably be accepted to be correct assured Chikhachev. With this figure in mind, it behooved one to ascertain a majority of Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) people in Kholm. Chikhachev further assured that these people were ethnographically no different from the people of Galicia, the Southwestern Land, the Left Bank of Ukraine and other such regions.¹²

As to the motives for apportioning Kholm province from Poland, Chikhachev gave Prince Cherkasskii credit for the initial idea as early as 1865. At that time Cherkasskii suggested forming Kholm into a separate province in order that the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) population there would be cut away from the influence of the Polish cities of Lublin and Sedlets. This political arrangement would help end the problem of Polonization in Kholm, according to Cherkasskii, said Chikhachev. The same motives were behind the Kholm

¹²Ibid., 2600-01.

movement today, he added.¹³

Concerning the border between the Polish and the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) people, Chikhachev admitted that there were serious difficulties involved in drawing its line. He admitted that there were enclaves of Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) and Polish majorities on both sides of the proposed border, but the line that was proposed gave a Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) majority in Kholm and gave the area an ethnographic entity different from that which remained in the Sedlets and Lublin provinces. He defended the committee's border line as opposed to the line that was suggested by the government. The slight increase in the area of Kholm gave the proposed province some ethnically and historically important sites that contributed considerably toward making it a complete political unit, according to Chikhachev. One such site was the Radochnitskii Monastery.¹⁴

Before concluding his report, Chikhachev reminded the Duma that there were two other reform proposals that motivated the necessity for the Kholm bill. One was the proposal on October 15, 1909 by the former Minister of Internal Affairs, Stolypin, that the zemstvo and city administrative authorities be given a distinctive Russian character in the Western Land while being allowed a distinctive Polish character in the Kingdom of Poland. This reform was all within the ideals of the Russian Empire. The other proposal was that of the Octobrist faction which concerned zemstvos in the Kingdom of Poland. In both proposals the Polish language could be used in all the authoritative offices of either the zemstvos or the local self governments in the Kingdom of Poland. If Kholm were to be allowed to remain in the Kingdom of Poland, the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian)

¹³Ibid., 2601.

¹⁴Ibid., cols. 2601-05.

population there would be in danger of becoming Polonized. On the other hand it would not be wise to postpone the necessary zemstvo and local self-government reforms, said Chikhachev, implying that the Kholm bill had to be passed first. In this light, the Kholm bill should be considered as only a first step toward a series of reforms pleaded Chikhachev.¹⁵

He then listed a number of proposed reforms which the government should consider for the new Kholm province. In the list were reforms concerning education, servitude laws, land committees, land banks, zemstvos, local self-government, and other administrative reforms. But an interesting reform additional to this list concerned the nationality problem there. The suggested reform, with the approval of the Roman Catholic Curia, would have the government introduce the Russian language in the services of the Roman Catholic churches wherever the people were Russian (i.e. Ukrainian).¹⁶

By combining his personal political convictions along with his office of committee spokesman on the Kholm bill, Chikhachev tried not to allow that bill to deviate too far by means of Duma amendments from its intended purpose. Its purpose, like the purpose of his Nationalist faction, was to further the cause of the Russian nationality at the expense of the non-Russian citizens of the Empire. Although Chikhachev technically guided the Kholm bill through to its ultimate resolvment in the

¹⁵Ibid., col. 2606.

¹⁶Ibid., cols. 2606-07.

Duma, he was not the prime political advocator of that bill. That honor was given to the Bishop of Kholm, Bishop Evlogii. A study of the bishop's activities in the Duma with respect to the Kholm question is outlined below.

Bishop Evlogii's initial Kholm speech was very long. He carried it over two Duma meetings. His speech began with a clarification of the Tsar's opinion on the Kholm bill. The opposition had managed to confuse the Tsar's position on the Kholm bill by implying that the bill would violate the spirit of his Manifesto of October 17, 1905. Actually there was likely more to the question of the Tsar's opinion on the bill than the matter of the manifesto, although that was the only part of the question that reached the Duma records. Because the Kholm bill was a measure initiated by Stolypin, and because Stolypin just prior to his death was no longer in the Tsar's favor,¹⁷ the opposition likely capitalized on this off-the-record situation known to the deputies to put forth speculative rumors that the bill would no longer be ratified by Nicholas II. This was likely what prompted Evlogii's statement to the effect that the Tsar was indeed in favor of the Kholm bill. Evlogii said that the Tsar was in agreement in 1896 with Count Shuvalov, the Governor-General of Warsaw, who suggested that Kholm be made a separate province. Again in 1901 the Tsar agreed to a similar

¹⁷Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokovtsov, Out of My Past: The Memiors of Count Kokovtsov, H. H. Fisher, ed., Laura Matveev, tr., Stanford University Hoover War Library Publications No. 6 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1935), p. 271.

suggestion made by the Lublin Governor, Tkhorzhevskii. Once again, in 1907 he demonstrated his approval of the Kholm bill when it came up for a preliminary study. By demonstrating to the Duma that the Tsar was favorably inclined toward the Kholm proposals even before Stolypin was in office, Evlogii was able to clarify the Tsar's position on the bill and to cancel out the rumored speculations that tended to confuse the issue.¹⁸

Along with this same point in his speech, Evlogii did not allow the opportunity to pass whereby he could charge the Polish Kolo, the faction which led the opposition to the Kholm bill, with race discrimination. Because the Poles regarded the Kholm bill a violation of the freedoms granted in the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, Evlogii asked why that faction only the previous day had opposed a bill which would allow the Jews to participate in local self-government? Was this faction, he asked, going by two standards of freedoms?¹⁹ With their obvious implications, these questions allowed Evlogii to begin expanding upon the matter of Polonization in Kholm.

It is a fact, said Evlogii, that historical Kholm-Rus' is becoming Polonized. The sons of fathers who spoke only Russian are now speaking Polish. The process of Polonization that was initiated by the Polish Republic has continued even

¹⁸S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), col. 2651.

¹⁹Ibid., col. 2652.

though the Kingdom of Poland became a part of the Russian Empire. The nineteenth century accentuated this process which culminated in the tragedy of 1905 when so many thousand Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) became Roman Catholics. It was time for this process to be stopped, asserted Evlogii. The 470,000 Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) of Kholm must be saved. He asked, if the Duma would allow a whole nationality to disappear in the Russian Empire? He asked further, if for that matter it would be tolerable to see a Russian (i.e. East Slavic) nationality disappear?²⁰ Having raised these emotional questions, Evlogii swung into a long harangue against Polish atrocities committed throughout history against the people of Orthodox faith.

From the records of the former Polish Republic's Sejm, Evlogii read a speech by its deputy, Lavrentii Drevinskii. Concerning the situation in the Polish-ruled Western Land, Drevinskii spoke of Orthodox churches being closed, monasteries being forbidden to exist, cattle being sheltered in Orthodox churches, Orthodox priests being dispersed, children having to die unchristened, the dead being buried without funeral rites, the living not being allowed to make confessions, the Orthodox heroes being beheaded, others being arrested for smuggling the Orthodox priests into towns to conduct services secretly, some Orthodox faithful being burned at the stake, still others having their arms cut off because of their faith and in some cases even castrations being inflicted upon numbers of the faithful. From another Sejm record, Evlogii read a proposal

²⁰Ibid., col. 2653.

made in 1717 to annihilate the Russians (i.e. East Slavs) and to fill the vacated land with Poles. This attitude toward the Russians (i.e. East Slavs), said Evlogii, continued until the Western Land was liberated by Russia. But this latter fortune was not to befall Kholm.²¹

Kholm, continued Evlogii, fell to the Kingdom of Poland in 1815 due to the unfortunate remissness of Alexander I. Polonization continued in Kholm as a result. For example, Evlogii stated, in 1862 Count Velepolskii's twenty-eighth Ukaz united all elementary schools, both German and Uniat with the Roman Catholic schools and had them conduct classes in the Polish language except for religious instruction. According to Bishop Mikhail Kuzemskii, continued Evlogii, the efforts of the Roman Catholic clergy and the Polish petty gentry will influence the upper classes west of the Bug River to become Polish through the intermediary stages of mixing their religious rites with those of the Roman Catholics and then converting them to Roman Catholicism. In the first of these intermediary stages the Uniats proved their inclination toward Polonization when in 1863 they joined the Polish revolt against the Russian soldiers. Nominat Kaminskii, the Uniat Bishop in Kholm, blessed the partisans of the revolt in person. No wonder Russian Kholm was dying, surmised Evlogii.²²

²¹Ibid., cols. 2654-56.

²²Ibid., cols. 2656-58.

If there were some 400,000 Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) Uniats in Kholm in 1820, only 300,000 in 1837, only 240,000 in 1861 and only 227,375 in 1866, then, if the natural increase in population were to be considered, there have been some 600,000 Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) lost over a period of 45 years, conjectured Evlogii. It was only the reforms of Cherkasskii and Miliutin that arrested the Polonizing trend, stated Evlogii. But the Poles have not given up Kholm without a fight. We nearly lost this fight, said Evlogii, having survived with only 300,000 Orthodox Russians (i.e. East Slavs) there. Then came the catastrophe of 1905 when we lost some 170,000 Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) all at once. But the battle is not yet finished, vowed Evlogii. It will rage, he exclaimed, as it rages now, until Kholm becomes either Russian or Polish.²³

In addition to the religious factor there is a political factor which also contributes toward Polonizing Kholm, continued Evlogii. Dymsha and the former deputy, Dmovskii, have often spoken of the rights of the Kingdom of Poland. They speak of the Kingdom as if expecting it to become independent some day. Certainly there are those Polish nationalist fanatics who indeed hope that that will be the case. They were greatly encouraged in the revolution of 1905 when Poland nearly realized an autonomous position within the Russian Empire. Had autonomy been realized by the

Kingdom of Poland, the fanaticism displayed by the Poles in their present position would have increased many fold. There would remain no hope for survival in Kholm for the Orthodox or the Uniats there. The Russians (i.e. East Slavs) in Kholm are therefore most fearful that Polish independence or autonomy might indeed become a reality. In order to avoid future punishment from the Poles, in order not to lose their lands, and in order not to be forced to go to the Polish churches, many Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) in Kholm are sending their children to the secret Polish schools and do not resist the Polonizing pressures there, explained Evlogii. Let us remind the Poles, he emphasized, that their kingdom is a Russian kingdom and let us give the Kholm peasant an assurance, through the enactment of this bill, that we are behind him. Let us inform the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) peasant that his future is with a great Russia and not with an independent or an autonomous Poland. Let us give him the freedom to develop his culture in his native way and he will leave the Poles to their own ethnic borders, Evlogii assured the Duma.²⁴

The parties in opposition to the Kholm bill had made a point of objecting to the bill on the grounds that it would complicate the administrative procedures in the Empire. They endeavored to make political capital by naming some of

²⁴Ibid., cols. 2659-61.

the Tsar's administrators from earlier times as objectors to the establishment of Kholm as a province. One such objector was Field Marshall I. V. Gurko who objected to the idea when he was the Governor-General in Warsaw and the Commander of the Warsaw Military District in the years 1883-1894. But the reason why Gurko was opposed to the establishment of a separate Russian Kholm province, Evlogii explained, was that he conceived an entirely different plan for solving the nationality problem in the Kingdom of Poland.²⁵

When Evlogii read to the Duma that nationality plan for Poland, it was obvious why Gurko opposed the formation of a separate Kholm province. Gurko wanted large numbers of Russians to settle the cities of Lublin and Sedlets so that these Russians would take away from the Poles the dominant influence over the two provinces which were governed from those cities. Furthermore, Gurko would extend the Governor-Generalship of Warsaw even further east than the Bug River.. He would include in it both the Southwestern and the Northwestern Lands. With one great administrative unit such as this, Gurko hoped to give a Russian (i.e. East Slavic) majority to his proposed political entity. Similar political circumstances throughout this region could be controlled by the same orders and instructions emitted from the same administrative office, he said. Furthermore, he felt that the greater area in his proposed administrative unit would give additional strategic defence advantages to Russia because the entire area would be under a single military commander. In other words, Evlogii paraphrased Gurko's proposal, by denying a separate Polish entity such as the Kingdom of Poland, and by establishing a greater governor-generalship in Warsaw to include enough Russians (i.e. East Slavs) to give the region a Russian (i.e. East Slavic) majority, the Poles would lose their dominant position in their own settled area and perhaps would themselves become Russified. Certainly their Polonizing policies

²⁵Ibid., cols. 2663-66.

would become more difficult to perpetuate, Gurko believed.²⁶

Before concluding this part of his speech, Evlogii listed a number of administrators who supported the idea of a separate Kholm province. Among them were Governor-General Count Shuvalov, Vice Governor-General Gofmeister Petrov (both formerly in the Warsaw office) and Prince A. D. Obolenskii, a member of the State Council. Among those administrators named by the opposition parties who once were opposed to the idea of a separate Kholm province have since changed their minds after having travelled to Kholm to see the situation there first hand. In this category were Prince Imeritinskii and General Gurko, said Evlogii. They were both Governors-General in Warsaw. Even Skalon, today's Governor-General there, continued Evlogii, and today's Lublin Governor, Mankin, were once opposed to the idea. But they too have changed their minds after seeing what the situation was really like in Kholm. It must also be noted, explained Evlogii, that some of these men, who were not in favor of a separate Kholm province, were influenced by the writings of their civil servant (chinovnik), Iachevskii.²⁷

Nevertheless, the arguments used by those administrators who were opposed to the establishment of a separate Kholm province were the kind of arguments which stressed the difficulty of administering the area as an administrative entity. These arguments were not directed against the motives for having a

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Iachevskii was the Polish Roman Catholic Bishop in Lublin.

separate province established there, explained Evlogii. The people presenting those arguments had always suggested that the authorities simply support and uphold the Russian culture, churches, and schools in the area to keep the population Russian by nationality. But Count Witte suggested that plan also on April 26, 1902 when he was Minister of Finance. Then look what happened a few years later, exclaimed Evlogii. What was required to be done, suggested Evlogii, was to have the name "Kingdom of Poland" removed from the lands of Kholm, so that the population there, on their own accord, once again would favor Russian culture over the culture of the Poles. By becoming loyal Russian citizens, the people of Kholm would solve their own nationality problem, implied Evlogii.²⁸

He was aware of the charges made by the advocates of Slavic unity and brotherhood who said that the Kholm bill had the tendency of arousing the Poles and that it jeopardized therefore the possibility of such a union. But, Evlogii asked, why were the Poles becoming aroused if all that the Russians were asking by the Kholm bill was to live in their own political state?²⁹

Concerning the charge that by transferring Kholm into the community of Russian provinces, the Congress of Vienna treaty was being violated, Evlogii had two answers. To the Poles he

²⁸S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 31 (November 26, 1911), cols. 2675-78.

²⁹Ibid., cols. 2679-80.

said that it was they who violated the treaty by their revolts in 1831 and 1863. Furthermore, those who advocated Polish independence were the least qualified to complain about the 1815 treaty's violation, when by achieving their independence they would inevitably violate that treaty. Obviously the Poles objected to the Kholm bill, not because of any treaty violations but because the bill would deprive them of their influence over the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) people of Kholm, argued Evlogii. As for those other people who still believed that the Kholm bill would violate the treaty of Vienna, Evlogii assured them that that would not be the case because the treaty only defined the borders between the Russian Empire and the states of Prussia and Austria and had nothing to do with fixing the eastern border of the Kingdom of Poland.³⁰

The Polish campaign to prove that all was well and peaceful in Kholm was subjected to question next in Evlogii's speech. The Poles maintained that only a few unimportant antagonistic incidents had occurred in Kholm and that they were incited by the pro-Orthodox elements there. Evlogii denied this charge and pointed out that one of the specific cases mentioned was foundationless. It was alleged that the Orthodox priests of Krasnostav incited their followers to commit atrocities against the Poles. When the local Polish authorities punished those who broke the law, according to the charge, the priests then wired the Minister of Internal Affairs to have him protect

³⁰Ibid., col. 2680.

the Orthodox from Polish oppression. Evlogii called the charge an outright lie. In the first place, he said, the only telegram of that nature that the Minister received was one from the Belgorai district and not from Krasnostav. In the case of this telegram, he continued, the trouble began on the lands of Count Zamoiskii. Apparently this great landowner sold his forests, which were interspersed with peasant holdings, to an out-of-state Jewish firm. When the firm insisted on clearing the forest, the peasants were faced with losing their supply of trees which were necessary for their livelihood. These peasants turned to the local government to prevent the clearing but nothing was done until their priests were asked to send a telegram to the Minister of Internal Affairs.³¹

Evlogii then compared a number of items from the police file archives with the evidence of the opposition parties that there were good relations and brotherliness among the Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) and the Poles in Kholm. The primary evidence presented by the opposition parties was a letter to the Duma deputy, Dymsha, from Bishop Iachevskii, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lublin. The letter minimized any religious and national conflict in Kholm. It went on to say that there was no nationality problem in Kholm and that the Kholm bill was not only unjustified, it was a measure that would be harmful to a continued good relationship among the Poles and Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) living there. In answer to this evidence of peace and tranquility in Kholm, Evlogii began reading

³¹Ibid., cols. 2681-82.

quotations from documents coming from the police archives of the Lublin Circuit Court. Among the documents were pamphlets distributed by the Roman Catholic Poles to arouse anti-Orthodox feelings. These documents, Evlogii pointed out, were quite indicative of the nature of the things said by a number of civil disputants before the courts. All of the documents are taken from the files for the years 1905-06, asserted Evlogii. This was the period which Iachevskii claimed to be so tranquil. Among the quotations from the files presented by Evlogii, the following are typical examples: Archive No. 29753, "The Orthodox faith is a misleading religion. It is sold out for money. It stands for nothing. It is the worst of all faiths and it is falling like leaves off a tree." Archive No. 29636, "The Orthodox faith is worse than the Jewish faith. The Orthodox priest walks in the church behind the fence (zaborom) etc.,"-- "That is the ikonostas, you understand," interjected Evlogii in the middle of the quotation--"and prays that God punish the Orthodox." Archive No. 30998, "The Orthodox faith comes from the Devil, who entangled it with a rope and separated it from the Catholic faith."³²

Apart from reading more quotations of a similar nature, Evlogii then listed a number of atrocities committed by Roman Catholics against the Orthodox. These included a religious banner being torn in Kane in the Kholm district; some thirty graves torn up and monuments destroyed in Tomashov; a number

³²Ibid., cols. 2683-86.

of Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) chased out of Zamost'e; and numerous other incidents such as beatings, fights and stone throwing at houses.

Evlogii concluded that these were the reasons why in 1905-06 some 170,000 Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) became Roman Catholics.³³ He added that if the Kholm bill was not passed by the Duma, the Poles would become even more bold and aggressive against the Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) in Kholm. The Kholm question presented a cause of such magnitude that the Russian people should be ready to fight and to die if necessary, Evlogii emphasized. In view of the seriousness of the matter, Evlogii implored the Duma to pass the Kholm bill.³⁴

This was not the only time Bishop Evlogii made occasion to implore the Duma to pass the Kholm bill. He spoke twenty-one times in the Duma to advocate the bill. On most of these occasions, by his sheer outspoken attitude, he was able to arouse great concern in the Duma. Below is an account of one such typical occasion.

I. M. Nakonechny of the Polish Kolo faction had denied that the Poles were advocating Polish independence. His denial was part of his faction's policy to convince the Duma of Polish tranquility in Kholm as well as in the entire Kingdom of Poland. But Evlogii rose before the Duma, dangling

³³Ibid., cols. 2687-89.

³⁴Ibid., cols. 2689-92.

a medallion from a chain, and asked Nakonechny why the Poles minted medallions such as the one he had and why they had them circulated throughout the Kingdom of Poland including Kholm and even elsewhere throughout the Empire? Why had they done this in 1905, if they were not advocating independence for Poland? He read from the medallion: "Revolution in Poland. Welcome the battle for liberty. Glory to the bloody battle and its sacrifices in Poland and Lithuania, 1904-1905." On the other side of the medallion, Evlogii described its engraving to consist of an armed Polish fighter trampling a crushed two headed Russian eagle and containing the words: "Down with the Tsar." "So you see," continued Evlogii, "what the Poles were up to when our homeland was in a bloody war with Japan."³⁵

At this point in Evlogii's speech a voice from the Duma's leftist seats was heard to ask,³⁶ "Who minted that medallion? Was it Azef?"³⁷

Evlogii continued, "Does this," referring to the medallion, "not refute Nakonechny's denial and prove the truth

³⁵S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 36 (December 2, 1911), cols. 3174-75.

³⁶Ibid., col. 3176.

³⁷Evno Azef was an agent-provocateur of the Russian police who worked among the Socialist Revolutionaries. His eventual party trial in 1909 disclosed the nature of that police provocation. His trial became well known. Therefore when his name was mentioned in the Duma it was implied that the police minted the medallion as if it were the Poles. See Hans Von Eckardt, Russia, Catherine Alison Phillips, tr. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1933), p. 174.

of our word?"³⁸

"Or does it prove provocation?" questioned a voice from the leftist seats once again.³⁹

"Certainly the words are provocative!" came a reply from the rightist seats.⁴⁰

"But they were minted in Russia, in Moscow!" insisted someone from the left again before the chairman was able to bring the meeting to order to allow Evlogii to continue with his speech.⁴¹ Evlogii concluded his speech but not without further heckling, for he seldom spoke without arousing the Duma with his outspoken extremism.

While Bishop Evlogii was the Bishop of Kholm, and the Duma deputy who represented the Orthodox populace of the Lublin and Sedlets provinces, it is understandable why he would be the man who would be the prime advocator of the Kholm bill. But another Russian Nationalist leader who was not from Kholm took an active part in the Kholm bill debates also. He was Vladimir Alekseevich Bobrinskii from Tula province.

For party political reasons Bobrinskii was keenly interested in the Kholm bill. He accepted Bishop Evlogii's

³⁸S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 36 (December 2, 1911), col. 3176

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid.

invitation to go on a tour of Kholm and spent considerable time in the area in the Bishop's company. He visited parish after parish and studied the situation there first hand. When the Kholm bill was being studied by the Committee for Directing Legislative Bills, Bobrinskii served in its subcommittee for studying the historical aspects of the Kholm question. Perhaps Bobrinskii's interest in the bill was largely because of its nationalistic nature. Certainly it provided his faction considerable opportunity to make political capital out of a national issue, for the issue made it possible for his faction to expound its nationalistic theories in the Duma. Furthermore, he had confidence that the bill would be passed by the Duma, and a political victory in the Duma therefore would add gainful prestige to his faction and party throughout the country.

Bobrinskii's first Kholm speech in the Duma was little more than a continuation of Bishop Evlogii's major speech. Bobrinskii said it was shameful for him to admit the extent to which Kholm had become Polonized in the last 100 years of its history within the Russian Empire. The rate of Polonization in this period exceeded by many times the rate during the 300 years that Kholm was within the Polish Republic. For example, he pointed out that prior to 1815 birth certificates in Kholm were issued in the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) language but since that time they were being issued in Polish.⁴²

⁴²S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 31 (November 26, 1911), cols. 2729-30.

"When in 1839-40 the people of northwestern Rus',⁴³ and southern Kholm started a movement to return to the Orthodox faith," Bobrinskii continued his speech, but was interrupted by someone from the Duma floor who wittily appended to his sentence the words:

"By force!"⁴⁴

Yet Bobrinskii carried on with his original sentence by saying that, "the officialdom in Peterburg suppressed the movement with the philosophy 'How can a Russian [i.e. Ukrainian]⁷ commoner desire to have that which even a Polish noble does not desire?'" The Russians of Peterburg therefore did not allow the movement to expand beyond the four parishes which initiated the trend, asserted Bobrinskii. In other words, he said, the rule of the day was to give rights to the Polish landlords very much superior to the rights given the peasants. Unfortunately that attitude exists even today, commented Bobrinskii.⁴⁵

That is why Dymsha charges, explained Bobrinskii, that the reason some peasants in Kholm want to join Rus' is because by such an event they hope to get the lands presently held by the Poles. Such things were said during the reigns of Catherine II and Elizabeth. They were said again by the Belo-

⁴³This reference is not to the entire lands of historical Rus' but to the Rus' palatinate specifically, which coincided roughly with what later became known as eastern Galicia and southern Kholm. See map infra, p. 285.

⁴⁴S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 31 (November 26, 1911), col. 2731.

⁴⁵Ibid., cols. 2731-32.

russian Bishop Georgii Konisskii. In those days the commoner could not become Orthodox without the permission of his lord. Today, once again, emphasized Bobrinskii, it is said that the problem in fact is an agrarian problem. But whenever the peasants were asked (Bobrinskii here referred to his visit to Kholm.) if it was the lord's lands that they desired, they denied this saying that they realized that everyone was subject to the same state laws and that they were not deceived with expectations of any such subsidies.⁴⁶

At this point in Bobrinskii's speech considerable laughter resounded from the Duma's leftist seats. Rising above the noise was the voice of the Social-Democrat deputy, E. P. Gegechkori, who said, "They will ask for land from you too Bobrinskii. Just you wait!"⁴⁷

Bobrinskii continued his speech by outlining the nature of the Polish position in the Kingdom of Poland and in Kholm. He denied that the Russians were trying to Russify the Poles by means of the Kholm bill. He admitted that certain administrators had applied Russifying policies in the past. But it was not in the course of history, he said, for the Russians to try to Russify the Poles in the Kingdom of Poland. It was only the Poles among the Slavic peoples who desired to assimilate other nationalities. The Russians were not guilty of that sin, Bobrinskii assured the Duma. Certainly the Russians

⁴⁶Ibid., cols. 2732-33.

⁴⁷Ibid., col. 2733.

do not have the power in Poland that is credited to them. Power in Poland lies in the positions of the district officials or the officials of the local militia. It is these officers who run the office of the Governor-General and who have the power to appoint personnel. They are the ones, who have placed certain officials into the Russian (i.e. East Slavic) areas within the Kingdom of Poland, who in turn have discredited the local Russian (i.e. East Slavic) governments. Among these Polish officers in power in the Kingdom of Poland, Bobrinskii gestured to the Polish deputies, is your friend, Bishop M. E. Iachevskii.⁴⁸

There is no doubt, continued Bobrinskii, that the Roman Catholic clergy and the Jesuits in particular are the most militant forces behind the Polonizing policies. The Roman Catholic priests are known to play their gramophones to their new Russian (East Slavic) converts in order to teach them Polish songs. They forbid these converts to sing their own traditional Russian (East Slavic) songs. Their Polonizing policies today are no different from what they were in the past. According to the eighteenth-century Galician Uniat Bishop, Athanasiia Sheptitskii, the Uniats could not exist if it were not for the Orthodox Church. This is what that Bishop told the Orthodox Bishop Gregory Kupnitskii, asserted Bobrinskii. The Uniats found themselves in that situation because of the pressures applied against them by the Roman Catholics. Sheptitskii admitted that the Roman

⁴⁸Ibid., cols. 2734-36.

Catholics were calling the Uniats, as well as the Orthodox, schismatics. On the other hand, said Bobrinskii, the Orthodox Bishop, Mikhail Kuzinskii, did not regard the Uniats as religious enemies even though they were a part of the Latin Roman Catholic Church. The enemies were strictly the Roman Catholic Poles because of their intense nationalistic zeal.⁴⁹

This was still the case today assured Bobrinskii. We see how the Roman Catholic gentry apply pressure on their Russian (i.e. East Slavic) servants. An example of this, said Bobrinskii, was seen while he was staying in a priest's home overnight during his tour of Kholm. On that night a man came nine versts to make an offering and a confession. He came secretly to the Orthodox priest because he had registered himself and his family as Roman Catholics in order that he may stay employed by a Roman Catholic landlord so that his wife and family could eat.⁵⁰

Bribery was another way of gaining converts, said Bobrinskii. On the lands of Count Zamoiskii the forests brought an income of 60,000 rubles annually from a market population which was half Roman Catholic and half Orthodox. Normally one would expect each half of the population to contribute 30,000 rubles, but it is no secret, assured Bobrinskii, that the Roman Catholics do not pay anything for their requirements of wood, while the Orthodox raise the entire 60,000 rubles. Then, ironically, a considerable portion of that sum goes toward

⁴⁹Ibid., col. 2737.

⁵⁰Ibid., col. 2741.

financing the Roman Catholic churches, surmised Bobrinskii.⁵¹

Nowhere else in the Russian Empire does a landlord abuse his servants like that for religious or nationality reasons, asserted Bobrinskii.⁵²

But A. A. Bulat, a Lithuanian and a deputy of the Toilers faction was quick to interject, "What about in Lithuania?"⁵³

Before Bobrinskii concluded his first Duma speech he read a number of vulgar phrases from the same Circuit Court Archives that Bishop Evlogii began reading a few days earlier. The reason that Bishop Evlogii did not read these, said Bobrinskii, was because they were too vulgar and too unbecoming to be quoted by a bishop. Yet he personally felt that the Duma should know the kind of things the Roman Catholics were saying about the Orthodox. Among the least vulgar of these sayings was the following from document No. 29742: "The Orthodox come to Communion like hogs to their pens."⁵⁴ For most of the other

⁵¹Ibid., cols. 2744-45.

⁵²Ibid., col. 2742.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴The implication of this statement might have been twofold. By "hogs" the saying might have referred to the peasants who composed the majority of the Orthodox members, since the landlord class was Catholic for the most part. From the nature of the peasants' dress, unlike the proper attire of their landlords, it could be implied that they were unrefined and perhaps unmannerly and therefore "hogs." However, the other likely implication by "hogs" was in reference to the Orthodox way of taking Communion. While the Catholics took Communion kneeling down, the Orthodox walked up to their priest and took Communion standing up. The Orthodox stood for their Communion because they believed that once they had confessed and had their sins forgiven, their souls were purified and therefore they did not have to humble themselves further to

documents that even Bobrinskii did not quote in their entirety because he said he was too embarrassed, he only recited the sayings, until the portion of each that he personally did not quote was obviously concluded by implication from rhyme or suggestion. The chairman of the Duma brought Bobrinskii to order and asked him not to read any more of those documents.⁵⁵

Bobrinskii concluded his first speech by presenting a few ideological concepts of his Russian Nationalist faction. He ridiculed the custom of the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) peasants in Kholm of kissing the hands of their lord upon greeting or taking leave of him. It is necessary, he said, to educate these peasants better and have them subjected to more of the great culture of the Russian people. We must unite them to Rus' not to Russia⁵⁶ because already they were in Russia, he said.⁵⁷ These people are not asking for foreign things.

receive the Holy Eucharist. On the other hand, the Catholics regarded such convictions to be too egoistic considering the nature of man and therefore the implication of walking "like hogs to their pens," for Communion.

⁵⁵S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 31 (November 26, 1911), cols. 2743-44.

⁵⁶The distinction between Rus' and Russia in this play of words by Bobrinskii was as follows: Rus' was the historic name for the original East Slavic state. Russia (Rossia) was the term currently used for the entire Russian Empire. While Rus' supposedly was a national state, Russia was a multi-national empire. Because Kholm was a part of the Kingdom of Poland which was within the imperial framework of the existing Russian state it was not necessary to reunite the province with that state but only necessary to reunite it with its ancestral national entity.

⁵⁷S. C., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 31 (November 26, 1911), col. 2745.

They are only asking for what is their own. The Russians (i.e. East Slavs) have always felt this way, continued Bobrinskii. He fortified this statement with a quotation by the nobleman Drevinskii, who represented the Orthodox of Lithuania and Poland in the Polish Sejm in 1623: "The Russian (i.e. East Slavic) people do not ask for foreign things but only for the things that are their very own."⁵⁸

With the above quotation, Bobrinskii was able to make the desires of the people of Kholm seem synonymous with one of the advocated ideologies of the Russian Nationalist faction. For this ideology, Bobrinskii quoted the Czech Nationalist, Kramář: "For us, nationalism does not mean to hate or to subjugate someone else and not let him live. For us, nationalism stands for a love of one's own nationality above all else, to sacrifice everything in order to strengthen that nationality and to have it achieve greatness, to protect every inch of our grandfathers' land and every member of our nationality's family."⁵⁹ To Bobrinskii, the Kramar quotation seemed to be most appropriate to express the Russian Nationalist faction's attitude toward the Kholm question.

In his second major speech in the Duma concerning Kholm, Bobrinskii expounded further on his faction's interpretation of nationalism. He defined nationalism and chauvinism, then endeavored to show that it was the Poles who were chauvinistic. To do that, he set out to read an article from a Polish

⁵⁸Ibid., col. 2746.

⁵⁹Ibid.

newspaper. It read:⁶⁰

On this Polish soil, from the Oder ("That is what it says, 'the Oder,'" interjected Bobrinskii.) to the Dnieper, from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains and the Black Sea, there is room for no one else save us. Either we or they--but certainly we must be victorious. We shall remind the Germans and Moscovites about Grunewald and Kliushin.⁶¹ Our children will see in the new era, the moment when the famous Moscovite tsars will be led in chains into Warsaw. They will see the Prussian kings falling prostrate before the greatness of the Polish Republic.

Dymsha interrupted Bobrinskii with, "Who wrote that? Obviously that is nonsense."⁶²

"Who wrote that? That nonsense? It is more than nonsense! No, gentlemen," answered Bobrinskii, "It was written not by a provocateur but in a publication of the Polish National Democratic Party; that party of which some deputies from the State Duma are members. The quotation is found in the first issue for the year 1901 of the newspaper 'Poliak' published in Lvov during the period when the head of the National Democratic Party, Dmovskii, was working there. Gentlemen, that party is the same one that is found in Galicia, as it is found in the Kingdom of Poland, and also in Posen. Every year they meet underground for their conventions. If that is provocation . . . then you will find the provocateur . . . to be whoever was the editor of

⁶⁰S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 46 (January 16, 1912), cols. 344-47.

⁶¹Grunewald and Kliushin were battles in which the Poles were victorious against the Teutonic Order of Knights and the Russians respectively in 1410 and 1610.

⁶²S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 46 (January 16, 1912), col. 347.

that newspaper."⁶³

Bobrinskii carried his argument further with another quotation. This time he quoted a fragment of a speech which read as follows: "When the Black Hundreds' State Duma legislates the Kholm bill with thieverish haste /vorovskoi pospeshnost'iu/" This was the opening fragment of a speech made in the Russian principedom city of Lvov by the chairman of a meeting which was called to protest the apportionment of Kholm from Poland, explained Bobrinskii. This protest ended in the destruction of the Russian two headed eagle on the Russian consulate. "So you see," continued Bobrinskii, "while we have been legislating this bill for two and a half years now, and today there are some 107 deputies registered to speak, even though the Duma is good and tired of having the bill discussed further, still it is said that we are legislating the bill with 'thieverish haste.'"⁶⁴

One of the matters in the Kholm question that took so long to discuss was its history, continued Bobrinskii. In the subcommittee studying the history of Kholm there were found certain deputies who signed their names to a statement that Kholm was a Polish possession by right of conquest. Indeed, if that was so, argued Bobrinskii, then it must be remembered that Kholm was reconquered. If only the historical Polish conquests are considered to decide the question of national possessions

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid., col. 348.

then the Poles can claim not only Kholm but Kiev, Poltava, Chernigov and even Novgorod. But these lands, like Kholm are ours, not Polish. They are ours, assured Bobrinskii, not by right of reconquest but because "they always were, are now, and God grant it, always will be Russian [i.e. East Slavic], by virtue of their settlement, by virtue of their original inrooted settlement as opposed to the claims of the later incoming transient [Polish] settlers."⁶⁵

A long discourse on a number of historical questions were dealt with at considerable length by Bobrinskii in his second major speech on the Kholm bill. But extremely interesting was his criticism of Dymsha's book, Kholmskii Vopros (The Kholm Question), for its erroneous statements concerning the ethnography of Kholm. Bobrinskii objected to the following words by Dymsha: "It is impossible to create there [in Kholm] through coercive means a Russian land where in reality there is only a mixture of Poles and Russniaks [Rusinov]."⁶⁶ What Bobrinskii objected to most vehemently was what seemed to him to be an evasive answer by Dymsha to the question of which nationality in Kholm was in the majority, Russian (i.e. East Slavic or "Great Russian" according to interpretation) or Polish? How could the Poles imply that there were no

⁶⁵Ibid., cols. 349-50.

⁶⁶Ibid., col. 354. The term "Russniaks" in English is equivalent to the Polish word "Rusiny" which was one of the many names given the Ukrainians to distinguish them from the Russians who were called "Rosyianiny" in Polish.

Russians (i.e. "Great Russians" according to Dymsha and "East Slavs" according to Bobrinskii) in Kholm because there were only Russniaks there and for that reason it was considered impossible to make Kholm a Russian land? Bobrinskii stated that when it came to considering the Great Poles, the Little Poles, the Mazurs and the Kashubs;⁶⁷ to the Poles these peoples were all nonetheless Polish. Yet when it came to considering the Russian tribes, then the Poles applied a different kind of yardstick for measurement of what constitutes a nationality.⁶⁸

From history Bobrinskii brought forth other examples of how the Poles used this particular double-edged yardstick for national measurement. From an earlier period of history the Poles used to say that the Pole and the Russniak were both children of a single Poland. In 1848 and 1863, in the years of uprisings, the Poles put forth the slogan, "For our and your liberty."⁶⁹ But the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) knew from experience what kind of liberty that would be for them and therefore they did not allow themselves to be tricked by the Poles. So the Poles then made a revengeful change in policy, said Bobrinskii. They decided that if they could not

⁶⁷The Great Poles, the Little Poles, the Mazurs and the Kashubs were terms used to distinguish the Poles by their regional differences.

⁶⁸S. O., 3D., 53., Pt. 2, M. 46 (January 16, 1912), col. 354.

⁶⁹Ibid.

have liberty for themselves, then they would see to it that the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) would not have liberty either. The Poles therefore began supporting the Mazeppist movement.⁷⁰ For that reason, today they are attempting to deny the Southern Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) their Russian (i.e. East Slavic) name. Upon the basis of this denial we lose our majority in Kholm, cynically explained Bobrinskii.⁷¹

He gave one more example of this kind of political explanation of national questions by the Poles from a more recent debate in the Austrian Reichstag. In a session of that legislative assembly, its deputy Kramař, laid charges against the Poles of Galicia for persecuting the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) population there. In his charges he mentioned the persecution of the Orthodox faithful. The Poles, according to Kramař, were keeping the Orthodox people tied down like wild beasts, not allowing them to have priests among their numbers and not allowing these Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) to pray in their own way. Kramař further told the Poles, according to Bobrinskii, that their actions were not at all civilized. But what, Bobrinskii inquired, did the chairman of the Austrian Polish Kolo, Belinskii, reply to this? Belsinskii said: "The member of the Reichstag, Kramař, charges us with persecuting the Russians [meaning Moscovite Russians]. No, gentlemen! There are no

⁷⁰The Mazeppist movement was the name given the Ukrainian independence movement after the Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazeppa seceded Ukraine from Russia in 1709 and became an ally of Charles XII of Sweden in a war against Peter the Great. The war culminated in defeat for Charles and Mazeppa at the Battle of Poltava, July 8, 1709. Mazeppa has since been regarded a traitor by the Russian nationalists. Simultaneously of course, the Ukrainian independence movement is considered treasonous and has been dubbed "Mazeppist." For an account of Mazeppa see Clarence A. Manning, Hetman of Ukraine: Ivan Mazeppa (New York: Bookman Associates, Publishers, 1957), ad finem.

⁷¹S. C., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 46 (January 16, 1912), cols. 354-55.

Russians in Galicia. For that reason it is impossible for us to persecute them and therefore all the charges laid by Kramař are foundationless, without subjects."⁷²

"So you see," Bobrinskii emphasized, "how straightforward and easy it was for the Poles to deny the charges. There are no Russians in Galicia and there are no Russians in Kholm either. So how do you reason with the Poles? The Poles call the people in question, 'Russniaks.' But what are they? Have they no brothers, no families, nor tribes? Can you twist them until they can be used as ethnic material for Jesuit religious purposes? Gentlemen, I am not going to refute those painful questions concerning the split among the Russian [i.e. East Slavic] peoples. I know that our Little Russians [i.e. Ukrainians] feel contempt and aversion toward that matter and it is not for me to dwell on it here, but there might be a number of you unfamiliar with that question who are wondering about the meaning of the word 'Russniak' in relation to the word 'Russian.' Gentlemen, it is not only in Galicia or in Kholm but also in the Archangle and Olonets provinces--and there the people are unquestionably Great Russians--that the people call themselves 'Russniaks' now and again."⁷³

Bobrinskii then went into a questionable etymological explanation of the word "Russniak" and concluded that a "Russniak" was a "Russian" and therefore "by neither bayonets nor persecutions can you eliminate the Russian name for the Western Russian [i.e. Ukrainian] people, regardless of whether they live within the Russian state or are annexed by whatever other states."⁷⁴ This emotion stirring conclusion to Bobrinskii's speech only reflected the degree of his Russian nationalistic convictions.

⁷² Ibid., col. 355.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., cols. 355-56.

Inferences

There were ten deputies from the Russian Nationalist faction who spoke on the Kholm question, yet it was Chikhachev, Evlogii and Bobrinskii who set the tone for the faction's attitude. That attitude, like their party platform was permeated with bias in order to further their cause of developing a single super-Russian nationality. As a result, their policy with respect to the Ukrainian nationality and the use of such terms as "Russniak" or "Little Russian" in reference to that nationality was as evasive as were the particular Polish political policies which Bobrinskii surely exposed.

Nevertheless the Russian Nationalists gave a good account of the nature of the national and religious strife that was a cause for concern in Kholm. Even Chikhachev, Evlogii and Bobrinskii were so biased on the Kholm question that they failed to realize how petty most of the issues in this strife were. Their own fallacious attitude toward those matters as prominent public men was indicative of how even the least of these issues could cause grave repercussions to the stability of the Empire. National prejudices therefore were found to exist in the Empire throughout the range of its citizens. From the peasants of Kholm to the politicians in the Duma there were people who were extremely passionate over matters of nationality. Nationalistic measures and provocations of violence were rampant as a result. Until this situation could be changed, the Russian Empire would be badgered with its inherent nationality problem.

CHAPTER 6

THE RIGHTIST FACTION

Ideology

The political ideology of the Duma's Rightist faction was largely dependent upon the convictions of the semi-secret reactionary organization known as the Union of Russian People. The Union did not officially contest the elections to the Duma. Its political platform was opposed to having a popularly elected assembly in Russia with the right to legislate laws. Nevertheless the Union had a large number of its members and followers in the Duma who considered it their duty to make that assembly loyal to the Tsar and favorable to the concept of autocratic monarchical government.¹ The deputies with these convictions formed the Rightist faction in the Duma.²

¹The members of the Union of Russian People who also became members of the Duma agreed not to register themselves as members of the Union. However an exception was found when a misinformed deputy from Vilna, Father A. S. Veraksin, registered himself as a Rightist and a member of the Union of Russian People when he first entered the Third Duma for the First Session. Upon being informed better by his colleagues he registered himself as a Rightist only for the next and subsequent sessions of the Third Duma. See "Lichnyi Alfavitnyi Ukazatel'" in Russia, Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Tretii Sozyv, Ukazatel' k Stenograficheskim Otchetam (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1908-1911); Sessia I, pp. 87-88; Sessia II, p. 76; Sessia III, p. 83; and Sessia IV, p. 82.

²See "Ustav Obschestva pod nazvaniem 'Soiuz Russkogo Naroda'" as registered by the city registrar of societies and unions in St. Petersburg on August 7, 1906 according to A. Chernovskii, Soiuz Russkogo Naroda (Moskva i Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1929), p. 412.

The political ideology of the Rightist deputies relative to the nationality question in the Russian Empire can be equated therefore with the ideological points on that matter found in the statutes of the Union of Russian People. The following excerpts from those statutes are important for an understanding of the Rightists' opinions on the question of nationality:³

The Union of Russian People decrees for itself the steadfast aim to develop a Russian national consciousness and a durable union of Russian people among every class and status for the purpose of promoting a comprehensive program which would be beneficial to our dear fatherland--the one and indivisible Russia. . . .

The Union finds no distinctions among the Great Russians, the Belorussians and the Little Russians.

. . . All the institutions of the Russian state should unite themselves in an effort to promote a firm trend toward steadfast support of Russia's greatness and to uphold the preferential rights of the Russian nationality. But on the basis of strict adherence to the principles of the law, let the numerous aliens living in our fatherland regard it their honor and fortune to belong to the entity of the Russian Empire and may they not burden us with their dependence upon us.

. . . The Russian language is to be the language utilized in the Russian Empire for all her component peoples.

The nationality policy outlined above created a dilemma for the Rightists when they were faced in the Duma with the Kholm bill. In the first place the bill was introduced by the Emperor's loyal government, yet one of the bill's fundamental motives involved the recognition of a separate Polish entity within the Empire from which Kholm was to be apportioned. The

³Ibid., pp. 411-12.

Rightists did not want to oppose the government lest they would violate the underlying principle of their faction's political existence. Nor did they wish to recognize a separate Polish entity for this would undermine their concept of an indivisible Russia. They resolved this dilemma by supporting the bill in the Duma strictly as a reform in the domestic administrative organization of the Empire. At the same time they openly criticized any implied or stated annotations in the bill or in the Duma speeches referring to the bill as a concession or intended concession to the national rights and privileges of the Poles or of any other non-Russian nationality. In accordance with this attitude, the Rightists insisted that the Kholm bill give to the Russians preferential treatment in the province to the detriment of whatever nationality might have inhabited any particular locality.⁴ Their contempt for the non-Russians or the so-called aliens and for the Ukrainians who disputed their insistence that there were no distinctions between Russians and Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians), only demonstrated the extent of their reactionary attitude. This attitude was easily seen in the speeches made by their deputies in the Duma.

Discourse

One Rightist having a particular contempt for the Jews was Georgii Alekseevich Shechkov. This attitude was

⁴Supra, p. 32. See also Kholmskaia Guberniia, 1914 g. (Kholm City: Tip. Kholmsk. Gub. Pravl., 1914), p. 49.

present throughout Shechkov's Kholm speech on January 13, 1912. It was he who tried to discredit those opposing the Kholm bill by associating them as agents of a Jewish conspiracy against Christendom and the Russian state. Although Shechkov was a landowner of gentry status, a judge and a zemstvo worker from distant Kursk province, he was aware that there was a large Jewish population in Kholm and that these Jews could not be disregarded in any thorough consideration of the Kholm question.⁵ Nevertheless as a Rightist, Shechkov did not want the Jews to have a voice in deciding the Kholm question in spite of their numbers within the proposed province. He was therefore very much opposed to those parties either for or against the bill who attempted to win the Jews to support their own stand on

⁵The government population statistics breakdown for the area proposed to form Kholm province was as follows: Russians, 463,901 (This figure included without a breakdown the Ukrainian population in Kholm plus the small number of Russian administrative officers resident there.); Poles, 268,053; Orthodox, 327,322; Catholics, 404,633; other nationalities and religions, 29,123; Jews, 135,238. Even if these statistics were not entirely accurate, they were not so biased as not to reflect that there were enough Jews in Kholm that any free plebiscite conducted there might have been determined by the Jewish vote as to whether or not the proposed province should or should not join the entity of the central provinces of Russia. This conclusion is drawn on the assumption that the Poles and a considerable number of the so-called Catholic Russians would vote against the union, while the majority of the Orthodox people of Kholm would vote for it. Of course there is no way of knowing how extensively the Orthodox population indeed would vote for the proposed union but Evlogii and others had implied that most of them were in favor of that proposal. For the above statistics see Prilozheniia k Stenograficheskim Otchetam Gosudarstvennoi Dumi; Tretii Sozyv, Sessia Chetvertaia, 1910-1911 gg. (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1911), Vol. V, Bill no. 440, p. 193. Hereinafter this source will be cited as Bill 440.

the question at issue.⁶

In particular Shechkov criticized those who favored allowing the Jews to have the right to buy, mortgage and rent real property in Kholm after the province would become a part of central Russia. There was a law in effect in the Western Land and particularly in those provinces under the Governor-Generalship of Kiev that did not allow Jews to buy, mortgage and rent property outside of their Pale as allotted within the various towns and cities. Because this law was not enforced in the Kingdom of Poland, nor therefore in the area about to become Kholm province, it was decided by some of the movers of the Kholm bill that this restrictive law not be applied to the newly proposed province even though that province might be placed under the Governor-Generalship of Kiev. By this special consideration of the landowning Jews in Kholm⁷ it was hoped to prevent any possible movement among the Jews in

⁶S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 45 (January 13, 1912), cols. 255-66.

⁷Of the landed estates (not including the peasant and municipal holdings) the areas in desiatines (2.7 acres) held by the nationality of their owners was as follows: Russian (i.e. East Slavic), 28,561½; Polish, 102,991; German, 2,967; Jewish, 18,038½ in the parts of Sedlets province about to become part of Kholm province. In the parts of Lublin province proposed for incorporation within Kholm province, the areas were as follows: Russian (i.e. East Slavic), 50,410; Polish, 231,871½; German, 9,232; Jewish, 4,872½. Therefore while the Jews owned nowhere near the amount of land that the Poles did in Kholm, they did own enough land to create a serious problem should their holdings become confiscated by the government. For the above statistics see the charts in Bill 440 on p. 193 et seqq.

opposition to the Kholm bill. But Shechkov would not compromise his faction's convictions of the inferior position of the non-Russians with a concession to the Jews even if the concession was designed to maneuver the Jews into supporting the Kholm proposal.⁸

Shechkov argued that any concessions to the Jews or any alliance with them was immoral and politically unsound in the long run. He pointed out that even the Poles have found their alliance with the Jews to be fruitless. For their 1861 insurrection the Poles allied themselves with the Jews in hope that they would increase their rebellious numbers against the Russians but today they regret that alliance. Had they been successful then, there would not be any declarations today from this Duma tribune by the Polish Kolo. Yet, what are the Russians doing today? They are making the same mistake, Shechkov answered his own question. The Russians believe that in an alliance with the Jews they will be able to counteract Polish influence more easily. They say that the Jews are no threat to the Russian nationality because the Jews do not concern themselves with religious matters. It is argued, continued Shechkov, that whenever a Polish landlord acquires an Orthodox person into his sphere of economic control, he immediately puts pressures on him to change his religion to Roman Catholicism. The Jewish landlord on the other hand, it

⁸S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 45 (January 13, 1912), col. 257.

is said, does not concern himself with the religions of those dependent upon him for their livelihood. But this thinking is all wrong, charged Shechkov. Whenever the Jew observes religious strife between the Orthodox and the Catholics he invariably tells both sides that it is not the religious beliefs of either side that count in the struggle but that it is only money--the kind of money he has in his coat pocket--that really counts in the matter. In this way he is insemminating religious indifference among the populace, charged Shechkov, and getting the people to worship a golden calf. Now, Shechkov questioned the Duma, does this not concern religious matters? Why is it that there are so many law suits over matters such as distributing pornographic materials among the people, practicing a white-slave trade, and disillusioning the populace with various intermediary devices? Can you see now how the Jews concern themselves with all kinds of matters that are able to undo our state both morally and physically? For these reasons, said Shechkov, we should not allow the Jews the right to buy lands freely in the proposed province of Kholm. This freedom for the Jews has been prevalent in Poland ever since Kazimir the Great but it has never existed in our country. Let us not introduce the matter for the first time in the future province of Kholm, pleaded Shechkov.⁹

Since Shechkov was a judge he offered a suggestion regarding the courts in Kholm. He felt that in a locality

⁹Ibid., cols. 257-58.

where two competing religions existed side by side as in Kholm the courts should be segregated. He pointed out that at one time the Parliament of England used to study matters of significance to one or another religion by dividing its members into groups of men of the same religion so that these groups could resolve separately those questions which pertained to their own religion. The resolutions so made were just as binding as if they were made by Parliament as a whole. Otherwise, if a majority of members of a certain religion could outvote those members of the religion whose matter was being resolved, the resolution by a simple majority vote in Parliament might have been resolved in a prejudiced manner. Similarly Shechkov thought that the Catholics should have their own courts in Kholm while the Orthodox should have their own. If the Catholics were to judge the Orthodox or vice-versa there might be undue punishment in a number of cases, said Shechkov.¹⁰

Another criticism of the Kholm bill that Shechkov gave concerned the province's proposed boundary. Because his faction defined nationality almost synonymously with citizenship, he spoke on the Rightists' behalf when he said that the Kholm bill should not be considered to be a question of nationality. The committee which studied the matter of the boundary for Kholm made a serious error in its approach to the problem, asserted Shechkov. Rather than considering what constituted the

¹⁰Ibid., col. 258.

historical border of Rus' and of Poland, or rather than considering the ethnographic demarcation line between the Poles and the Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) or between the Catholics and the Orthodox, the committee should have merely considered the question of where the most practical boundary for administrative purposes could be located. After all, setting up Kholm province was a domestic administrative problem, emphasized Shechkov. The question of Polish nationality should not even enter the picture because there was no longer a Polish nationality. In Kholm the people do not distinguish among themselves as to whether they are Polish or Russian, but whether they are Catholic or Orthodox. According to the philosopher, Schelling, said Shechkov, the people are what they believe in.¹¹ If a Pole prefers not to be a subject of Prussia, having observed the plight of the Polabians, the Lusatians and the Poznanians within that state,¹² and prefers to be a subject of Russia, then he is Russian by nationality. He would be Polish only if there was established a Polish state once again. For these reasons, said Shechkov, the committee was in error when it drew the boundary for Kholm on the basis of combining those regions having a majority of Orthodox faithful and those regions where the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) language was spoken predominantly regardless of the religious beliefs of the people. By using this criteria the committee was recognizing the Poles as a separate nationality with a territory beyond the Kholm boundary even though some 70,000 Orthodox Russians (i.e. Ukrainians)

¹¹

Ibid., cols. 259-61.

¹²The Polabians, Lusatians and Poznanians were Slavic subjects of Prussia. The Posnanians were Polish while the ancestors of the Polabians and Lusatians respectively were the masters of the Sorb and Wiltze nations in the ninth-century. Collectively they were known as the Wends. With the advance of Germanic political control into the lands east of the River Elbe, these Western Slavic peoples along with the Pomeranians (po moriany i.e. those living next to the sea) were gradually Germanized until at the time of the Russian Duma there was only a small minority of them who had not yet become assimilated into the German nationality.

still remained in enclaves west of that boundary within the provinces of the former Kingdom of Poland. The committee was therefore creating a fictitious Polish nationality stressed Shechkov. It was dividing Russia into fictitious national entities and creating a nationality problem that was non-existent and certainly not desirable for preserving the unity of the Russian state. It was a serious mistake for the committee to make by not considering the Kholm bill strictly as the internal administrative problem that it was, said Shechkov.¹³

From Shechkov's speech above it is obvious that the Rightists did not recognize the Kingdom of Poland as an existing political entity. They claimed that the area was reconquered by the Russians twice since the Kingdom was established in 1815. In carrying this argument further, Shechkov made a speech on February 10, 1912 in support of his faction's amendment to the Kholm bill which would eliminate any mention of the Kingdom of Poland in its title. He said that a bill giving this name to the area in question could not be properly codified in the state's volumes of laws because page one, volume two of Uchrezhdeniia Gubernii (The Establishment of Provinces) referred to this area simply as the provinces of "Varshava, Kalish, Petrokov, Radom, Kelets, Lublin, Sedlets, Plotsk, Lomzhin and Suvalki."¹⁴

¹³S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 45 (January 13, 1912), cols. 261-62.

¹⁴S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 65 (February 10, 1912), cols. 1988-94. Also see M. 66 (February 13, 1912), cols. 2005-09.

It was Fedor Fedotovitch Timoshkin however who made the amendment to eliminate the questionable words, Kingdom of Poland, from the title of the proposed Kholm bill. Timoshkin, who represented the Russian settlers in the Caucasus, devoted an entire speech on January 18, 1912 to expound his faction's convictions that no Kingdom of Poland existed legally in Russia following the conquest of revolutionary Poland in 1863. He verified his stand by the authority of a text written on the state laws of Russia by Professor Alekseev of the University of Moscow. He quoted directly from the section in the book which dealt with the particular legal relations of Finland and Poland to Russia.¹⁵ Because his amendment was accepted by the Duma, the ultimate wording of the Kholm bill called for an apportionment of the "eastern sections of the Sedlets and Lublin provinces" rather than for an apportionment of the eastern portions of the Kingdom of Poland as was the case when the bill first came before the assembly.¹⁶

But neither Shechkov nor Timoshkin among the Rightists were as ambitious on the matter of boundaries for Kholm as was their colleague, Sergei Valerianovich Voeikov from Tambov province. In two of his Duma speeches, Voeikov suggested that the Lublin and Sedlets provinces in their entirety be removed

¹⁵S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 48 (January 18, 1912), cols. 504-09.

¹⁶Supra, pp. 8 and 29. Also cf. S. O., 3D., 2S., Pt. 4, M. 114 (May 19, 1909), cols. 1441-42 with Kholmskaia Guberniia, 1914 g. (Kholm City: Tip. Kholmsk. Gub. Pravl., 1914), p. 43.

from the Governor-Generalship of Warsaw and be given those laws intended for the proposed province of Kholm. This, he suggested, was the solution to the problem of halting any further conversion of the Orthodox people there to Catholicism.¹⁷

It would seem from Voeikov's stand that the Kholm bill was not extensive enough to satisfy the Rightists. But even the Kholm bill in its narrow limits was considered diluted relative to its original purpose. This attitude was taken by Shechkov in some of his later speeches. He wanted the original government bill passed with only minor amendments, such as removing any mention of the Kingdom of Poland from its title. In line with this policy, Shechkov opposed all the amendments that seemed to compromise the government's original version of the bill with either concessions to the Poles of Kholm or to the political ideology of the Russian Nationalist faction that had dominated the Duma committee which composed and presented the alternative version of the Kholm bill. On February 16, 1912 Shechkov did not hesitate to charge the Russian Nationalist faction with being responsible for the diluted version of the bill. He questioned if there was any logic behind the bill if all the social and legal aspects of life in Kholm were to continue to be the same after the creation of the province as they had existed beforehand. Shechkov wanted all the social and legal reforms that were included in the government's

¹⁷S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 45 (January 13, 1912), cols. 266-69. See also M. 63 (February 8, 1912), cols. 1782-92.

version of the bill to be put into force. He wanted Kholm to have the same laws and social life that existed in the other provinces of central Russia with no special considerations for the Polish minority as a result of amendments.¹⁸

The special privileges that the Russian Nationalists were willing to grant the Poles of Kholm regarding Polish-language public schools were particularly odious to Shechkov and the Rightist faction. On February 22, 1912 Shechkov said that the arguments presented by the Nationalists and some other Duma deputies favoring special rights for Polish language public schools were extremely absurd. It was argued, Shechkov said, that if those enclaves of Polish majorities in Kholm were not allowed to have their own language schools openly within the public school system, then they would take recourse to secret Polish schools for their school-age children. Those who argue this way, continued Shechkov, emphasize further that it is better to have their schools legally recognized and controlled by the government than to have the Poles organize secret schools of unknown numbers with uncertain motives. Yet, those who argue this way are wrong, said Shechkov. They are wrong because they fail to realize that there should be only one official language in the state and in this case it would be the Russian language. If everyone in Kholm learns the Russian language in the public school system, then what significance can one attach to any

¹⁸S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 70 (February 16, 1912), cols. 2353-54.

minority of people who learn an additional language in secret schools? All these people would nevertheless still know the language in which all the province's official business would be conducted, asserted Shechkov. But this would not be the case if the school system there raised a number of school children knowing only the Polish language. If we allowed this to happen we would not be terminating our problem in Kholm, with the Kholm bill diluted in this way, but we would be perpetuating and perhaps increasingly aggravating the problem there, explained Shechkov. That was not the purpose of the bill as it was introduced originally by the government, the Duma was reminded by Shechkov.¹⁹

Voeikov was even more extreme in his opinion over the use of the Russian language. He would compel the public school system throughout the whole area of the Governor-Generalship of Warsaw to teach in Russian. He wanted to leave no uncertainty in the matter that Russian was the official language not only throughout this area but throughout the entire Russian Empire. Therefore compulsion in the use of Russian in the schools of Kholm should not be limited to that province only, in Voeikov's opinion.²⁰

While the Rightists had their way on the language

¹⁹S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 73 (February 22, 1912), cols. 2659-62.

²⁰S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 63 (February 8, 1912), cols. 1782-92.

question in the public schools of Kholm,²¹ they had to compromise their stand on the language question in the courts.²² Timoshkin introduced an amendment to the Kholm bill on April 26, 1912 which would allow the use of a local language in the courts of Kholm only if the person involved was illiterate. The amendment was based on the assumption that all literate people will have gone to school where inevitably they would have learned Russian. For that reason Timoshkin said that the illiterate person could be forgiven if he knew only a local language. Such a person therefore should be allowed to express himself in any way at his command.²³ But Timoshkin's amendment was not adopted by the Duma.²⁴ The resulting court language clause allowed the use of local languages in the courts in areas where they were spoken by a majority of the populace. This concept was more in accord with the ideology of the Nationalists and the Octobrists. However, the Rightists were able to win on the point that the population majorities were to be determined by the central government for Russia rather than by the local authorities. The Octobrists were in favor of this procedure also. Therefore the final draft of the bill saw a court

²¹Supra, p. 30. Also see Kholmskaia Guberniia, 1914 g., p. 47.

²²Supra, pp. 31-32. Also see Kholmskaia Guberniia, 1914 g., pp. 48-49.

²³S. o., 3D., 5S., Pt. 3, M. 117 (April 26, 1912), col. 3400.

²⁴Ibid., col. 3403.

language clause which was a compromise arrangement among the three right wing Duma factions.²⁵

Another matter in the Duma Kholm bill that concerned the Rightists was the inclusion of the Roman Catholic Gregorian Calendar as the official and legal calendar to be used in the proposed province of Kholm. Shechkov proposed an amendment to the bill to delete this statement and his proposal was carried by the Duma.²⁶

On April 26, 1912 Shechkov summarized his faction's stand on the Duma's Kholm bill. He listed those parts of the bill which the Rightists could not support. They were first the proposal that the local courts in Kholm be composed of judges and juries from among the local residents regardless of their religious convictions or nationalities. The opposition to this proposal was based on the Rightists' belief that such courts might give prejudiced decisions in cases where a minority religion would be involved in any particular court issue. They claimed that religious strife would be aggravated therefore rather than subdued. As a solution the Rightists therefore advocated a segregated court system wherein separate courts for each religious group would be composed of members of that same religion in order that they may judge any transgressors of the

²⁵Supra, pp. 31-32. Also see Kholmskaia Guberniia, 1914 g., pp. 48-49.

²⁶S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 73 (February 22, 1912), cols. 2725-26.

law from among the people belonging to their own religious group.²⁷ The reason for this stand by the Rightists was possibly due to their expectations that the Polish minority in Kholm was better educated on the whole because of their superior economic landowning status. This situation most likely would enable the Poles to gain control over the court system in Kholm if it was left open without the religious restrictions. Of course the Rightists did not divide the courts along nationality lines but along religious lines thereby maintaining their position that there was no Polish nationality. Yet by segregating the Roman Catholics, for the most part, they would be segregating the Poles from the so-called Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) population.

Secondly the Rightist could not support the proposal that the Poles in Kholm not be restricted legally to buy, mortgage or rent real property. The Rightists did not want to give the Poles this freedom lest the Polish minority in Kholm would continue economically to oppress the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) peasants there. By allowing the proposed economic freedom for the Poles, it was feared that they would continue to be the dominant and most influential national group in Kholm.²⁸

Finally the Rightists objected to the proposal that the Jews also not be restricted legally to buy, mortgage or

²⁷S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 3, M. 117 (April 26, 1912), cols. 3409-10.

²⁸Ibid.

rent real property outside of their allotted pales in the towns and cities of Kholm. The Rightists objected to this proposal in the bill because it gave the Jews special economic privileges that were not given them elsewhere in the central provinces of Russia.²⁹

As a matter of fact, the Rightists claimed that the Jews in reality were not supposed to have those rights in the area of the former Kingdom of Poland either. The Rightist, Ivan Ivanovich Balakleev explained this matter in his speech on April 26, 1912. He said that the Kingdom of Poland was legally a part of the area where the laws regarding the Jewish Pale were applicable. Those laws were no different for that area than they were elsewhere in Russia. The confusion over the matter arose however when in 1896 the Supreme Senate interpreted the law in the Kingdom to be applicable only to those lands originally owned by peasants. The Jews therefore took advantage of this to buy, mortgage and rent lands of the great landed estates category. The Rightists therefore wished to correct the erroneous interpretation by the Senate. Certainly they did not wish to perpetuate that error in the case of the new Kholm province.³⁰

But in spite of these major criticisms of the Kholm bill by the Rightists, Shechkov said in his summary speech that they would vote for the bill's adoption in the Duma. They were

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid., cols. 3395-97.

in favor of the general principles and of the purpose of the bill. As for the errors the bill contained, it was hoped that they would be corrected in the government's process of re-editing the text. If the above mentioned corrections were made, suggested Shechkov, the bill would be very beneficial to the Russians in Kholm.³¹

One day Nikolai Semenovitch Chkheidze, a Social Democrat from Tiflis province, asked the Rightists why they never mentioned the Ukrainians, who in fact were the nationality in the majority in Kholm, but only considered the Poles and the Russians in the Kholm question.³² He was answered by the Rightist, Father Andrei Danilovich Iurashkevich from Minsk province, who gave the following two reasons: (1) The Poles speak of the people in Kholm to be of a nationality midway between the Poles and the Russians. They also speak of a religion midway between the Roman Catholics and the Orthodox (i.e. the Uniats). Yet there is no nationality or religion of this nature, asserted Iurashkevich. The people of Kholm are the same as those of my native Pinsk, of Volynia or of the most central regions of Little Russia (i.e. Ukraine). They all have their origins in Rus'. (2) The second reason no mention is made of the Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) people is because there are certain elements which are endeavoring to disrupt our state by exploiting

³¹Ibid., cols. 3409-10.

³²S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 48 (January 18, 1912), cols. 523-28.

Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) separatism. "It is well known," said Iurashkevich, "that to speak of the Little Russian [i.e. Ukrainian] people as a separate nationality, having a separate language and the so-called right of self-determination would be tantamount to driving a wedge into the body of the Russian state."³³

Inferences

It may be concluded from the Rightists' stand on the Kholm bill that their faction would endeavor to support the government even though the government's proposals might not entirely agree with their convictions as a political entity. Nevertheless, the Rightists certainly expounded their own political opinions in the Duma even if by doing so they openly pointed out the errors that were made by the government or its allies for the duration of legislating the Kholm bill, the faction of Russian Nationalists. The Rightists were equally bold when they took a stand on the question of the rights of the non-Russians within the Empire. They did not consider it morally wrong to limit those rights whatsoever. Certainly the Jews were earmarked to be severely restricted. The Poles too were to be restricted. Yet the restrictions against the Poles were perhaps more due to their militant Roman Catholic Jesuit-influenced religion and to their economically ambitious landlord class than to their particular nationality as such.

³³Ibid., cols. 551-52.

This attitude of course was only supplemented with the Rightists' insistence that the Polish nationality was in fact nonexistent. The Ukrainian nationality also was nonexistent, for there was no nationality other than Russian in the Russian state. Once the state conquered a national area, the nationality of its people became extinct along with its former national political institutions. The Rightists therefore believed in no political ethics other than the concept that might was right, particularly since they considered themselves to be the true heirs of the power that was at the command of the entire Russian state. Furthermore because the Russians conquered and controlled a number of non-Russian peoples, the Rightists believed that in a competitive world of powers there were no moral values involved in the question of what restrictions, rights or privileges should be allotted to their acquired subjects. The welfare and advancement of the interests of the Russian state was the only criteria to be considered. This was the criteria advocated by the Union of Russian People. This therefore was the criteria applied by the Rightists to their legislative work in the Duma. This was also the criteria which they utilized in their stand on the Kholm question.

CHAPTER 7

THE OCTOBRISTS

Ideology

The Duma deputies who were either members or supporters of the political organization officially known as the Union of October Seventeenth were simply called Octobrists. Their faction had by far the largest numerical membership of any in the Duma. In the Fifth Session of the Duma there were 121 Octobrists out of the 442 deputies in the entire Duma. The stand of the Octobrists on any issue in that Duma therefore had a very important impact on its outcome. The Kholm bill, without exception to this rule, would not have been passed without the support of the majority of the Octobrists. The entire faction however did not support this bill. Yet this is not surprising since the Octobrists were men of diverse backgrounds, localities and political convictions. Furthermore, the faction was too large for any party whip or leader to compel its members to act in unison on any issue that did not touch directly upon those fundamentals which gave the Octobrists their entity as a faction or a political party.¹ This entity was based on the political platform of the Union of October Seventeenth.

¹Unlike the English parliamentary party system, the Duma faction system did not allow political parties to operate in the Duma legally. There could be no official party sanctions imposed against any renegade deputy. There was no party in power theoretically (although a faction having a majority of deputies within its ranks might in fact act as a party in power) for the Duma as a whole was regarded as an advisory legislative

This platform stipulated the party's adherence to the principles of the semi-constitutional monarchy outlined by the Tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905 and the laws promulgated on August 6, 1905 regarding the establishment of the Duma as an advisory legislative body to the Tsar and his government in addition to the Supreme Senate which was granted a similar role.² This state constitutional type of basis for the party's platform gave the Octobrists a possible wide range of differences over

body to the Tsar and his government. The deputies ran for election as individuals intending to represent certain constituencies and not as members of particular political parties. Of course most of the deputies advocated platforms of the political parties which supported their election campaigns, and of course, once elected, the deputies organized themselves in the Duma into factions of similar political convictions. But this was allowed legally for the purpose of speeding up the legislative process. The members of each faction had their separate meetings to formulate their stand on any particular issue. Each faction had a few spokesmen appointed for each issue to speak on behalf of its members as a whole. It was hoped that this system would eliminate numerous duplicate speeches in the Duma and therefore speed legislation. However, if an individual within a faction had personal convictions about an issue contrary to the majority in his faction, he could not be compelled to vote in the Duma along with the majority of the faction. This was simply because he was not directly responsible to the faction for his seat in the Duma. He might not oppose any fundamental principles of the political party operating outside of the Duma and perhaps in his constituency however for fear of losing its support in the next election, but if that support was negligible the deputy might even vote freely in the Duma according to his personal convictions or whims at any particular time. With this freedom of action given the deputies in the Duma, a number of re-alignments of deputies into factions took place throughout the Third Duma. See Appendix II, infra, p. 278.

²"Soiuz 17-go Oktiabria," in Polnoe Sobranie Podrobnykh Programm Russkikh i Pol'skikh Politicheskikh Partii (Vil'na: Tipografiia Ruskii Pochin', 1906), pp. 41-43.

what specific political principles should or should not be applied in the process of solving the various problems which they faced as deputies of the very Duma which they supported. While many of the Octobrists were quite conservative³ they distinguished themselves from the Rightists, who favored an autocracy, by advocating a constitutional monarchy for Russia. They distinguished themselves from the Nationalists by advocating equal rights before the law for all the Empire's citizens without distinction among them because of their nationality (in the ethnic sense) or their religious faith. At the same time, the Octobrists, in agreement with the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, would allow each ethnic nationality within Russia to develop freely its own culture. They applied this latter principle to the Kholm question in the form of supporting the bill in order that the people of Kholm could develop their culture free from Polish interference.

Another plank in the Octobrist platform advocated an administrative reform on the level of local municipal and

³The Octobrist, Vasilii Konstantinovich Fon-Anrep from St. Petersburg City, took pride in calling himself a conservative in his speech against the Kholm bill. See S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 50 (January 20, 1912), cols. 717-18. Another Octobrist, Vasilii Aleksandrovich Kariakin from Kazan province, also voted against the Kholm bill out of line with his faction. His stand on the issue was not unlike the position taken by some of the extreme Rightists who felt that the bill would recognize a separate Polish national entity which in fact would undermine the concept of an indivisible Russia. Kariakin's stand therefore is a good example of Octobrist conservatism and demonstrative of how an Octobrist could remain true to his party's platform yet find himself in opposition to his own faction. See Ibid., M. 65 (February 10, 1912), cols. 1922-23.

regional or provincial governments. They advocated self-government at these levels in order that local peculiarities or conditions could be considered more easily by the resident administrators. But each local government was to have its constitutional scope of powers regulated by Russia's central government to which it would be responsible. It was therefore emphatically stated in the Octobrists' platform that the proposed reforms were not to be taken mistakenly as concepts of federalism. The Octobrists strongly defended the principle of maintaining Russia as a single indivisible state.⁴

As a whole, the Octobrists' local self-government and state centralism planks in their platform had two effects on the Kholm bill. One effect was that the Russian Nationalists used the local self-government proposal as a springboard for advocating the Kholm bill. If the local peculiarities and conditions in the Kingdom of Poland were to be met through the proposed Octobrist reform, it was argued, then the Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) of Kholm would become a minority group that could easily lose its political and national identity under Polish dominance. It was necessary therefore, went the argument, to take Kholm away from the entity of provinces composing the Kingdom of Poland in order to save its inhabitants from becoming Polonized.⁵

The other effect that the two Octobrist planks had on

⁴"Soiuz 17-go Oktiabria," op cit., pp. 41-43.

⁵S. C., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), col. 2603.

the Kholm bill was that the Octobrists themselves amended that bill so that the newly created provincial government was not transferred to the Governor-Generalship of Kiev from the Governor-Generalship of Warsaw as originally proposed, but that it was made responsible directly to the Minister of Internal Affairs for the entire Russian Empire. This amendment in favor of state centralism was followed through to its adoption by the Duma primarily through the efforts of the Octobrist deputy from Kharkov province, Nikolai Ivanovich Antonov.⁶

Discourse

Antonov's efforts to convince the Duma to adopt the Octobrist ideological principle in connection with the Kholm bill were successful largely due to his position as chairman of the Committee for Directing Legislative Bills. As chairman of the committee which composed the Duma version of the Kholm bill, Antonov was able to utilize two advantages for his Octobrist faction. One was in his ability to make an arrangement with the Russian Nationalists that the Octobrists would support the Kholm bill providing the Nationalists supported the Octobrist amendment. In order to get the support required for the bill, the Nationalists agreed to the Octobrist proposal even though the amendment would compromise the Nationalists'

⁶S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 70 (February 16, 1912), cols. 2321-23.

political ideology to the extent that Kholm theoretically would not become annexed to the entity of historical Rus' but rather would become simply another province within the administrative organization of the Russian Empire. Of course there might have been a significant difference in the interpretation of policy and law for the people of Kholm had the line of authority from St. Petersburg passed through Kiev. But that was not the concern of the Nationalists or the Octobrists. For them it was a matter of ideology. For them it was a question of state centralism versus the concept of national entities. Meeting the needs demanded by the peculiarities of local conditions was not in the realm of their serious considerations. The other advantage that Antonov utilized was his extensive knowledge of the laws that affected or could affect the Kholm bill in any way. As chairman of the committee which studied the Kholm question, Antonov had access to all the findings of that committee. By pointing out to the Duma the laws of the state which supported his faction's ideological amendment, he was able to convince enough of the Duma deputies to have his amendment passed.⁷

This was particularly the case when some of the deputies questioned whether it would be lawful for the Duma to assign Kholm province to be accountable to the Ministry of the Interior rather than to a governor-generalship such as the one in Warsaw or Kiev. In answer, Antonov pointed out the number of legal possibilities that were open for the Duma to choose from. He gave an example from the administrative

⁷Ibid., cols. 2321-23 and 2329-30.

arrangement in the Caucasus. He said that in the single Caucasian administrative area there were two types of local administrative systems. There were the civil administrative provinces such as Tiflis and Kutai. Then there were the oblast administrations such as those of Kuban and Terek, which were responsible directly to the Minister for War. Similarly Kholm could become the direct responsibility of this or of any other minister, the Duma was assured by Antonov.⁸

Apart from the Octobrist motives to insert their centralist government ideology into the Kholm bill, Antonov gave an additional reason why his faction felt that Kholm should not fall under the Governor-Generalship of Kiev. On April 26, 1912 he said that in the nine provinces which constituted the Western Land, there were many more restrictions against the citizens than were found in Kholm in its position within the Governor-Generalship of Warsaw. Because the Octobrists did not wish to impose those restrictions on the people in the newly proposed province, they implored the Duma to make Kholm responsible directly to the Minister of the Interior.⁹ The Duma responded positively to the Octobrist amendment.¹⁰ But this latter reason for the amendment was not likely sincere since the Ukrainians of Kholm were granted no

⁸Ibid., col. 2322.

⁹S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 3, M. 117 (April 26, 1912), cols. 3398-99.

¹⁰S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 70 (February 16, 1912), cols. 2329-30.

special privileges over their brothers in the rest of the Western Land.

While Antonov concerned himself with the technical aspects of the Kholm bill, partly because of his position as chairman of the committee which studied the bill, and partly because of his interest in its constitutionality in the light of his Octobrist convictions, other Octobrists were interested in strictly the political aspects of the Kholm debate. One of these men was Georgii Vasil'evich Skoropadskii from Chernigov province. Skoropadskii joined with the Russian Nationalists in their effort to undercut and negate the arguments presented by those opposing the Kholm bill. He spoke on behalf of the Octobrist faction thereby fulfilling its obligations to the Nationalists to support the Kholm bill.

To cancel out any possible accusations that he was presenting a biased point of view on the Kholm question, Skoropadskii chose to verify his statements on the issue with Polish rather than Russian sources. In his initial speech on the Kholm bill he began with the fundamental assertion that the people of Kholm were mostly Russians (i.e. East Slavs). He said that the Poles in their speeches in the Duma have asserted that the people of Kholm were not entirely Russian (i.e. East Slavic) nor entirely Polish. Because the statistics proved this to be true, Skoropadskii insisted that the Poles must also be in agreement with those statistics when their figures state that the Russians (i.e. East Slavs) are in the majority there. By this he implied that the Poles were

selecting only those factors which would enhance their point of view rather than tell the whole story.¹¹

With a Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) majority in Kholm, continued Skoropadskii, it must be admitted that if there are to be any ethnographic considerations regarding the people there before reforming their political status (referring to the Octobrist proposal for local self-government), those reforms would have to be made according to a different set of principles than those applicable to the remaining provinces of the Kingdom of Poland. Skoropadskii then expanded his argument by listing the possible administrative reforms that would be considered suitable for Kholm. One possibility was to annex part of Kholm to Grodno province and the rest to Volynia. By annexing those districts of Kholm adjacent to these two Russian provinces the interests of the Russians of Kholm could be met, but there would develop a serious problem administering them efficiently. Both provinces, Grodno and Volynia, said Skoropadskii, are already too large for purposes of efficient administration and there are suggestions being made that they should be subdivided. Furthermore, it has been suggested in the committee which studied the Kholm question that parts of Grodno and Volynia be united to Kholm to form a greater Kholm province. If this is to be done, continued Skoropadskii, then it is necessary first to establish a separate Kholm province to

¹¹S. C., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 43 (January 11, 1912), cols. 136-39.

which some of the districts from Grodno and Volynia could become annexed.¹²

Once a separate Kholm province is established, Skoropadskii developed his argument further, the question arises about what its relationship should be to the Governor-Generalship of Warsaw. A governor-generalship in principle united those provinces which by nature were politically similar. If you consider this principle, then obviously Kholm would not fit logically into the group of provinces within the Governor-Generalship of Warsaw. Carrying his argument further, Skoropadskii said that it stood to reason that if Kholm were unsuitable to be under the Governor-Generalship of Warsaw, then there was no reason whatsoever to regard the province as an integral part of the Kingdom of Poland. But because the Polish deputies insisted that Kholm was a primordial part of the Kingdom and that the province should not be separated from Poland's national entity, their stand was entirely in disagreement with the conclusions arrived at in Skoropadskii's argument. It was against the Polish stand therefore that Skoropadskii aimed the remaining portion of his speech.¹³

He quoted at length from the Polish writers, Sviantokhovskii and Nemoevskii to prove that there was a long-standing animosity between the Poles and the Russians over Kholm. Skoropadskii chose these Polish writers as his sources

¹²Ibid., col. 137.

¹³Ibid.

for denying the assertions by the Polish deputies that there was no animosity among the nationalities in Kholm. Having thereby made his point, Skoropadskii then asked if it was not high time that the boundary between Poland and Rus' be established. He assured the Duma that even the Poles themselves were desirous for a solution to the boundary problem. To prove this statement Skoropadskii quoted another Pole, Kul'chitskii-Mazovetskii. This man suggested that a plebiscite be held in the provinces of Suvalki, Lublin and Sedlets, where there was a mixed population, to determine which districts would prefer to belong to Poland. Of course, Kul'chitskii-Mazovetskii suggested the plebiscite to settle the boundary for the Kingdom of Poland along with the proposal that the Kingdom be made politically autonomous.¹⁴ However Skoropadskii did not wish to grant the Kingdom of Poland an autonomous position within Russia. He would not pay that price in order to establish a separate Kholm province. An autonomous Poland was not in the program of reforms proposed by the Octobrist political platform.¹⁵

There were those in the Duma who said that by separating Kholm from the Governor-Generalship of Warsaw, the provinces remaining would be recognized as forming a purely Polish entity which was not in the interests of the Russian state. To them, Skoropadskii had the counter-argument that

¹⁴Ibid., cols. 138-39.

¹⁵"Soiuz 17-go Oktiabria," op. cit., pp. 41-43.

the purely Polish entity for the provinces of the Kingdom of Poland would be limited to a recognition of their Polish ethnographic nature and that they would not be recognized as having any political distinctions from the other provinces of Russia. He implied that Russia was to remain indivisible and governed by a centralist governmental system. This line of reasoning was not only in agreement with the Octobrist political ideology; it negated the charges from the extremist conservative deputies that the Kholm bill was indirectly dividing Russia into undesirable national entities. At the same time it undercut any possible hopes that the Poles might have had concerning autonomy for the Kingdom of Poland either with or without the establishment of Kholm province.¹⁶

Another criticism of the Kholm bill claimed that an administrative reform could have no effect on the social trends among the people of Kholm. According to the argument, the problem was social since it concerned the trend of Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) becoming socially Polonized. There was nothing wrong with the prevailing administration over Kholm, the argument went further. The establishment of a new province there would do nothing more than declare that a new administration was taking office to govern the area. Criticisms of the Kholm bill of this nature, said Skoropadskii, were not founded on realities. He felt that the people of Kholm were so oppressed politically by the Poles

¹⁶S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 43 (January 11, 1912), cols. 141-42.

that their social attitude was governed by that oppression. It was therefore necessary to announce their new political status in order to bring them to realize their social potential as Russian citizens. The Kholm bill would not only enact the political laws suitable for the rebirth of Russian national consciousness among the people of Kholm, the declaration announcing those laws would have the psychological effect of jolting these people into realizing their national significance. The declaration, Skoropadskii said, was therefore not merely a declaration which was void of significance. Great events and changes have come about as a result of declarations. He cited the Manifesto of October 17, 1905. "Did that declaration not have results of tremendous significance?" asked Skoropadskii, referring to the establishment of the Duma itself among other things.¹⁷

The next criticism of the Kholm bill which Skoropadskii rejected was that which was made by the Poles who claimed that the bill violated both the treaty of the Congress of Vienna and the fundamental laws of the Russian state. In the first case Skoropadskii said that the Congress of Vienna was no longer in effect anywhere according to Professor Ashkenazi who was an authority on the treaty. The items of the treaty effecting the Poles, the Greeks, the Finns, the Germans and others were no longer in force according to the professor. But even if they were, said Skoropadskii, the treaty did not define the

¹⁷Ibid., cols. 139-40.

eastern boundaries of the Kingdom of Poland. As for the charge that the Kholm bill violated the fundamental laws of Russia because it altered the legitimate boundaries of the Kingdom of Poland, Skoropadskii countercharged the Poles with violating those same fundamental laws by insisting that the Kingdom of Poland was a separate political entity when in fact the laws clearly stated that the Russian state was one and indivisible. The fundamental laws included a special clause for the Grand Duchy of Finland, said Skoropadskii, but because there was no special clause relating to the Kingdom of Poland, its territories therefore were subject to those same laws which were applicable to the rest of Russia. There was no special political significance granted the Poles in these laws, Skoropadskii informed the Duma.¹⁸

It is true, historically speaking, said Skoropadskii, that following the revolt in 1830 certain constitutional rights were given the Poles in 1832 for administering the Kingdom of Poland from Warsaw. But these laws were all forfeited by the Poles upon the reenactment of entire series of new laws relating to Poland by the state authorities since then. It is true that in 1861 and 1862 the Kingdom of Poland was to have autonomous status within the Russian state, said Skoropadskii, but all that was cancelled following the revolt in 1863. Even so, the granted status resulted in only an ephemeral paper autonomy according to Nol'de for it never became a political reality, continued

¹⁸Ibid., cols. 140-42.

Skoropadskii.¹⁹ Finally on December 8, 1866 when entire sections of the fundamental laws were rewritten there was no special mention given to the Kingdom of Poland. The Kingdom therefore is no longer a reality. It is a fiction. According to Ellinek, Skoropadskii explained, an oblast may be given separate treatment in the organization of the state if it has one or more of the following elements which constitute a state: "a territory, a nationality, or organs of a state." As for the Kingdom of Poland, it cannot be said that it merits the status of a separate oblast because it does not have its own territory, nor its own citizens, nor even its own state institutions, concluded Skoropadskii. This was his answer to those who said that the Kholm bill violated the fundamental laws because it intended to alter the territorial extent of the Kingdom of Poland.²⁰

The charge that the Kholm bill violated the Manifesto of October 17, 1905 was also denied by Skoropadskii. He said that the Manifesto could not, under the most liberal interpretations of its clauses, be conceived to invalidate any legislative bill concerning the location of the political boundaries within the Russian state. On the basis of the Manifesto, the Poles could ask the Duma not to violate their right to speak in the Polish language. They could ask the Duma not to hinder the development of their culture. They could ask the Duma, providing they regarded themselves to be sons of Russia, that the state

¹⁹Ibid., col. 141.

²⁰Ibid., cols. 141-42.

enable them to develop their spiritual and material needs, continued Skoropadskii, but they could not ask the Duma, on the basis of the Manifesto, not to legislate on matters of internal political boundaries. The answer to this question was very clear, emphasized Skoropadskii.²¹

Then there were those, said Skoropadskii, who believed that the present time was not appropriate for dealing with the Kholm question. It was however this question of timing, Skoropadskii asserted, that was not appropriate at this time. Had it been mentioned earlier in the form of whether the Kholm question should be raised in the Duma at this time or not, then the question would have been appropriate. But now that everyone is following the Kholm bill with intent interest, it is too late to withdraw from the issue without resolving it. If we do not solve the Kholm question now once and for all, said Skoropadskii, numerous repercussions might befall the people of Kholm as a result of the national and religious differences which were responsible for the strife there. Furthermore, said Skoropadskii, if we would fail to solve the question of Kholm favorably for the Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) living there, we would strike a terrible psychological blow against their confidence in our state and its legislature. This blow might cause them to lose what faith they still had in the Russian nationality. We must not let them down; Skoropadskii concluded his speech. A separate Kholm province should be established and it should

²¹Ibid., col. 142.

not be included in the Governor-Generalship of Warsaw.²²

In another speech on the Kholm question on February 15, 1912 Skoropadskii added two further arguments in favor of the bill that were particularly reflective of the Octobrist's opinions regarding the nationality question in Russia. At one point he asked why it was that during the apportionment of the Caucasus Region in 1899 nobody objected to the establishment of a separate Stavropol' province for the same reasons that they object today to the establishment of a separate Kholm province out of the eastern portions of the Kingdom of Poland? No one at that time claimed that we were creating a separate Caucasian entity apart from Russia as a result of the reform. Then why, asked Skoropadskii, should anyone say that a separate Polish entity in particular was being created as a result of the Kholm bill when this reform was similar to the other in nature? Skoropadskii then mentioned other similar reforms, including another bill already approved by a Duma committee regarding the establishment of a separate Chernomor province which would no longer be governed by the Tsar's Vicegerent in the Caucasus. Why did no one object to this reform on the grounds that it was undermining the unity of Russia? What made the apportionment of the Kingdom of Poland any different from the apportionment of the Caucasus, Skoropadskii wanted to know?²³ From the

²²Ibid., col. 143.

²³S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 68 (February 15, 1912), col. 2175.

administrative point of view of a centralist governing organization which Russia had, Skoropadskii's questions were fully justified, but the comparison of a Polish national entity with a territorial nonnational (or rather multinational) entity in the Caucasus was hardly a convincing parallel of similar situations.

Another unconvincing parallel that Skoropadskii drew in his speech concerned the relations between the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) and the Russians in view of the Kholm question. Without mentioning the special restrictions against the populace that existed in the Western Land, Skoropadskii said that the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) were the landlords of the Russian (i.e. East Slavic) lands on an equal footing with the "Great Russians." He said that some deputies had tied the matter of Kholm in with the Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) question, but he as a Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) would deny the allegations that the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) formed a separate nationality, that that nationality was being oppressed, that it had a separate language of its own which also was being suppressed and so on. He wanted it to be known that the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) and the "Great Russians" had the same obligations to the state, the same friends and the same foes. Furthermore, Skoropadskii continued, there were Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) who participated in the committee which studied the Kholm bill and that they had the same sympathies for the bill's adoption as had the Russians. He personally, asserted Skoropadskii, desired to have Kholm

apportioned from out of the Kingdom of Poland as a Russian and he awaited that day as a Little Russian.(i.e. Ukrainian).²⁴

Reflective of the Octobrists' attitude on the nationality problem in Russia, in spite of their seemingly liberal party program in this regard, was the speech of Vasilii Aleksandrovich Potulov of Orlov province on January 13, 1912. Among other arguments against the Kholm bill which he disputed was the one that the Kholm question be settled favorably for the Poles so as not to inflame the relations between them and the Russians. This was a ridiculous argument, Potulov said, because no appeasement of the Poles would lessen their ire at the Russians. This ire had its roots in the distant past. "Have you not noticed from their demonstrations in the past four years what hatred the Poles have for the Russian people? We cannot douse those flames of ire they have for us with the tears of the populace of Kholm. We cannot fill the gulf between the Poles and the Russians by offering Kholm to them. Such an offering would be both fruitless and criminal," Potulov concluded his argument dramatically.²⁵

Inferences

The Octobrists therefore, as champions of a centralist government for Russia based on the principles of a constitutional monarchy, were by no means willing to tolerate separate political entities for the many nationalities of the empire. Yet they were

²⁴Ibid., cols. 2176-77.

²⁵S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 45 (January 13, 1912), cols. 248-55.

willing to tolerate the development of local cultures and languages in the various diverse administrative areas of Russia. These local social or ethnic peculiarities according to their ideology were not however to be reflected in the political organization of the state. The Russian state was not to be a federation of national entities, but a state organized politically on the principles of centralism and national indivisibility. Any national movement which sought special political recognition for its nationality within the Russian state was not only frowned upon in principle by the Octobrists, but was deterred by them through whatever political means they could muster, regardless of the ire or public opinion their actions would arouse.

It is not surprising then, that the Kholm bill in its ultimate form which was supported by a majority of the Octobrists, presented an example of the application of state centralist political principles to the resolution of the nationality question in the Russian Empire. Also linked to the bill were the nationalistic concepts of the Russian Nationalists and the chauvinistic amendments of the Rightists. Certainly the clauses in the bill reflected the combined influence of these three powerful political factions who together formed the pro-government bloc and the majority in the Duma. This bloc therefore governed the Duma's policy on the nationality problem in the Russian Empire. In the case of the Kholm question, the bloc resolved that the province be apportioned from the Kingdom of Poland and that its governor be made accountable to Russia's

Minister of the Interior. As a result of the Kholm bill, the residents of the province were to be subjected to educational, legal and local political reforms which would promote the ideological interests of the Nationalists, the Rightists, the Octobrists and the central government. As the above speeches indicate, those interests invariably were to have Kholm Russianized. Even though the Octobrists alone among the pro-Kholm bill parties supposedly championed the development of local cultures and languages, they did not apply this principle in the case of the Ukrainian population of Kholm. Skoropadskii made this clear by referring to the Ukrainians as "Little Russians" and by equating them with the Russians. This attitude with respect to the Ukrainian nationality therefore was not unlike the attitude of the Rightists or the Nationalists who also continuously referred to the Ukrainian population of Kholm as Russian, and who also were continuously concerned about how to get these people to accept Russian nationality as their own. Obviously they tried to Russianize that population. Perhaps in the long run they desired to Russianize all of the non-Russian nationalities within the Empire, if that were possible. Perhaps that was their solution to the nationality problem should the Kholm experiment prove itself fruitful. But many of the deputies in the Duma who were in opposition to the Kholm bill proposed other solutions to the nationality problem in Russia and particularly in Kholm. Their opinions on the matter are outlined in the section which follows.

SECTION III
THE OPPOSITION

CHAPTER 8

THE POLISH KOLO

Ideology

The faction in the Duma which led the opposition to the Kholm bill was the Polish Kolo. This faction was composed of Polish nationalist deputies from the Kingdom of Poland regardless of their particular political party affiliations. While each Polish political party emphasized different grievances and shortcomings that required correction in the interest of the Polish people, all of these parties endeavored to act in national unison vis-à-vis the political policies of the Russian state.

In the Conciliatory (Ugodovoi) Party program it was stated that the individual, political, legal, social and cultural rights that allowed the development of the national peculiarities of any region in Russia should be applicable equally to the Kingdom of Poland as well. In other words, if the Russians could develop their culture, why should the Poles not have the right to do so also.¹

The program of the Polish Progressive Democratic Party was more specific in its political demands for the Kingdom of Poland. It called for the same political organization for the Kingdom that existed in 1815 when Poland was

¹"Programma 'Ugodovoi' Partii," in Polnoe Sobranie Podrobnykh Programm Russkikh i Pol'skikh Politicheskikh Partii (Vil'na: Tipografiia Ruskii Pochin', 1906), pp. 112-113.

incorporated by the Russian Empire. The party desired that the Kingdom no longer be considered merely an oblast of the Empire under the name, Privisljanskii krai (the region in the vicinity of the Vistula). The program clarified this statement to mean autonomy for Poland. It further stipulated that Polish autonomy could not be sacrificed for a voice in the affairs of the entire Russian Empire. In other words, the party would give up the Polish representation in the Duma in order to have a special separate Polish self-governing apparatus for the Kingdom of Poland.²

The National Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland worded its political aims in ideological rather than specific terms. This party believed that all local government should be manifested in self-governing administrative organizations by the local population without distinctions being made among the people because of their social or economic status.³

Each of these Polish political parties reflected the interests of certain classes of people--the great landowners, the old ruling aristocrats and the conservative middle class. Nevertheless, political self-rule for Poland was a platform common to all. Another common platform among these parties was their aim to establish the Polish language in the offices

²"Programma Pol'skoi Progressivno-Demokraticeskoi Partii," Polnoe Sobranie Podrobnykh Programm Russkikh i Pol'skikh Politicheskikh Partii (Vil'na: Tipografiia Ruskii Pochin', 1906), p. 113.

³"Programma Natsional'no-Demokraticeskoi Partii Tsarstva Pol'skago," Polnoe Sobranie Podrobnykh Programm Russkikh i Pol'skikh Politicheskikh Partii (Vil'na: Tipografiia Ruskii Pochin', 1906), p. 114.

of local government and in the courts and the schools throughout the entire Kingdom. Common to all of these parties also was their stand on guaranteeing the freedom of choice of religious faith. The Progressive Democrats and the National Democrats made special mention of this freedom for the Uniat Church.⁴ This latter plank in their platform would of course appeal to many of the people in the area about to form the province of Kholm. But apart from the public appeal of their particular party platforms, there was sufficient national ideological unity among the Polish deputies to the Duma to have them present a common national front through the organized efforts of their faction. Contributing to that political union within the Polish Kolo of course was the predominance of the National Democrats in the faction's ranks since they alone among the Polish political parties did not officially boycott the elections to the Third Duma.⁵ But even without the one-party dominance over the Polish Kolo, the national character of the Kholm bill in itself was a factor of sufficient motivation to encourage the Polish deputies to act in unison on the issue. Their unity, with few reservations, could be said therefore to be representative of the united political product of the Polish people of the Kingdom of Poland with respect to their stand on the Kholm issue.

⁴Polnoe Sobranie Podrobnykh Programm Russkikh i Pol'skikh Politicheskikh Partii (Vil'na: Tipografiia Ruskii Pochin', 1906), pp. 112-14.

⁵Edward H. Lewinski-Corwin, The Political History of Poland (New York: The Polish Book Importing Company, 1917), pp. 555, 557-58.

Discourse

Many of the members of the Polish Kolo participated in the Kholm debates. They spoke on the issue, not merely because their faction was carrying out a filibuster against the bill and therefore required numerous speakers to participate, but also because the nationalistic nature of the bill aroused their personal emotions. One of the members of the Kolo was so interested in the issue that he personally made a substantial study of the Kholm question and published his results in a 122-page treatise which included statistics from various sources and a detailed political-religious map of the area.⁶ This man was Liubomir Kleofasovich Dymsha from Sedlets province. Because he was personally from one of the provinces to be apportioned by the Kholm bill, he was particularly suitable among the Polish deputies to lead the Kolo against that bill.

Dymsha led the opposition to the Kholm bill primarily on the grounds that the bill intended to convert the Roman Catholic Poles of Kholm to the Orthodox faith and thereby make them Russian by nationality. He had this in mind when he said that the bill was proposed with the motive to Russify the Poles. It was the principle of Russifying the Poles against their will to which Dymsha objected in his speech. Because this was the motive of the bill it was unconstitutional by virtue of its nature insisted Dymsha. It violated the Manifesto of October

⁶L. Dymsha, Kholmskii Vopros (St. Peterburg: Obshchestvennaia Pol'za, 1910).

17, 1905, he said, because it was intended to restrict the use and development of the Polish language and culture in Kholm. Also the bill was designed to suppress the Roman Catholic Church there. Dymsha implied further that if the Duma hoped to continue its existence by virtue of its constitutionality based on the October Manifesto and the Fundamental Laws of the state, then it had better respect that Manifesto and its laws regarding equality and equal privileges for all the nationalities and religions of the Empire.⁷

One of the fundamental questions behind Dymsha's opposition to the bill concerned the national and religious composition of the proposed province. He disputed the statistical figures given by both the government and the Duma committee in their respective studies of the composition of the population of Kholm. In the first place the figures of the Russian Professor Frantsev from Warsaw University were highly biased in favor of the interests of his Orthodox Fraternity of the Mother of God (Bogoroditskago Bratstva), said Dymsha. Even so, Frantsev came up with only a 30% Orthodox population in Kholm, Dymsha informed the Duma. With this weak showing from the religious point of view, the committee studying the Kholm question then decided to use ethnographic statistics by which to decide the Kholm issue, continued Dymsha. The committee then turned down the sugges-

⁷S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), cols. 2624-26.

tion that the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic priests in Kholm conduct separate ethnographic surveys in order that their figures could be compared asserted Dymsha. Instead the committee members decided to ask the governors and their agents in Kholm to submit the necessary ethnographic composition statistics. The validity of these statistics can be questioned, Dymsha said, because of the following inconsistencies: In 1909 the Governor of Sedlets province reported that 62% of the population of the district of Konstantinov was Russian (i.e. Ukrainian). Two years earlier, in 1907, he reported the population for the same district to be only 22% Russian (i.e. Ukrainian). Were these statistics, asked Dymsha, not influenced by the opinions of the government at any particular time? Just because the government decided in 1907 to bury the Kholm question, implied Dymsha, the Governor of Sedlets felt it appropriate to say that only 22% of the people were Russian (i.e. Ukrainian). But when the Kholm question was up once again for consideration, the Governor found it appropriate to increase his figures to 62%, concluded Dymsha.⁸

As for the 1897 statistics, Dymsha continued, they were unreliable also. In 1896 there was an order relating to the census which said that all those people of the provinces of Lublin and Sedlets who were uncertain of their allegiance or were in a state of flux were to be registered as Russians (i.e. East Slavs).⁹ Because the Orthodox priests were con-

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Ibid., cols. 2627-29.

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Ukaz Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva iz Kholmskoi

sidered closer to the poorer populace and would know best who these people were, they were asked to point out those of uncertain allegiance to the census takers. "So you see how valid was the 1897 census for Kholm," concluded Dymsha.¹⁰

The assertion that the language spoken in Kholm was Russian also was invalid, Dymsha assured the Duma. The so-called common language (prostoi iazyk) was not Russian as the government's minister alleged, said Dymsha. In reality it was a mixture of the Polish and the Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) languages. This language could be claimed equally well by either nationality. The situation was similar to that found on the borders between France and Italy, between Bulgaria and Serbia, or between Poland and Moravia, said Dymsha. Nor were the ethnographic collections of songs from Kholm entirely in the Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) language as it was implied earlier in the Duma, he said. There were Polish songs in these collections also. Therefore it cannot be ascertained, concluded Dymsha, to which nationality the people of Kholm belong from the language they speak. This question could have been resolved only if the committee studying the bill would have adopted the solution to the problem suggested by the Polish Kolo, said Dymsha. This solution was to have each individual in Kholm sign a statement as to whether he considered himself Russian or Polish. If he was illiterate he could have

dukhovnoi konsistorii Kholmskomu dukhovnomu pravleniiu ot 12 noiabria 1896g.

¹⁰S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), cols. 2630-31.

been given the opportunity to call upon a friend, either Polish or Russian, to register him one way or the other, according to his own will, explained Dymsha. A census of this nature would have been much more reliable than any census conducted by agents who wished to please the government, Dymsha concluded his argument.¹¹

The historical treatment of the Kholm question as presented by the Russians also was challenged by Dymsha. He could not see how anyone could prove Kholm to be ethnographically Russian in the thirteenth century. It is known that Prince Daniel said that in his land among others there were Germans, Czechs and Poles. Politically the borders were constantly changing at that time because of the frequent wars that were being waged in that region. At times the area was occupied even by the Magyars. How could any political or ethnographic boundaries be traced effectively in this period, wondered Dymsha, if it was a period of such great instability.¹²

However, there was an economic solution to the Kholm question, said Dymsha. Going up the economic hierarchy of subordination, it stands to reason that a province should belong to the country from which it gets its services. It is customarily an accepted ethical principle that employees should be loyal to their employers. Apply this principle to the people of Kholm, who for the most part work on lands that are owned by Poles, then the loyalty of the area should be to the Polish

¹¹Ibid., pp. 2632-34.

¹²Ibid., p. 2634.

landlords and therefore to Poland, argued Dymsha.¹³

As for the charges that the Polish landlords discriminated against employing those people who were Orthodox, Dymsha said, those charges were utterly false. Count Zamoiskii, the very man who it was alleged was so very discriminating in this way, has 105 Orthodox employees compared to 37 Catholics in his five estates in the district of Grubeshv. The verifying document for these figures, said Dymsha, were the census statistics for the towns of Kholm in 1909.¹⁴

Dymsha then charged the pro-Orthodox agitators with connecting the Kholm question to the agricultural question. The peasants in Kholm were being promised more land providing they became Orthodox, he said.¹⁵

This charge brought down resounding shouts of "Not true!" from the rightist seats in the Duma.¹⁶

But with persistence on this point, Dymsha presented a document at another appearance before the Duma which said that the Orthodox clergy were agitating for the abolition of current land debts and for reforms in the servitude laws on the landed estates. The document consisted of a letter from a peasant commissar to the Governor of Lublin province, dated March 9, 1907. The motives for the agitation were explicitly

¹³Ibid., col. 2635.

¹⁴Ibid., cols. 2635-36.

¹⁵Ibid., col. 2636.

¹⁶Ibid.

stated to be for the purposes of popularizing the Orthodox clergy in order that they may win converts from among the Catholics. Accordingly, the Orthodox priest Stempkovskii, upon orders from Bishop Evlogii set up an office for receiving peasant petitions for agrarian reforms which were to be sent to the Duma for consideration. Once Evlogii was elected to the Duma, the peasants expected the legislature to pass the numerous reforms which were promised. They had considerable confidence, according to the letter, that their petitions would be resolved positively.¹⁷

Another charge that came from Dymsha against the parties advocating the Kholm bill was that the Russians used compulsion against the Uniats forty years earlier to make them sign affidavits that they were Orthodox. They were told, "Unless you sign affidavits that you are Orthodox we will send Cossacks to your wives," quoted Dymsha.¹⁸ After suffering for forty years by being forced to attend Orthodox churches, it should not be surprising that when the Emperor allowed them the freedom to choose their faith in 1905, they switched to Catholicism, said Dymsha. These people sang songs of glorification to the Emperor for his kindness. They were not victims of Catholic agitation or compulsion as it has been suggested, emphasized Dymsha. If they had not been persecuted by the Russians for

¹⁷S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 50 (January 20, 1912), cols. 686-703.

¹⁸S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), col. 2638.

forty years they would not have switched religions so suddenly. It was the beastly acts of the Russians that drove these 180,000 people from the tserkov to the kostel,¹⁹ asserted Dymsha as a conclusion to his charge.²⁰

To deny further that the Roman Catholics participated actively in an endeavor to convert the 180,000 Orthodox people of Kholm to become Catholics in 1905, Dymsha read a letter from the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lublin, Iachevskii, to his priests concerning the Emperor's decree of April 17, 1905 on freedom of religion. The Bishop requested his priests not to take any initiative toward breaking this law which gave the citizens the freedom to choose their religion. He called upon the priests not to interrupt the existing state of peaceful coexistence among the Roman Catholics, the Uniats and the Orthodox. As a result of this request, said Dymsha, only a few minor incidents of strife occurred between the Catholics and Orthodox of Kholm. Furthermore these incidents occurred in the revolutionary year of 1905, said Dymsha apologetically.²¹

Dymsha denied also that the Kholm bill was necessary for the protection of the Orthodox Church in Kholm. Already

¹⁹The words "tserkov" and "kostel" mean "church" in Russian and Polish respectively, but both words have been adopted by both languages to mean specifically the Orthodox or Uniat Church in the use of the first word and the Roman Catholic Church in the case of the latter.

²⁰S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), cols. 2637-38.

²¹Ibid., cols. 2639-40.

there were ample safeguards taken there to fortify the position of the Orthodox Church, he said. In the area intended for apportionment there were 365 Orthodox Church elementary schools while all the Polish schools had been closed by the local police authorities, leaving over a million Poles without any means of education. The income of the Orthodox clergy in Kholm averaged 2,690 rubles annually, said Dymsha, a figure not surpassed elsewhere in Russia. On the other hand the state paid only an average of 209 rubles annually to the Polish clergy. In some places even this legal minimal state allowance was not received by the Polish clergy, added Dymsha. Certainly the Orthodox people of Kholm were served much better than the Roman Catholics, continued Dymsha. There were 1,052 people per Orthodox priest as compared to 4,041 people to each Roman Catholic priest. Each Orthodox church served 1,387 people while each Roman Catholic church served 6,800 people. Furthermore, out of 68 municipalities in the eastern parts of Lublin province, 24 did not have any Roman Catholic churches although in population they were composed of 70 to 95 per cent Roman Catholics per municipality. Surely these people should be allowed to have their own churches, asserted Dymsha. Other existing discriminating practices in Kholm against the Roman Catholics included the closing of the Land Banks to them and the closing of their cemeteries. In the former case, the order was issued by Governor-General Chertkov of Warsaw in spite of the fact that the Land Bank was set up for all peasants regardless of their religion. In the latter

case a law was made allowing only the public cemeteries to be used. Were these laws and practices, questioned Dymsha, lawful acts? Were they not safeguards favorable to the Orthodox Church even before the enactment of the Kholm bill?²²

It is obvious, Dymsha concluded his speech, that the Kholm bill is only another attempt to Russify Kholm. It is not a measure merely to prevent the people from becoming Polonized as it is alleged. The motive of the present bill is no different from the motive for the measures taken in 1875 by Pobedonostsev and Tolstoi. The difference was only in the method of approach. In 1875 the approach was religious with particular repercussions against the Uniats, said Dymsha. Presently the approach is to Russify the economy of the region through an administrative reform. A Russified political entity for Kholm would only serve the nationalistic and chauvinistic purposes of the Russian people. It would not serve the legal principles of Russia. Nor would it contribute to the justifiable trend in the twentieth century to have freedom of religion and the assertion of nationality as the prevailing policies of modern governments. But, just as the illegal measures taken against the Uniats to compel them to join the Orthodox Church forty years ago failed when some 200,000 of them left that Church to become Catholics in 1905, so the present Kholm bill will again fail to achieve its aims because of its illegal and compulsory nature, predicted Dymsha. If cultural methods cannot be used to win converts to

²²Ibid., cols. 2641-43.

the Orthodox Church, added Dymsha, then surely compulsory administrative reforms on the basis of nationality cannot be expected to accomplish that aim. Furthermore, the apportionment of Kholm out of the Kingdom of Poland can only arouse the ire of the Polish people, warned Dymsha. Then addressing specifically the advocates of the Kholm bill, Dymsha said, "Your vote for the bill may indicate your power, but it will not indicate that your power is just or honest. Justice and righteousness will remain on our side."²³

In a later speech to the Duma, Dymsha made an effort to challenge the stand taken by Evlogii and Bobrinskii of the Nationalists, and by Skoropadskii and Potulov of the Octobrists. He insinuated that there was a political deal made by the Nationalists and the Octobrists when he said that he found it very difficult to comprehend the ideological stand of the Octobrists on the Kholm bill since it was nothing more than another blind emotional plunge by the Nationalists, being made without regard to the welfare of the state. The bill was without regard to the welfare of the state, said Dymsha, because it was intended to tear the state into national strife. He could verify this by the things that the four mentioned deputies had said. Dymsha quoted Evlogii as saying that peace with the Poles could not be had until Kholm was taken from Poland and the Polish soul there was subdued. He quoted Bobrinskii as saying

²³Ibid., cols. 2643-50.

that the Polish movement in Kholm must be broken. Although Skoropadskii was not as blood thirsty as the other two gentlemen, said Dymsha, he nevertheless drew the conclusion that once the Kholm question was raised, it must be resolved unquestionably. But lastly and significantly vivid were the statements of Potulov, said Dymsha. They called upon the Russians to fight the Poles to the finish. "Now," Dymsha asked, "was this the purpose of the bill? Was it made to launch a fight? Was it becoming of the Duma to pass such a bill?"²⁴ As far as he understood the purpose of the Duma, said Dymsha, it was to iron out peacefully any problems that arose in the state. The Duma therefore should not pass any bill which was intended to create a conflict between two national groups of citizens within the state, he concluded.²⁵

Another member of the Polish Kolo, Ian Semenovitch Garusevich from the Province of Lomża, also stressed the point that the Kholm bill was capable of starting a physical conflict in Kholm. He presented his argument through a number of letters and petitions which he read to the Duma on January 20, 1912. One of these letters was from the Polish populace of the village Vul'ka-Dobzhinskaia in the Bel'sk district of Sedlets province.

²⁴S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 50 (January 20, 1912), col. 697.

²⁵Ibid.

In it they asked the Polish deputies of the Duma to let the Russian people know that they wished that the Kholm bill would not be forced upon them since they were willing to defend their rights even if it required the spilling of blood.²⁶ Another letter signed by 84 citizens from the village Chasnovka in the same district had words to the effect that the wounds inflicted thirty years ago had not yet healed (referring to the compulsory union of the Uniats to the Orthodox church in 1875) when once again there was a movement afoot to set brothers against each other in conflict.²⁷

Some of the letters and petitions presented to the Duma by Garusevich charged that some of the petitions made in Kholm by those promoting the bill were falsified and were therefore misrepresenting the true opinions of the populace there. A letter from thirteen villages and municipalities from the district of Kholm stated that the people were tricked in two ways into signing a petition favoring the Kholm bill. In the first case, their children were asked to sign the petition in the schools without knowing what they were signing. In the second case, the petition was said to be a list of peasants desirous of increasing their land holdings at the expense of the landed estates. Those seeking greater privileges in the use of the forest preserves could also sign. Numerous peasants

²⁶S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 50 (January 20, 1912), col. 617.

²⁷Ibid.

signed the petition in expectation of personally gaining from the promised reforms not knowing that the petition which they signed was in fact intended to be used to support the bill which would annex their lands to the central provinces of Russia. This letter stated further that in a number of the villages and municipalities the citizens were registered as Russians and Orthodox although each one of them in reality were Polish. The 769 people who signed this letter asked that the Duma not consider them favoring the Kholm bill. They wished that the Duma would disregard both the above mentioned petitions and the falsified municipal registrations of citizens according to nationalities.²⁸

With another letter from Vasilii Iaroshuk, a 65-year-old man from the Zheliazna municipality of the district of Radin, Garusevich documented the kind of persecution the people endured since the compulsory union of the Uniats with the Orthodox Church. A number of people known by the writer of the letter were listed along with their punishment which they bore for their insistence upon remaining Catholics. For their heroic stand they were fined up to 600 rubles, imprisoned up to two years, whipped severely (at least one death was reported as having resulted from the whippings), and kept under police surveillance up to 15 years. The punishment imposed by the authorities on these people was for trifling reasons such as for refusing to submit their birth certificates upon the request of the authorities or for failing

²⁸Ibid., col. 619.

to christen their children in the Orthodox Faith. Along with the Iaroshuk document, Garusevich submitted an order signed by the reeve (nachal'nik) of the Radin district, dated November 17, 1879 and given the file number 13472. This order called upon a certain Bartolemiu Gavrishuk to christen his child according to the Orthodox rite within a month's time or suffer punishment for not complying with the order. This was only typical of the kind of persecution the people of Kholm have endured, asserted Garusevich.²⁹

Before closing this speech, Garusevich endeavored to verify the charges of the Polish Kolo that the Orthodox clergy were engaged in agitation for land reforms and implying that the reforms were dependent upon the passage of the Kholm bill. He quoted from the Orthodox press in Kholm to prove his point. From Kholmskoi Tserkovnoi Zhizni (Kholm Church Life) No. 9, 1906 Garusevich read the statement that numerous families would receive considerable relief if all the landholdings over and above the average holding were to be sold to the peasants. The statement was qualified however, said Garusevich, for it was further suggested that such a reform as that was not likely to come about on a voluntary basis. The reform would have to be legal so that force could be used to make the proposed program a reality.³⁰ Garusevich then pointed out an article in Bratskoi Besede (Fraternal Discourse) No. 36, 1907 which said that Bishop Evlogii

²⁹Ibid., cols. 620-22.

³⁰Ibid., col. 624.

ought to bring about the passage of the Kholm bill and have transferred to the peasants all of the public fields, pastures and forests. If this were not possible, the article went on, then at least transfer to the peasants the share of the fields, pastures and forests of the great estates which constituted a part of the public holdings.³¹ Another article from Kholmskoi Tserkovnoi Zhizni No. 18, 1910 read that the peasants of Kholm requested their deputies in the Duma to transfer to them not only the estates of the noblemen, and the entailed holdings, but also the lands held by the Orthodox clergy.³² From that day on, the clergy has been rather reluctant to continue agitating for land reforms, commented Garusevich.

The Social Democrat Gegechkori interjected from his seat: "They became over enriched at someone else's expense."³³

In concluding his speech, Garusevich called upon the Duma to consider his documents before making their decision on how to vote on the Kholm bill. Those documents obviously prove that the people of Kholm are not in favor of the bill. If the deputies will not take heed of those documents but will vote nonetheless for the bill's passage, then let it be known, emphasized Garusevich, that the result will not be a victory for righteousness but a victory for compulsion. It will be a victory which could be paraphrased in the saying, "Woe to the

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

victors! Honor and glory to the vanquished!"³⁴

Even after the Kholm bill was adopted by the Duma in its first reading on January 20, 1912 the Polish Kolo continued to resist the bill throughout its subsequent readings. The attitude of the Kolo was well phrased by one of its members, Al'fons Ippolitovich Parchevskii from the province of Kalish who said:³⁵

Perhaps fate has already resolved the bill. Perhaps all our defense is fruitless. Nevertheless we are following our conscience for the sake of those poor people of Kholm, for the sake of the Polish people, for the sake of the better elements of Russian society, and for the sake of society in general.

As each clause of the Kholm bill was voted upon separately in the second and third readings of the bill, the Polish Kolo endeavored to make the Duma pass amendments to those clauses so that the end product of the bill would be less injurious to the Polish national interests than the bill otherwise would be should it be passed unamended as originally drafted. Toward that purpose the Kolo members utilized not only all the means of persuasion at their command but also tactful temporary political alliances with their foes on the issue. For example on the very last day, only minutes before the third reading of the bill was taken in its entirety, Parchevskii was able to ally with the Polish Kolo the Octobrist followers of Antonov to support an amendment proposed jointly by the two men

³⁴ Ibid., col. 625.

³⁵ S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 63 (February 8, 1912), col. 1750.

to abolish the clause which would subject productions of drama in Kholm to censorship by the the Governor-General's office. This clause was not necessary, argued Parchevskii, because already there was a law in Russia making such productions subject to censorship by local authorities. Antonov and most of the Octobrists voted for the amendment because they agreed with Parchevskii that the censorship clause was redundant to existing regulations and because they felt that cultural matters concerned the local governments anyway. The Polish deputies wanted the censorship clause abolished so that it would be easier for the Polish minorities in Kholm to put on dramatic productions. Drama was an important means of upholding and perpetuating Polish culture in Kholm. As a result of this Octobrist alliance with the Polish Kolo on the censorship issue, the offending clause was removed from the Kholm bill by a majority vote in the Duma.³⁶ This maneuver by Parchevskii was only typical of the way the Polish Kolo operated in its efforts to reduce the sting of the otherwise intolerable Kholm bill.

Inferences

The members of the Polish Kolo displayed remarkable skill for a Realpolitik approach to the Kholm question. Not only did they question the legality of the Kholm bill in light of the Congress of Vienna treaty with the hope perhaps that the issue might develop into a problem of international concern,

³⁶S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 3, M. 117 (April 26, 1912), col. 3406. The clause however was again inserted into the bill by the State Council. Supra, p. 32.

but they also questioned the bill against the domestic criterion of the Imperial Manifesto of October 17, 1905. In the first case they hoped that the threat of international involvement over the issue might cause the Duma to shelve the bill. In the second case they hoped to prove that the bill with its restrictions against the Poles of Kholm was a violation of those laws and freedoms that were found in the same document which gave the very Duma its right to exist. By violating the laws of that document the Duma could undermine the basis of its own existence, implied the Poles. By inciting one threat after another therefore, the Poles hoped that the Duma would find it practical to drop the Kholm question. Having failed to convince the Duma that the bill's promulgation could lead to undesirable repercussions within the legal framework of the state, the Polish deputies then warned that an armed insurrection could occur in Kholm against the new authority that would be established there by the bill.³⁷

In every argument, the deputies of the Polish Kolo spoke as if they were speaking in the interest of the Russian state, although in reality they were concerned with the national interest of the Poles in Kholm. In their practical political manipulations they even went so far as to ally themselves with their foes on the issue, if by doing so they could advance their own national cause. The joint Octobrist-Polish Kolo amendment of the drama censorship clause was a good example of this. It

³⁷Supra, pp. 149 and 151.

can be inferred therefore that among the Duma factions, perhaps the Polish Kolo played the game of Realpolitik best.

CHAPTER 9

THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN-BELORUSSIAN FACTION

Ideology

The only non-Russian national faction in the Duma, in addition to the Polish Kolo, to take an active part in the Kholm debate was the Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian faction. This faction was among the smallest in the Duma with only seven deputies in its ranks. In spite of its tri-national political claims, it was dominated largely by Poles. Six of its members were Poles. The seventh was Lithuanian. Without any Belorussian members, the entire faction was Roman Catholic by faith. Its deputies were from the provinces of Vilna, Grodno and Kovno, with five of them coming from Vilna.¹ Their political outlook as a group therefore was strongly influenced by the social and political conditions of only one small part of the entire Empire.

The Poles in this faction might well have preferred to belong to the Polish Kolo but they were excluded from that faction for geographical reasons. It was politically wise for the Polish Kolo not to include in its ranks those Polish deputies who were elected beyond the boundaries of the Kingdom of Poland if the Poles were not to appear territorially aggressive in their strivings for autonomy for the Kingdom. Furthermore, by dominating the faction

¹Vide *infra*, Appendix I, p. 277. Cf. Kantseliariia Gosudarstvennoi Dumy, *Obzor Deiatel'nosti Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Tret'iago Sozyva 1907-1912, Chast' Pervaia: Obshchiia Svedeniia* (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1912), pp. 2-65, 68-70, 72-93, 98-99 and 102-129.

which supposedly represented a mixed Polish, Lithuanian and Belorussian population on the north-east periphery of the Kingdom of Poland, the Polish political parties were able to exert more political influence than would be possible if they had based their strength on the numerical magnitude of the Polish nationality alone within the Russian Empire. It can be stated therefore that the Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian faction was a puppet of the Polish Kolo. Certainly that faction unquestionably was the Kolo's closest political ally.² That alliance was evident in its stand on the Kholm issue.

Discourse

The most outspoken deputy of the Duma on the Kholm question from the Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian faction was Father Stanislav Giliar'evich Matseevich from the province of Vilna. As a Roman Catholic priest, Matseevich argued that there was no reason for the Kholm bill because there was no reason for the Orthodox Russians to regard Catholics as enemies of the state. Subsequently there was no reason for the Duma to take those political measures against the Catholics that were an integral part of the bill. He supported his argument with historical

²Many historians do not bother distinguishing between the deputies of the Polish Kolo and those of the Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian faction but list them together as Polish deputies, e.g.: "The total number of Polish deputies in the Third Duma numbered but eighteen, eleven of whom were from Poland proper and the remainder from the border territories." See Edward H. Lewinski-Corwin, The Political History of Poland (New York: The Polish Book Importing Company, 1917), p. 555.

sources that enabled him to present in his speeches a Catholic version of the history of the Western Land.³

Basic to his version of the history of this land was his assertion that the people of Rus' including Vladimir the Great were Christians of the Roman Rite and not of the Greek Rite as it was commonly alleged. By citing chronicles, Matseevich verified his statements that Christianity came to Kiev not from Constantinople in the tenth century but from the Varangian Norsemen who had settled in the area at that time. While Kiev did not have any favorable contact or exchange of ideas with Constantinople until a later date, the Roman Catholic Varangians converted many of the local people to Christianity of the Western Rite. Even Ol'ga, the mother of Vladimir became a Christian in her own native land and not in Constantinople. It is known that she implored Otto I to send bishops and missionaries to convert her people to Christianity. Obviously such bishops and missionaries would have been of the Western Rite, concluded Matseevich.⁴

The entire history of the Western Land, said Matseevich, was western-oriented. It had nothing in common with the history of the central and eastern parts of Russia which had their cultural centers in Suzdal' and Moscow. Matseevich cited chronicles that

³S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 48 (January 18, 1912), cols. 538-550; Ibid., M. 50 (January 20, 1912), cols. 595-603, 714-15.

⁴S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 48 (January 18, 1912), cols. 539-40.

mentioned envoys from Rome being received by the rulers of Kievan Rus'. On a number of these occasions these rulers accepted the relics of saints as gifts from the popes of Rome. had these rulers not been of the Western Rite they would not have received these gifts, argued Matseevich. Furthermore, it is well known that Daniel of Galicia and other Rus' rulers received crowns of kingship from Rome. Still further, continued Matseevich, the church of Rus' worships St. Nicholas as a church saint. This practice has perpetuated the proof of western influence in Kiev, because it is a practice not found to exist elsewhere in the Greek church.⁵

It is true that the Greek church made substantial gains in influence upon Rus', continued Matseevich. Its influential advance however was not hampered by Iagello of Lithuania nor by the Polish Republic as it was alleged in the Duma, said Matseevich. As a matter of fact, the Polish kings encouraged the development of the Orthodox church as a force through which they wished to check the ambitions of the nobility. To prove this point, Matseevich cited documents by Kazimir the Great in 1347, by Sigismund I in 1506, by Sigismund II in 1563, by Vladislav IV in 1641 and other documents by commissions and investigators for these and later dates. In all cases the documents attested to the freedom of religion which was granted to the Orthodox people.⁶ As for Iagello's decree, said Matseevich,

⁵Ibid., cols. 539-41.

⁶Ibid., cols. 544-46.

he intended it for the native Lithuanians who had not yet become Christians. His decree was not applicable to Rus' which was already Christian at the time it was made. It is also known, said Matseevich, that according to the chronicle of Pustyn for 1432, when Iagello was in Kiev, he not only granted the Orthodox the right to practice their religious rites freely, but also the right to win converts over to their Church from among the many unfaithful in the area.⁷ The religious strife of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Rus', continued Matseevich, was not between the Roman Catholics and the Orthodox. In other words it was not between the Poles and the Russians (i.e. Eastern Slavs), but between the Uniats and the Orthodox. It was a conflict therefore among the Russians (i.e. Eastern Slavs) themselves and the Poles should not be blamed.⁸ The conflict was the result of the movement to dispel the original western influence in Rus' and to replace it with the influence of the Greek Church, said Matseevich. It was the Orthodox movement that was aggressive, asserted Matseevich. Its activities since the time of Peter the Great certainly prove that point, said Matseevich.⁹ Furthermore, that aggressiveness of the Orthodox was still evident in the current discourse on the Kholm question, concluded Matseevich.¹⁰ Remove the aggressive intentions of the

⁷Ibid., col. 545.

⁸S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 50 (January 20, 1912), col. 597.

⁹Ibid., cols. 599-600.

¹⁰Ibid., cols. 601-02.

Orthodox in Kholm, implied Matseevich, and you will have eliminated the necessity for the Kholm bill.

Matseevich's associate, Kazimir Aleksandrovich Zavisha from the province of Kovno, did not require any historical proof however to tell the Duma that the Kholm bill was a means of dealing an aggressive blow against the Poles. Zavisha did not even feel obligated to prove his charge in his first speech on the Kholm bill. He merely accepted Russian aggression to be a fact since the foreign newspapers which were mentioned in the speech by the Minister of the Interior, Makarov, were writing editorials accusing the Russian government with taking the initiative through the Kholm bill to curtail the Poles and the Roman Catholic Church in Russia.¹¹ Obviously then, asserted Zavisha, the bill was an evil political act. It was not merely an administrative reform as claimed by some, or else the foreign press would not have developed the interest in it that it did. The repercussions that the bill would have on national and religious affairs were of considerable concern to the foreign press, said Zavisha. Although he did not carry the argument further, he implied with this statement that the issue was of the nature that it could precipitate international

¹¹The newspapers mentioned in the speech by Makarov were the Revue des deux Mondes, the Journal des debats, the Revue Bleue, the Le Pays Breton, and the Gazette de Lousanne. See Makarov's speech in S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 30 (November 25, 1911), cols. 2608-09.

involvement easily.¹²

Religious and national anarchy in Kholm also could be precipitated by the Kholm bill according to the Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian faction. Of the three speakers on the Kholm bill from this faction, Genrikh Ippolitovich Sventsitskii took up this matter when he challenged an amendment to the bill to have the Roman Catholic Church in Kholm conduct its religious services in the language spoken by the local population rather than in Latin. The amendment was proposed by Iosif Iakovlevich Pavlovich, a Russian Nationalist from the province of Minsk, and Georgii Alekseevich Shechkov, a Rightist from the province of Kursk. As a resident and representative of one of the provinces in the Western Land, Sventsitskii opposed the amendment on the grounds that it was unsuitable if one considered the nature of the populace that would be affected by it.¹³

In support of his argument against the proposed amendment, Sventsitskii shared with the Duma his personal experience of conditions in the Western Land. At about the time that the Uniats were united to the Orthodox Church some forty years ago, said Sventsitskii, there was a law made for the Roman Catholic churches to supplement their services with parts to be given in the Russian language. In the district of

¹²S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 46 (January 16, 1912), cols. 361-75.

¹³S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 73 (February 22, 1912), cols. 2675-81.

Borisov in the province of Minsk where Sventsitskii was born, there were eleven Roman Catholic churches affected by that law. For seven of them there were no priests found to conduct the services in this manner. Three of the parishes that had priests to conduct services in this way had their attendance fall to naught immediately after the law went into effect. The people there considered their non-attendance of these reformed churches to be demonstrative of their faithfulness to the Church of their fathers even though they did not christen their children, take marriage vows or bury their dead with the blessings of priests. Religious and national anarchy became prevalent among the people of those parishes, said Sventsitskii, and their priests became disillusioned.¹⁴

Those who propose the amendment to the Kholm bill have demonstrated their lack of knowledge of conditions in Kholm, said Sventsitskii. They proposed that amendment, he said, to meet their nationalistic ideology and not to meet the national peculiarities of the area involved. To have the Roman Catholic churches give their services in the locally spoken languages would be tantamount to taking the first step toward setting up the Uniat Church there again. This would be the case particularly because the local language is Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) and not Russian as it is alleged. Because the Uniat Church is no longer the Church that it was in the nineteenth century but a national Church for the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians), the amendment, if adopted, would cause the

¹⁴Ibid., cols. 2678-79

resulting circumstances to be played into the hands of the Uniats, reasoned Sventsitskii. Now surely after expending so much energy and suffering to stamp out the Uniats in recent history, you would not build them up again, Sventsitskii advised the Russian deputies. If you did this, you would be initiating another period of religious strife and torment for the faithful in Kholm, concluded Sventsitskii.¹⁵

Perhaps the Duma considered Sventsitskii's advice, since the Pavlovich-Shechkov amendment to Russify the Roman Catholic churches in Kholm was not adopted. Even though Sventsitskii was interested in preserving the Polish and Latin character of the Roman Catholic Church in Kholm, he did not make this aim the theme of his speech. Instead, he incited the Russian Orthodox element against the Uniats to gain his own ends. To the Uniats this undoubtedly would seem to be an alliance of the Roman Catholics and the Orthodox against them. Similarly, a national parallel could be drawn, by considering the alliance to be Polish-Russian versus "Little Russian" or Ukrainian. While the Russians were opposed to the Polonization of Kholm, they were even more opposed to have any "Little Russian" or Ukrainian national movement become established there under the leadership of the Uniat Church. Certainly the vote in the Duma on the Pavlovich-Shechkov amendment following Sventsitskii's speech indicated that to be the general consensus among the Russian deputies who unquestionably held the majority of seats.

¹⁵Ibid., col. 2679.

Inferences

The Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian faction contributed considerably to the political achievements of the Polish deputies in the Duma. Their particular approach to the Kholm question softened the anti-Polish attitude of the Duma. As Polish deputies geographically outside of the Kingdom of Poland, they carried with them no stigma of separatism. They fortified this desirable position by speaking in terms which could be interpreted favorable to the advancement of the Russian national cause. Matseevich isolated Russian nationalism from the religious question by his interpretation of the historic struggle between the pro-western and the pro-eastern religious camps for influence over the Western Land. Because he regarded Vladimir the Great to be in the western camp, Matseevich implied that a precedent had been established from which it could be concluded that no harm would be done to the Russian national cause if a sympathetic attitude to the Roman Church were adopted by the Duma. Sventsitskii advanced this attitude further by advocating a common cause among the Roman Catholic Poles and the Orthodox Russians against the Uniat Ukrainians, when a proposed amendment to the bill threatened to Russify the Latin Church in Kholm. The motives for this alliance of course were different for both parties involved. The Russian nationalists did not want to have the Duma pass an amendment to the bill which would enable a separatist Ukrainian movement to become established in Kholm. On the other hand, the Polish nationalists were defending their

Church from undesirable reforms. Yet, the persuasiveness of the Poles on the matter of defeating the amendment might not have been so effective had the suggestion come directly from the Polish Kolo which was considered a separatist faction also. But because the arguments came from deputies from an area not within the Kingdom of Poland, and from an area which was ethnographically as complex as was Kholm itself, their point of view was considered with a certain amount of authority by the Duma. With this in their favor, the deputies of the Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian faction were able to contribute considerably toward the Polish cause. Undoubtedly they were the closest allies of the Polish Kolo. They were so close, that Zavisha's speech on the threat of foreign involvement might well have been given by one of the Kolo's deputies. Certainly the Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian deputies were very important to the Polish political apparatus in the Duma, even if in numbers they constituted only a small faction with a limited number of votes.

CHAPTER 10

THE PROGRESSIVISTS

Ideology

The Progressivists faction in the Duma was composed of men who had the support of two political parties outside of the Duma, the Progressive Party of Russian Manufacturers and Merchants, and the Progressive Economic Party. The former was strictly a manufacturers', merchants' and businessmen's party, while the latter party had the support of a number of lawyers and some of the more liberal great landowners. The merchants and businessmen were not able to gain the political popularity among the electors that was necessary for them to have an effective political party of their own in the constitutional system of government which was in effect in Russia. Therefore they endeavored to influence and ally themselves with the Progressive Economic Party.

Certainly the political program of this latter party reflected the political desires of the businessman of Russia. The state was to be one and indivisible. This was perhaps because trade would be hampered by tariffs on the borders of any would-be autonomous parts of the Empire. Furthermore, business in Russia would become complicated if it had to abide by the variable controls that likely would be imposed by the various aspiring autonomous governments. Another political concept which would contribute to more business, trade and manufacture

if put into effect was that of equality before the laws of the state for all of Russia's citizens regardless of their nationality, religion or status. If there were no limitations regarding purchase or sale of real estate and no limitations regarding personal economic or educational advancement for the various nationalities, religions, societies and categories of status within the state, then the economy of the country would be stimulated by more economic activity. Many new financial transactions would occur directly as a result of any new freedom of activity that would be given to the previously suppressed peoples of Russia. Similar economic reasoning was found behind this party's platform for inviolability of the person and his dwelling, freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of mobility and travel, freedom of assembly and association and so on.¹

Discourse

It was the above convictions of the Progressive Economic Party that were behind the stand taken by the Progressivists faction on the Kholm bill. This faction's deputies regarded the Kholm bill to be an internal question of administrative reform for Russia. It was not a question of nationality or religion because for them all of Russia's

¹"Progressivnoi Ekonomicheskoi Partii Programma," in Polnoe Sobranie Podrobnykh Programm Russkikh i Pol'skikh Politicheskikh Partii (Vil'na: Tipografiia Ruskii Pochin', 1906), pp. 112-113.

citizens regardless of nationality or religion were to be equal before the laws of the state. The Kholm bill therefore was considered to be both impractical and uneconomical. For those reasons they were opposed to it. Certainly that opposition was evident in the speech by the Progressivist deputy from the Province of Saratov, Count Aleksei Alekseevich Uvarov.

In that speech of November 26, 1911, Uvarov asserted that the Kholm bill had become emotionally clouded by Polish and Russian nationalism, whereas it was merely a question of altering the internal administrative borders of the empire. He denied the validity of using historic, ethnographic and statistical studies for solving the problem. None of these studies were relative to the simple administrative nature of the bill. To be practical Uvarov suggested that the Kholm bill be studied according to factors of administration, economics, communications and law. None of the statistics presented need be considered since even the State Council did not regard them to be accurate, added Uvarov. As for the history or ethnography of Kholm, he felt that those were not matters for the Duma to debate. What Kholm was in the past was not important. What Kholm was today, however, was very vital to the solution of the issue presented by the bill.²

In the first place, Uvarov questioned how the new province's proposed capital city, Kholm, could compete with Lublin and Sedlets as the cultural center for its administrative area?

²S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 31 (November 26, 1911), cols. 2692-94.

The population of Kholm city was only 17,000 as compared to 62,000 for Lublin and 23,000 for Sedlets. Furthermore, he questioned how Kholm city could become that bastion of Orthodoxy which was expected of the place by the Duma when its population had 7,000 Jews, 4,000 Catholics and only 6,000 Russians (i.e. Ukrainians)? Still further, he stated that the city was in an area that was particularly strong with Uniats.³

Another factor that made Kholm province administratively unpractical was the isolated nature of its proposed northern reaches with respect to its capital in Kholm city, said Uvarov. If a person living in the north wished to go to his provincial capital, he would have to go by train through Sedlets and Lublin before arriving in Kholm city. Furthermore, if that person's courts are transferred by the Kholm bill from Lublin and Warsaw to Zhitomir and Kiev respectively, then consider the increased distance he would have to travel to be present for a hearing, Uvarov reasoned. While Warsaw was only 230 versts from Kholm, Zhitomir was 400 versts and Kiev was 500 versts away.⁴

The civil and criminal laws also presented a problem for the proposed province of Kholm, said Uvarov. If the existing Code Napoléon there was replaced by the laws used in Kiev, that would be a step backward as far as justice was concerned. Uvarov said he was sure the citizens of Kholm would not appreciate that. On the other hand, by having the Code Napoléon effective in Kholm

³Ibid., col. 2695.

⁴Ibid., col. 2697.

but having the courts transferred to Kiev, the citizens of Kholm would be burdened with otherwise unnecessary expenses, said Uvarov. These people would have to hire Warsaw lawyers familiar with the Code Napoléon and have them sent to Kiev to present their cases. Furthermore, a special court for hearing such cases would have to be established in Kiev since Napoleon's Code was unfamiliar among court circles there, concluded Uvarov on this argument.⁵

On another argument against the Kholm bill, Uvarov said that Field Marshal Gurko's military defence reasons for opposing the establishment of a Kholm province in the past were even more important today. Because the military line of defence in the event of war had been transferred from the Vistula River to the Bug River and because the latter river constitutes the border between two military defence districts, Uvarov considered it wise not to subdivide a military district with two civil authorities because this would lead to difficulties in wartime due to the additional communications that would be necessary. Uvarov felt that the Duma should ask the Minister of War to tell them personally the opinion of his ministry on this matter. He felt sure that the administrative problems created by a Kholm province were too many and too serious for the Duma to favor the bill's passage.⁶

Against the arguments advocated in the Duma for

⁵Ibid., cols. 2698-2700.

⁶Ibid., cols. 2700-03.

setting up a separate Kholm province, Uvarov disqualified particularly the one which said that the Poles were to be given self-government and for that reason it was necessary to take Kholm out of the Kingdom of Poland or else there was a danger that the Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) in that area would become Polonized. He disbelieved this argument as a reason for the bill. In the first place, he said, the Russian Nationalist Party did not have in its platform any plank for Polish self-government. In the second place, even though it is alleged that the Octobrists have such a bill in mind, how many years will pass by, he asked, before a party in power or in the government will give someone else self-government? The same question is applicable to the present bill on city and local self-government, said Uvarov. "Will you really apply this bill to the Polish cities," Uvarov asked the Duma, "or are you just toying with the idea as a demonstration of your good intentions until the Kholm bill is passed?"⁷

There were several inconsistencies in the Kholm bill which made it more undesirable as an effective act. Why, asked Uvarov, was the Code Napoléon which was a Polish institution intended to remain among a people about to become Russians? Why, Uvarov asked again, was the Polish Zemstvo Credit Society to be left operative there? Why did Evlogii intend to abandon the Orthodox further west than Kholm? Surely, Uvarov asked once more, it was not expected that the people would become assimilated

⁷Ibid., cols. 2703-04.

simply by an act of incorporating them into the country? The Rumanians of Bessarabia have been in Russia for forty years, he said, and they still have not become assimilated. What then, he continued to question, were the reasons for the bill? Perhaps the initiators of the bill, secretly among themselves, were desirous of expropriating the Polish estates in Kholm for themselves and for the Orthodox Church, Uvarov answered his own question. For those reasons, said Uvarov, he and the Progressivists faction would not vote for the Kholm bill. Obviously the bill was not intended to bring welfare to the people of Kholm. It was intended only to bring profits to the bill's initiators, concluded Uvarov.⁸

Uvarov's associate in the Progressivists faction, Nikolai Fedorovich Rumiantsev from the province of Novgorod, gave one more reason why the faction was opposed to the Kholm bill. In his speech to the Duma on January 11, 1912, Rumiantsev said that the Kholm bill was not based on the desire of the local population for the proposed administrative reform. Because there was no plebiscite on the matter conducted there, the bill was in fact imposing the reform on the populace by compulsion.⁹

A more detailed explanation of the Progressivists stand against compulsion was given however by Nikolai Nikolaevich L'vov from the province of Saratov. L'vov granted that the Polonization

⁸Ibid., cols. 2708-11.

⁹S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 46 (January 16, 1912), cols. 381-82.

of the local population was the prevailing tendency in Kholm. He agreed that the Orthodox suffered severely in their struggle for survival in the former Polish Republic. But just as the Polish Sejm heard of the atrocities waged against the Orthodox in the seventeenth century, the Russian Duma in the twentieth century was hearing about atrocities being waged against the Catholics. While our predecessors pleaded before the Poles to be allowed to worship as their own conscience dictated to them, said L'vov, now things have changed and we were not allowing others those very freedoms that our ancestors sought when they fought and suffered under the Polish Republic.¹⁰

There is no doubt as to why Kholm is becoming Polonized, continued L'vov. He told the Duma that he personally visited the church in Protulin where in 1874 Russian soldiers opened fire on the Uniat people in the church while they were praying. This happened because they did not wish to join the Orthodox Church. The following year Governor Gromeko celebrated the union of the Uniats with the Orthodox Church. Today the Orthodox are conducting services in that very church where much human blood had washed its steps, said L'vov. But that did not happen in a period of the distant past about which the people of Kholm could only read. It happened within their own life span. What these people know and remember is what they saw in Protulin. They remember their fallen heroes as martyrs for their faith. This was the conclusion

¹⁰S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 48 (January 18, 1912), cols. 511-15.

that Prince Imeretinskii drew in 1897 when he spoke of the serious blunder that was made in 1875. At that time we were told that the Uniats were asking to join the Orthodox Church. Now we are told that the Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) of Kholm are asking to join Russia. When word got around that there was resistance to the union in 1875, we were told that it came from a few Uniats who had not yet realized the truths of the Orthodox faith, who therefore were not allowed to join the Church and were causing trouble in their frustration. Today we are told that those converts to Catholicism are not really converts but people who by economic or local police compulsion or by some other mistaken reason such as improper registration have increased the numerical ranks of the Roman Catholics. "No gentlemen!" L'vov made his statement emphatic, "those conversions were not mistaken ones! They were real by every conviction of the converts! It is our policies there that are mistaken!"¹¹

The positive solution in Kholm would allow the people there to send one of their own kind to represent them in the Duma. "But no! You would not dare allow a Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) Catholic from Kholm to enter the Duma, would you?" questioned L'vov.¹²

His speech was interrupted at this point by comments from the rightists' seats, "What else?" "What next?"¹³

But L'vov continued, you would never allow such a

¹¹Ibid., cols. 512-16.

¹²Ibid., cols. 517.

¹³Ibid.

representative to appear, to intercede on behalf of "the Russian soil, the ancient Russian soil," so that he would be considered to be like you claim the people of Kholm to be "the descendants of Roman and Daniel of Galicia."¹⁴

L'vov continued his criticism of the policy behind the Kholm bill which did not concede the problem in Kholm to be religious primarily. He criticized those deputies who persisted in complicating this problem by involving it in the question of nationality. In Kholm the questions of religion, nationality and language were not separable, L'vov claimed. No action pertaining to nationality or language could remain free of religious involvement. There was no such thing as Russian (i.e. East Slavic) Catholicism, said L'vov. The language of the Roman Catholic Church in Kholm was the Polish language. For that reason all Catholics strive to teach their children the Polish language. When you take action to suppress the Polish language you are taking action against the Roman Catholic Church at the same time. The Kholm bill can therefore incite the same evil we saw earlier when the Uniats were compelled to become Orthodox, L'vov warned the Duma.¹⁵

Furthermore, it must be remembered, he continued, that those people in Kholm which you call Russians are in fact Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians), and those songs which you say so enthusiastically that you are intending to preserve are Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) songs. You

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., col. 518.

approach these people in Kholm not in the language which their native and former bishops, Kuzemskii and Terashkevich spoke, but in another language, the Russian language which you are teaching them in their schools. What you are doing, said L'vov, is replacing Polish oppression with the oppression of another state. You are forcing those people to become what they themselves do not want to become. You do this in the name of Roman and Daniel of Galicia. Yet all you are doing is laying your heavy hand upon these poor unfortunate people, said L'vov to the initiators of the bill.¹⁶

You have explicitly stated in the bill, L'vov continued, that in the future, suitable administrative measures will be taken in the province of Kholm to bring into legal reality those changes that will come about as the people eventually begin to accept those standards and practices that are found in the primordial provinces of Russia. This is a loaded clause, stated L'vov, enabling all kinds of repressive measures to be taken against these people. If you intend to take measures to try to assimilate these people you should remember what the Minister Sipiagin had to say on this matter in 1902, reminded L'vov. After making a thorough study of the situation in Kholm, Sipiagin said that a province of Kholm could be made Russian only after considerable expense and effort. Among the measures that would be required to solve the problem there was one that would have the entire Polish population in Kholm removed by compulsion and

¹⁶Ibid., cols. 518-19.

resettled into other lands.¹⁷ L'vov agreed with Sipiagin that without this measure, any establishment of a separate province of Kholm would make the area only figuratively Russian. Unless the Duma was willing to violate the Manifesto of October 17, 1905 by resettling the Poles of Kholm, the bill as it stood could not achieve its intended aims, said L'vov.¹⁸

There was therefore no necessity for the bill, inferred L'vov. Furthermore, it was capable of inciting considerable evil for Russia. For those reasons the Progressivists were strongly opposed to the bill, asserted L'vov. The Progressivists believed that by giving the people of Kholm the freedom to choose religions as they saw fit, that populace as a result of the measure would not hold any animosity toward that state which allowed them to have that freedom. On the other hand, the Progressivists felt that any compulsive measure of whatever nature against the religious convictions of the people of Kholm would cause these people to react against the state. Freedom of religion therefore was the key to the solution of the Kholm question, concluded L'vov, and no further measures or bills needed to be applied to Kholm

¹⁷Although it is extraneous to this thesis, it is interesting to note that a resettlement of peoples solution was applied to Kholm in 1945 by the Soviet Union and Poland. Unlike Sipiagin's suggestion, however, the measure in 1945 saw the Ukrainians moved out of Kholm rather than the Poles. The Ukrainians of Kholm were resettled in the Soviet Union in exchange for those Poles who lived east of the Bug River. This river became Poland's eastern boundary once more. See map infra, p. 282.

¹⁸S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 48 (January 18, 1912), cols. 520-22.

other than the enactment there of the Manifesto of October 17, 1905.¹⁹

Inferences

The Progressivists faction presented to the Duma a fairly realistic study of the Kholm question. Perhaps their business-world background enabled them to detach themselves from any emotional feelings toward the religious and national problems involved. Their criticism of the Kholm bill and their solution to the Kholm question was based on a few practical principles that were in harmony with their economic political ideology. Their businessmen's consciousness for security in their everyday transactions perhaps prompted their suspicion of possible perverted interpretations of the Kholm bill in the future. This was reflected in Uvarov's suggestion of the possible expropriation of Polish estates as a real motive for the bill, and his questioning of the Duma's sincerity behind the promise of local self-government for the Poles once the Kholm bill should become law. L'vov too was suspicious of those parts of the bill, which allowed for alterations in the future as conditions in Kholm changed, presumably as a result of the population's assimilation into the Russian way of life. In the first place, the Progressivists doubted whether assimilation by compulsive acts was possible. In the second place, they certainly considered the Kholm bill a compulsive act, since there was no plebiscite on the issue in Kholm according to Rumiantsev, and since the Duma did not dare allow a native

¹⁹Ibid., col. 523.

resident of Kholm to represent his people on the matter before the assembled deputies according to L'vov.

In accordance with their concern for practicality, the Progressivists pointed out numerous problems which the bill raised. Among them the problems of communication in the proposed province and the unusual complexity involved in the proposed legal court system there. They suggested having the political boundaries within the state synonymous with the military districts, which in turn were dependent upon the physical geography of the country. With this proposal it was implied that Kholm could not belong to any political entity east of the Bug River since that river constituted the natural eastern border for the Empire's western-most military district for defence. Also the Progressivists were practical enough to realize that the so-called Russians of Kholm were not in fact Russians, but Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) with a language and a way of living all their own. The Progressivists therefore suggested that the Duma give the people of Kholm the freedom to choose their religious faith and not bother them with any other special national reforms. Equal rights and opportunities were all that the people of Kholm required. This was their practical solution to an otherwise emotionally beclouded problem.

CHAPTER 11

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATS

Ideology

The Constitutional Democratic faction in the Duma, like most other factions had an active political party outside of the legislature to which its members belonged. Although these men were synonymously referred to as Constitutional Democrats or Kadets both inside and outside of the Duma, the official name of their political party was "The Party of National Freedom" (Partiia Narodnoi Svobody). Besides duplicating and even spelling out in greater detail those freedoms applicable to man in society and man as an individual that were found in the platforms of most of the other liberal political parties of Russia, the Constitutional Democratic party program was unique among those programs because it had a specific solution to the Kholm question among its political planks.¹ In the first place the Kadets felt that the Kingdom of Poland should be autonomous with its own freely elected legislative sejm. In the second place:²

the boundary between the Kingdom of Poland and the neighboring provinces should be arranged in consideration of the tribal circumstances and the wishes of the local populace.

In the third place, any non-Polish minorities still found within the Kingdom were to be given not only the same freedoms that the

¹"Partiia Narodnoi Svobody (Konstitutsionno-demokraticheskaiia) Programma," in Polnoe Sobranie Podrobnnykh Programm Russkikh i Pol'skikh Politicheskikh Partii (Vil'na: Tipografiia Ruski Pochi Pochin', 1906), pp. 68-72.

²Ibid., p. 72.

Poles would have as citizens of an autonomous Poland but also the freedom to develop and assert their own national cultures.³

With a stated platform of this nature, the Kadets could not object to the Kholm bill if it drew the eastern boundary for the Kingdom of Poland along ethnographic lines. But they could object to that bill for not drawing that border with the consent of the local populace through a plebiscite on the issue. Indeed this was the vital objection that the Kadets made against the Kholm bill. Along with this objection they linked numerous other political matters that were related to the freedoms which their party advocated.

Discourse

The Kadet deputy who presented his faction's stand on the Kholm question was Fedor Izmailovich Rodichev from the city of St. Petersburg. Rodichev was an incendiary speaker who not infrequently drew comments from the floor of the Duma by virtue of his skill in asking embarrassing questions which often got the necessary replies that called for further even more embarrassing questions. For example, he asked the initiators of the Kholm bill what all the fuss was about for apportioning Kholm from the Kingdom of Poland? Someone from the Duma floor asked him to ask the Poles why they objected to the bill so vigorously? Rodichev's follow-up question asked if Poland was not subject to

³Ibid.

the same Russian laws that were found in the whole empire.⁴

With an additional question he elaborated on his implication that Poland had no separate political entity from which to apportion the province of Kholm. He asked what sort of state was given the name "Kingdom of Poland?" Was the name not given to Poland because she had the right to autonomy just as Finland had? Was the Kholm question therefore no different than the currently discussed question about apportioning Finland so as to annex the province of Viborg? Was that why there was so much fuss? Rodichev asked this question implying that the consent of a Polish sejm, like the consent of the Finnish Diet, was perhaps necessary in the event of a political annexation of this sort. Certainly the fuss was not over any concern over violating any Polish fundamental laws, Rodichev insinuated. Do you think the Poles have the right to use their own language in Poland and that is why Kholm needs to be apportioned? Rodichev replied with another question. Is it not the case that in the state schools of Poland the Polish language is taught with no more priority than are the Lithuanian, English, German and French languages? Thus Rodichev made his faction's position clearly in favor of Polish autonomy. Also he made the apportionment of Kholm subject to the consent of a Polish sejm.⁵

Next he dealt with the specific aspects of the Kholm

⁴S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 36 (December 2, 1911), col. 3159.

⁵Ibid., col. 3160.

question. In 1874 and 1876 the Kholm question was religious, said Rodichev. For thirty-five years the people were persecuted there and now it has become a question of both religion and nationality. With this result, did we not repeat in the nineteenth century that which happened to the Christians in the first century? In those years it was said that from the blood of the martyrs grew a family of Christians, said Rodichev. So in our time we have raised a family of Catholics. Now do we want to do the same with nationality as we did with religion? The Russian government in a short period of time Catholicized Kholm. This was an achievement the Poles were not able to claim after centuries of control there. Surely nationality deserves the same freedom as religion, pleaded Rodichev, or else we will reap the exact things we wish to avoid.⁶

Just as there must be freedom of religion, and freedom of nationality, there must also be freedom of culture, asserted Rodichev. You cannot force culture upon a people. For how many years now has a Russifying policy been imposed upon Poland and the Western Land?⁷

To this question of Rodichev, a comment from the floor of the Duma was heard, "What do you mean by 'Russifying the Western Land?'"⁸

But Rodichev asked another question, "Well gentlemen?"

⁶Ibid., cols. 3160-61.

⁷Ibid., col. 3161.

⁸Ibid.

Answer me. Who have you Russified in Poland?"⁹

The Nationalist Vasilii Konstantinovich Tychinin replied, "We desired to Russify no one."¹⁰

"Of course the answer to the question is that no one was Russified. But it is here stated that there were no desires to Russify anyone. Yet," answered Rodichev, "just as there is no truth in the statement that there were no such desires, there is equally no truth in those similar statements made here concerning the Kholm bill."¹¹

Rodichev also commented on the argument that a person acquires the nationality of the state in which he lives. It was argued that once Kholm becomes a part of Russia, the people of that province would regard themselves Russians by nationality rather than Poles. To make his comments effective, Rodichev chose to ask Kryzhanovskii, the government's representative on the Duma committee studying the Kholm bill, whether he would feel that he was Polish if an independent Polish state annexed the lands in which he lived? The present bill will make the people of Kholm no more Russian than the Minister's assistant, Kryzhanovskii, would become Polish in the example given, explained Rodichev. In other words the Kadets felt that nationality and state citizenship were separate concepts which were not necessarily synonymous with each other in all cases.¹²

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., col. 3162.

Then Rodichev proved that this actually was the conviction of most of the other Duma deputies also, in spite of their political statements in the Duma to the contrary. He cleverly apologized for having used Kryzhanovskii's name in his allegory since, with after-thought, he realized that the name did not sound very Russian.¹³

To this apology Rodichev got the comment from the seats on the right in the Duma saying, "Of course he is Russian. He is Little Russian."¹⁴

The comment was what Rodichev wanted to hear, for it proved his point. Of course the commentator intended to assert that a Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) was nonetheless Russian by nationality. But Rodichev was able to point out that obviously even the rightists were aware of the distinction between the Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) people and the Russians. This distinction was recognized by everyone although the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) had been incorporated into the Russian state for centuries.¹⁵

Another plank in the platform of the Kadets called for the abolition of special privileges for certain nationalities, religions, bureaucratic ranks and estates in Russia. Rodichev applied this political principle to the Kholm question when he asked why it was that whenever the slogan, "Russia for the

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

Russians" was mentioned it was understood to mean, "Russia for Russian holders of the free estates and the Russian bureaucrats?" If Manchuria was to be annexed--or Kholm for that matter--that annexation would mean nothing more to the Russians than the granting of new estates to the high ranking civil servants and to the gentry. It would also mean that certain bureaucrats would be assigned new positions. Had these people run out of work, asked Rodichev, and were they therefore seeking employment in Kholm?¹⁶

Another matter regarding the Kholm bill, said Rodichev, was its financial aspect. The bill of course would require considerable money to put the measure into effect, yet there was no mention of money in the bill nor in its presentation in the Duma because this was a matter that required to be camouflaged. The question only came up indirectly in such statements as, "We must prevent the land banks and zemstvos from getting into Polish hands in Kholm." Was this demonstrative of the equality of the citizens before the law? Or was the bill, asked Rodichev, intended only to provide certain Russian functionaries with land, money and work?¹⁷

You say you are concerned with the plight of the peasant in Kholm, continued Rodichev. If your concern for the peasants is so great, why do you not pass the appropriate zemstvo reforms in the Western Land, and why do you object so vigorously

¹⁶Ibid., cols. 3163-64.

¹⁷Ibid., cols. 3164-65.

to an agrarian reform for the peasants in internal Russia? When Count Bobrinskii said that in internal Russia the landlords did not compel their employees to switch religions at the threat of expulsion from their estates as did the Polish landlords of Kholm, perhaps he had forgotten that peasant-landlord relations in Russia were considerably worse in 1904 than they were in the Kingdom of Poland, said Rodichev. He wondered if Bobrinskii had forgotten how in that year of social disturbances Prince Gagarin from the province of Riazan' was beaten with whips by peasants all his way home from church? Rodichev said that he felt that Bobrinskii and his associates had that beating fixed well in their minds, yet they could not learn a lesson from it. Nor could they learn a lesson from that sole Jew whom they claimed was the only landlord in Kholm who was good to his employees. Yet they should learn how to be good, said Rodichev, and learn to leave Kholm well enough alone. If you were really concerned with the welfare of the peasants of Kholm, said Rodichev to Bobrinskii and his political colleagues, you would pass a bill like the Manifesto of October 17, so that freedom of religion and nationality would exist everywhere in Russia and not only in certain national areas and among certain ranks of status and estates.¹⁸

As for raising the culture of Kholm, said Rodichev, you cannot raise it by using force and compulsion. Furthermore, by imposing a foreign culture on a people by force, a reaction

¹⁸Ibid., cols. 3165-68.

of resistance to it could only be created. Look what happened in the nineteenth century when France did not suppress the German populace within its bounds but gave those people citizen rights and freedoms not unequal to those applicable to any other individual in the country. Then in 1870 when certain provinces¹⁹ fell to Germany by force, the people there who were not able to speak a word of French began to learn that language and became ardent French nationalists, said Rodichev. Do you want to do the same thing in Kholm? Or do you wish to raise a population of Poles by annexing Kholm without the consent of the people?²⁰

If you wish to raise the level of culture there, advised Rodichev, you should give the people of Kholm their freedom. It is said here in the Duma that the people of Kholm want this or that. But how do we know what they want? Rodichev then launched a barrage of other questions. Have they the right to call mass meetings? Or to resolve issues? Can anyone there oppose Bishop Evlogii in an election?²¹

Evlogii answered that they could.²²

Rodichev then asked if that person who opposed Evlogii would be allowed to enter the government?²³

¹⁹He likely referred to Alsace-Lorraine.

²⁰S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 36 (December 2, 1911), cols. 3166-68.

²¹Ibid., cols. 3168-69.

²²Ibid., col. 3169.

²³Ibid.

Another comment from the floor was hurled at Rodichev, "Those are lies! What are you trying to invent?"²⁴

To this Rodichev replied that there was nothing more repulsive than to have a repressed individual with his hands tied and mouth locked, then to say to him, "Who is preventing you from fighting me?"²⁵

If you were not afraid to meet the Kholm question on the basis of freedom, continued Rodichev, you would not require the proposed bill. You are afraid to give these people their freedom because it would not fall to your profit. If you would let them have the freedom to develop their nationality, undoubtedly they would raise a movement against the Polish landlords, but they would raise it under another banner, said Rodichev, not yours.²⁶

They would raise the movement under the banner of Ukrainianism (Ukrainstva), asserted Rodichev. We can draw this conclusion from studying the comparable situation in Galicia where the subsidized Russian society spends its money buying its members.²⁷

With this statement, laughter resounded from the leftists seats in the Duma. It implied the failure of the Russian-subsidized society in Galicia to incite a Russian nationalist

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

feeling among the Ukrainian population there.²⁸

Similarly, continued Rodichev, the Russifying program in Kholm would fade away if in an unprotected challenge it faced freely the movement of the Gaidamacheskago Ukrainofil'stva.²⁹

At this point in his speech Rodichev emphasized his statement with considerable emotion. Voices from the right were heard to say, "Do not disturb yourself!" implying that the movement was not as serious as Rodichev's emotions indicated.³⁰

²⁸Ibid. Certainly the political impact that this society had on the people of Galicia was declining. This was demonstrated in the 1911 elections to the Austrian Reichstag when the pro-Russian Old Ruthene party won only two out of thirty-two seats. See William Alexander Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 215.

The results of this election were well known in the Duma because of their significance to the Russian Nationalist Party. This party was largely responsible for the moral and financial support that the Russian society in Galicia received from Russia. See "Zapadno-Russkii S"ezd, 4-6 Oktiabria, 1909: Galitsko-Russkii Vopross," in Sbornik Kluba Russkikh Natsionalistov, No. 2 (Kiev, 1910), pp. 201-02.

²⁹S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 36 (December 2, 1911), col. 3169. This was a reference to an eighteenth-century Ukrainian resistance movement against the social, national and religious oppression of the Polish government and Polish landlords. The "Haidamaky" uprisings, as they are called in Ukrainian, started a popular oral tradition that was taken up by Ukrainian literature of the Romantic period so that by the time of the Duma the movement was transfigured by a romantic halo into a patriotic struggle for national ideals. See D. Doroshenko, History of the Ukraine, Hanna Chekalenko-Keller, trans. (Edmonton, Canada: The Institute Press Ltd., 1939), pp. 494 and 507.

³⁰S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 36 (December 2, 1911), col. 3170.

But Rodichev continued to affirm his statement by saying that the Ukrainian national movement was destined to rise. Sooner or later it will have its day and there will be nothing in your power to erase it, he said. But it is in our power, continued Rodichev, to give that movement a course so that it will take on the character of a peaceful and cultural movement. We can do this only by giving these people their freedom. Yet the Kholm bill, said Rodichev, violates the freedoms of religion, nationality, and social behavior. By passing this bill you will create in Kholm a nest in which will hatch all kinds of idiotic boiling passions.³¹

"They have boiled for a long time already," a voice from the right was heard to interject.³²

Let us take the matter of religion first, Rodichev continued. You of the Robe (priests) have presented ugly words that have been spoken against your faith in Kholm. Those of you on the other side have presented words equally as ugly in return. These filthy words demonstrate a collision of evil passions that have been perpetuated under the banners of religion, love and forgiveness. This is all connected with the operations of the Peasants Land Bank. When you apply for land at the bank you are asked from whom the Holy Ghost proceeds and when you answer, "from the Father and the Son," instead of just, "from

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

the Father," you cannot get your land through the bank.³³ By this practice you have introduced religion into commerce as it relates to the buying of land. Still further, because you brought that matter up here in the Duma with the intention of capitalizing political gains from its persuasive emotional appeal, "Where can we expect to find enlightenment?" asked Rodichev.³⁴ He then charged the initiators of the Kholm bill with discarding righteousness for religious zeal and nationality,

³³The eighth clause of the Orthodox Ecumenical Nicene Creed reads as follows: "And I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord, the Giver of Life, Who proceedeth from the Father; Who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified; Who spake by the Prophets." See George Mastrantonis, What is the Eastern Orthodox Church? (St. Louis Mo.: Orthodox Lore of the Gospel of Our Savior, 1956), p. 19.

The same clause in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniat) Creed reads as follows: "And I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord Giver of Life, Who proceeds from the Father and the Son; Who with the Father and the Son are equally worshipped and glorified; Who spoke through the Prophets." See the prayer book Z Namy Boh: Molytovnyk, 2nd ed. (Yorkton, Sask.: Ukrainian Redemptorist Fathers, 1942), pp. 21-22.

The Roman Catholic Church recites the same clause as follows: "And I believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and the Life-giver, that proceedeth from the Father and the Son, who with Father and Son is worshipped together and glorified together, who spake through the prophets." See Henry Bettenson (ed.), Documents of the Christian Church (London, New York and Toronto: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 36-37.

Because both the Uniats and the Roman Catholics have in their Creed the additional phrase "and the Son" (in italics above) they would not be allowed to buy land through the Peasants' Land Bank is the implication made by Rodichev.

³⁴S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 36 (December 2, 1911), col. 3170.

since they intended to convert a foreign nationality and a foreign religion to their own by suppression and conflict. Rodichev implored the Russian Duma not to pass such medieval laws of religious and national intolerance in the twentieth century.³⁵

Father Iurashkevich interrupted Rodichev's speech with, "Tell that to the Poles!"³⁶

"Yes, I am speaking to the Poles as well as to the Russians at this time," replied Rodichev. "I am not a defender of Polish nationalism, either."³⁷

"Bravo!" came a shout from the right which was followed by cheers and applause.³⁸

"The difference between Polish and Russian nationalism," continued Rodichev, "was that Polish nationalism was that of the oppressed while the other was that of the oppressor. But the names, 'Polish' or 'Russian' did not preserve these nationalisms from being evil."³⁹

"What about Jewish nationalism?"⁴⁰ someone asked Rodichev from the floor of the Duma, implying that the Kadet

³⁵Ibid., cols. 3170-71.

³⁶Ibid., col. 3171.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

party was a Jewish party.⁴¹

Rodichev continued his speech with a definition of nationalism. "It is the lack of recognizing any foreign merit and dignity," said Rodichev. "This is a negation of Christianity," he continued, "because Christianity says that there exist no distinctions between a Helene [ellina] or a Jew [iudeia]. But for you, first of all, there exists a Jew, a Pole and a Russian." This reply to the inquirer about Jewish nationalism caused a tremendous commotion in the Duma which was not checked by the chairman until he rang his bell to call the deputies to order again.⁴²

"It is not up to me to defend the dignity of the Orthodox church," continued Rodichev.⁴³

He was interrupted again with: "That is for sure, indeed!" from the rightist seats in the Duma.⁴⁴

"But I will defend the dignity of man and of the Russian name," Rodichev finished his sentence. "I want to

⁴¹To discredit the Kadet party it was frequently alleged that it was a Jewish party. It was pointed out that all of the three Jewish deputies in the Duma belonged to the Kadet faction. This was however the result of the party's program of equality of nationalities before the laws of the state. The Kadets therefore had a greater variety of nationalities represented among their deputies in the Duma than any other faction. There were 43 Russians, 1 Ukrainian, 1 Pole, 2 Armenians, 1 German, 2 Estonians and 3 Jews in the Kadet faction. See Appendix I., p. 277.

⁴²S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 36 (December 2, 1911), col. 3171.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid.

be proud of my Russian name."⁴⁵

Again he was interrupted with laughter from the right and voices from the center, "Oh, oh!"⁴⁶

"I want to say, 'Yes! we are not oppressors,'" continued Rodichev, getting applause from the leftist seats which was stopped by the chairman's bell.⁴⁷

"For the Russian people there is another course than to oppress other nationalities and religions," continued Rodichev. "So if you wish to care also for the dignity of the Russian name, you should care to pass a bill concerning equality for all the citizens of Russia."⁴⁸

"Oh, oho!" came an interrupting voice from the Duma floor again.⁴⁹

"Yes," continued Rodichev, "and in the State Duma where there is a plurality who call themselves Octobrists, who stand for equality before the law for nationalities and religions, there seem to be made from among their ranks some calls of disagreement with these words in the form of 'oh, oh, oh.' Let me, gentlemen, return these words to you." Again Rodichev was applauded by the leftist deputies. There was laughter coming from the seats on the extreme right, but Rodichev continued:

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid.

"Since these words of citizen's equality were asserted along with your name on the 17th of October, so assert them again in regard to the Kholm bill. Or is it that you in reality are not taken in very much by that very Act of October 17, 1905?"⁵⁰

It seems that the Kholm bill is nothing more than a result of June 3rd,⁵¹ continued Rodichev. This act came first of all as a blow to the innocent non-Russian citizens and to the Russian peasants. Now you cement it further with hatred against mankind and with religious intolerance when what you should be doing is applying those principles of freedom that are stated in the Manifesto of October 17th. World domination must be stricken out from your plans, or it will not be long when voices in many languages will speak to you about the evil of this adventure, Rodichev warned the initiators of the Kholm bill. But the response he got was laughter from the seats on the right. "You had better not laugh," he retorted, "lest you will see that day when you will regret you spoke those misanthropic words and phrases that penetrated into this very Third Duma. Yes, here one speaks of non-Russians in the same way as one speaks of a starving peasant. Just as you would feed the peasant birch-tree porridge, you would treat the non-Russians

⁵⁰Ibid., cols. 3171-72.

⁵¹He referred to the restrictions in the electoral laws of June 3, 1907, by which the Third Duma was elected. These laws reduced or eliminated entirely the possibilities for certain non-Russian nationalities to send their representatives to the Duma. See Samuel N. Harper, The New Electoral Law for the Russian Duma (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1908), pp. 2-3.

with national and religious oppression."⁵²

In his speech Rodichev concluded that the Kholm question could be solved only if the people of Kholm were given election laws based on the equality principles of October 17th. Still further, they should be given the freedom to assemble and to hold meetings and the freedom to speak their minds. Then after a free election, their true representatives would be able to tell the Duma honestly how these people want to solve their problem.⁵³

Inferences

Because Rodichev covered quite thoroughly the attitude of the Kadet faction on the Kholm bill, there is no need to delve here into the speeches of other deputies from his faction on this topic. We will however have the opportunity to study the speeches of other Kadet deputies in another chapter. These deputies however spoke as co-nationals on behalf of the nationalities involved in the Kholm question. Yet even before studying these other Kadet speeches, it can be concluded that the Kadet faction made every attempt to advocate as many of its political policies as was possible in connection with the Kholm bill. It might also be concluded that the Kadet party was among the political parties of Russia that were most tolerant of the cultural activities of the non-Russian nationalities in that state. The Kadets of

⁵²S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 1, M. 36 (December 2, 1911), cols. 3172-73.

⁵³Ibid., col. 3173.

course considered the concept of nationality as something not necessarily synonymous with citizenship.

Because the Kadets did not want to appear to be favoring either of the two principal non-Russian nationalities, the Ukrainians and the Poles, who were involved in the Kholm question, they chose to propose that the issue be solved by local decision. Yet, because their vote was against the bill as presented in the Duma, in action they appeared to favor the Polish stand that Kholm remain a part of the Kingdom of Poland. To balance this off, they chose to state that for the most part the settlers of Kholm were not Polish but Ukrainian by nationality, and that the Ukrainians were capable of developing a strong national movement there which might get out of hand and lead to separatism if certain freedoms were not granted. At the same time, the Kadets advocated full autonomy for the Kingdom of Poland.

This stand by the Kadets was not only in harmony with their ideology, but it enabled them to seek favors from both the Polish and the Ukrainian political camps. The Poles had a bloc of deputies in the Duma worth considering as potential allies for several measures the Kadets would like to advocate. On the other hand, one of the most powerful of the Ukrainian national parties, the Association of Ukrainian Progressivists (Tovarystvo Ukrains'kykh Postupovtsiv) had supported the Kadets in their election campaign to the Third Duma. Perhaps that support could again be used in the coming elections to the Fourth Duma.

Certainly arrangements for cooperation in the forthcoming campaign were under negotiation at this time between the Kadets and the Ukrainian association. A stand on the Kholm question that was favorable to the Ukrainian point of view was therefore appropriate.⁵⁴

⁵⁴See Panas Fedenko, Ukrains'kyi Rukh u 20 Stolitti (London: Vydavnytstvo Nashe Slovo, 1959), p. 67.

CHAPTER 12

THE TOILERS' FACTION

Ideology

The Toilers' (Trudovik) faction, like the Rightist faction, did not use in the Duma the name of the political party to which most of its members belonged. Once again, like the Rightists, the Toilers considered their political ideals incompatible with the semi-constitutional monarchist regime of which the Duma was a part. The Toilers were republicans who followed quite closely the political platform of the Socialist Revolutionary party. The Socialist Revolutionaries officially boycotted the Duma elections for various political reasons. They did not wish to recognize the monarchist system of government and its legislative process. But they could hardly afford not to have at least some deputies in the Duma to present their party's point of view on matters of state and to keep the party informed on the Duma's legislative activities. Therefore those Socialist Revolutionaries who contested the elections to the Duma, took on the name "Toilers," after the name which they applied to their Duma faction.¹

Besides their platform of republicanism, the Socialist

¹Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia 1855-1914 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952), p. 249; Katerina Breshkovskaia, Hidden Springs of the Russian Revolution: Personal Memoirs of Katerina Breshkovskaia, Lincoln Hutchinson, ed. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1931), p. 296.

Revolutionaries advocated national autonomy for all the nationalities in Russia who wished to make themselves self-governing entities. All these national self-governing areas would form a single federal democratic republic in which all legislation would be legalized by the direct initiative and referendum of the people whose activities and rights would not be restricted by sex, religion, or nationality.² With political convictions of this kind it is not surprising that in their stand on the Kholm bill the Toilers' faction insisted that the people of Kholm be given the right to assert their nationality and to decide their own political allegiance by a referendum.

Discourse

Of the three Toilers who participated in the Kholm debate, Andrei Andreevich Bulat from the Province of Suvalki took the most active part. Bulat was particularly suitable among the Toilers to speak on the Kholm question because he himself was a peasant from an area with a national mixed population whose circumstances were similar to those found in Kholm. Bulat was Lithuanian and the Province of Suvalki was in the Kingdom of Poland. A considerable portion of the province was settled by Lithuanians, while the large estates there were owned for the most part by Poles. In his main speech on the Kholm bill, Bulat outlined the parallel situation that was found in his native

²"Programma Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov," in Polnoe Sobranie Podrobnykh Programm Russkikh i Pol'skikh Politicheskikh Partii (Vil'na: Tipografiia Ruskii Pochin', 1906), p. 110.

province with that of Kholm. He applied the principle of national self-assertion as the solution to the problem in both Kholm and his native Suvalki.³

Regarding Kholm, Bulat said that the Duma has witnessed the problem to be a question of whether the proposed new province should be under the jurisdiction of either one governor-general or under another. It has even been suggested that perhaps a special governor-general be assigned for Kholm so that the province would be answerable directly to the Minister of the Interior in St. Petersburg. Yet in spite of this rather simple internal administrative problem there had been considerably more political commotion in the country and much more said than was the case when it was decided to apportion Sakhalin Island and surrender part of it to Japan, a foreign state. What then, asked Bulat, is the disagreement about over Kholm? It is over the question of what is to be apportioned from whom, and then to whom will what be given, he answered. But the people of Kholm are entirely forgotten in the melee. Yet it is necessary above all to come to the people themselves to find out what they want, said Bulat. But that is what the Duma has failed to do. It has not asked the Ukrainian people who settle those districts what their national needs are. The entire conflict is over the question of whether the Russian government, the bureaucrats and the Orthodox priests will Russify these people or whether the

³S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 45 (January 13, 1912), cols. 218-33.

Polish landowners and Roman Catholic priests will Polonize them. That is what the whole issue is about, said Bulat.⁴

He continued his speech by drawing a parallel between Kholm and his own Suvalki province. Like the Ukrainians in Kholm, the Lithuanians in Suvalki were subject to Polonizing policies by the great-estate landlords on the one hand, and on the other hand were subject to the Russifying policies by the Russian government and its puppets. Bulat wanted to emphasize that it was the Russian government and its puppets that carried out the Russifying policies because he did not believe that the Russian people themselves were interested in foreign acquisitions. These people were too interested in their own problems, he said. However, he reported with great grief that the Russian people do not have a say on the matter of government policy-making.⁵

There was no question about the matter of whether the government could or could not apportion Kholm from the Kingdom of Poland though, said Bulat. If the people were not asked if the government could sign away Sakhalin to a foreign state, then surely the government could alter its internal political boundaries at will.⁶

Another question raised in the Duma pertaining to the Kholm problem was the historical political origins of the area. This was a question, said Bulat, entirely unapplicable as an

⁴Ibid., col. 219.

⁵Ibid., col. 220.

⁶Ibid., cols. 220-21.

influential factor for solving the problem. Throughout the history of Kholm, as presented by the reports of the Duma committee and the government, a number of different states were mentioned who had governed the area from time to time. Even the national composition of the early settlers there changed. It was also said that at one time a Lithuanian tribe, the Iatviagi, lived there. On the basis of historic settlement the Lithuanians therefore could claim Kholm as their native land. But the Lithuanians did not apply this principle for determining their national boundaries. They recognized that Kholm was settled by Ukrainians, said Bulat.⁷

It is worth noting that in the entire reports on Kholm by the Duma committee and the government there was no mention of the Ukrainian inhabitants of the area, continued Bulat. The study was made to appear as if the issue was between the Polish and the Russian populations there. Yet, Bulat said, the Ukrainians had no desire to be either Polish or Russian. He could not see why anyone but a renegade would change his nationality for the sake of a Polish priest or landlord or for that matter for the sake of a Russian bureaucrat or Orthodox priest. "Once a person was Ukrainian," Bulat said, "he would always be a Ukrainian. Once he was a khokhol,⁸ he would always remain a

⁷Ibid., col. 221.

⁸The word khokhol means "tuft" or "topknot" in the Russian language. This was a nick-name given the Ukrainians by the Russians. Perhaps the usage of this nick-name comes from the hair style worn by some of the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the sixteenth century.

khokhol," implying that the Russians considered the Ukrainians to be unlike themselves since they had a special name for them.⁹

Evlogii tried quickly to distort the implication. He interrupted Bulat's speech with: "Of course he would be a khokhol. He would be a Russian khokhol."¹⁰

Bulat then read a pamphlet in Ukrainian which he said presented the Ukrainian point of view on the Kholm issue:¹¹

In the whole issue, of particular note was the characteristic that all the negotiations, agreements and contests are being conducted between Russian and Polish bureaucratic circles. They are being conducted over the heads of the Ukrainian population of Kholm.

A Rightist from the province of Kursk, Nikolai Evgen'evich Markov, interrupted with the question, "Are you reading that in English?"¹²

"There you are, gentlemen," answered Bulat. "There is your answer what sort of nationality is involved in Kholm. Often it has been said that there exists no Ukrainian nationality and that there exists no Ukrainian language, yet when I read a citation in Ukrainian, Deputy Markov asked whether it was English that I was reading. Since you have not recognized the Ukrainians as a nationality and therefore have not allowed them to speak for themselves here in this Duma, I will speak here on their

⁹S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 45 (January 13, 1912), col. 222.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

behalf."¹³

To protect himself from any charges that he was making up arguments to further his own political ends, Bulat verified his delegation to speak on behalf of the Ukrainians. He presented letters, pamphlets and other documents, some even from Kholm, which were sent to him by Ukrainians to be presented before the Duma. He explained why he agreed to present the Ukrainian point of view on the Kholm issue on their behalf.

First of all, Bulat said, the nationality and language exists whether you call it Ukrainian, Little Russian or khokhlatskii iazyk. Secondly, there were some tens of deputies in the Second Duma who formed a group known as the Ukrainian-Autonomists-Deputies. These deputies spoke of having an autonomous Ukrainian educational system, an autonomous government and a national legislative sejm. They also spoke of Kholm as one of the component areas of Ukraine. Bulat did not know whether the boundary for Kholm as proposed by the Duma committee was correct or not, since this was a difficult matter to solve without a free plebiscite there; but he knew that the area about to become the new province was more or less the area which was inhabited primarily by Ukrainians. Furthermore, the Ukrainians were vigorously upholding their national ideals wherever they had the opportunity to do so. Their national consciousness was revealed well in their struggle against the Poles in the Galician Sejm. This is well known to all. It should be recognized further, Bulat said, that the so-called

¹³Ibid.

Russians of Galicia and the Ukrainians of Kholm are not merely brothers but one and the same nationality.¹⁴

Evlogii interrupted with, "That is right!"¹⁵

"On this matter," continued Bulat, "Bishop Evlogii agrees, but he disagrees with me that there is a Ukrainian nationality. In his mind, there is no Ukrainian nationality nor can there ever be such a nationality. But in my mind, every nationality that desires to assert its national self-being should be given the right to do so. That right is a natural human law with which mankind is born."¹⁶

Bulat went on to prove that the Ukrainians had their own national language. His verification was based on the conclusion drawn to this effect by the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences which made a study of the matter. Bulat felt that the Duma was not qualified to challenge the findings of the Academy.¹⁷

But Markov asked: "Why not challenge it?"¹⁸

Another Toiler, Konstantin Matveevich Petrov from the province of Perm was heard to say, "For Markov even the Academy does not exist!"¹⁹

Bulat agreed that one could certainly challenge the

¹⁴Ibid., cols. 222-23.

¹⁵Ibid., col. 223.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., cols. 223-24.

¹⁸Ibid., col. 224.

¹⁹Ibid.

findings, but if a nationality desired to assert itself as such and if it was not allowed to assert itself peacefully, sooner or later it would resort to violence to accomplish its aims.²⁰

Bulat was again interrupted with, "Now look at the course his speech has taken!"²¹

But Bulat continued his argument that national assertion for the Ukrainians should be allowed and that its territorial extent should be established by a referendum.²²

At this point the Social-Democrat, Georgii Sergeevich Kuznetsov from the province of Ekaterinoslav was heard to say, "The referendum is to be held in a Russian assembly!"²³

Bulat asserted in reply that national determination and the solution to the Kholm question could not be resolved satisfactorily in the Duma. It was first necessary that the people in Kholm enjoy the freedoms of speech, press, and self-determination. Once these freedoms were granted, then a local referendum could be held. But at the present, continued Bulat, the Ukrainians enjoyed none of these freedoms. They were not allowed to express themselves freely in the press nor orally before any meaningful assembly. Nor were they allowed to assert their national being since it was alleged that there was no Ukrainian nationality. Note that in the mass of literature

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

published with the bill, nowhere will you find the term "Ukrainian nationality," but rather the term "Russian nationality." Yet without the right of national self-determination the Ukrainians cannot expect any just solution to their problems.²⁴

Then Bulat said that his words regarding the Ukrainian nationality were not radical, for even professor Hrushevskii, who was far from being a radical, would agree with his solution. In the book Formy Natsional'nago Dvizheniia v Sovremennykh Gosudarstvakh,²⁵ according to Bulat, the historian Hrushevskii wrote as follows:²⁶

We will demonstrate by results that the progressive, democratic and social Ukrainian movement appears to provide a course for the conscientious people in Ukrainian society. This movement is not a theory created without formulation by a small group of people. It is the organic result of a historical process, the logical outcome of the mode of Ukrainian livelihood and the facts of their sovereign conduct. Up to this time, nevertheless, not to mention the recognition of its general political and social problems, the Ukrainian movement did not have sincere allies nor well wishers among the progressive elements of the Great Russian or Polish societies.

Bulat used the above quotation to prove that he personally was not putting forth an unrealistic assertion regarding the existence of a Ukrainian nationality. He then quoted another

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Mykhailo Hrushevskii wrote a chapter on the Ukrainians in this book of collected scholarly articles on the national movements of Central and Eastern Europe. See that chapter in A. I. Kastelianskii (ed.), Formy Natsional'nago Dvizheniia v Sovremennykh Gosudarstvakh: Avstro-Vengriia, Rossiia, Germaniia (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia Pol'za, 1910), pp. 307-30.

²⁶S. o., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 45 (January 13, 1912), col. 225.

source to prove that his assertions on the Kholm question were those presented by Ukrainians. The book that he was referring to, said Bulat, was legally published in Russia, so he challenged the Duma deputies to read it. Then he proceeded to read from that book. It was Bilousenko's book, Kholms'ka sprava:²⁷

The conflict should be resolved by a friendly agreement between the interested parties, the Poles and the Ukrainians. The agreement should be based on the results of a plebiscite which would be conducted in a manner so that every person in the entire Kholm area would be asked his desired national allegiance. But this ideal solution is far from any likelihood of being utilized. Meanwhile, the relationship between the two nationalities in Kholm has reached a degree of disagreement so great as reflected by the prevailing national and religious strife that it is no longer tolerable to live there. That religious and national fire which was ignited by the Roman Catholic priests along with certain Polish elders on the one hand and by the Orthodox priests with the help of the government on the other, has engulfed so much with its powerful and extensive flames that the local Ukrainian people have called for help. As it is usual in such circumstances, a policeman appeared on the scene.²⁸

"So you see," added Bulat, "the Polonizers and the Russifiers started a conflict and now that a policeman has appeared, he is resolving the question as he himself pleases. From that quotation you can see also the necessity of that referendum of which I spoke to you about. Furthermore, the Ukrainians desire to resolve the issue only on the basis of national autonomy for themselves even though they agree that, 'apportioning Kholm from the Kingdom of Poland is the natural thing to do in order to protect a part of our people from

²⁷Ibid., cols. 225-26.

²⁸The policeman referred to here was the proposed Kholm bill.

losing our nationality.'"²⁹

"But the issue had to be resolved on the principles of national self-determination" continued Bulat, "because: 'The Kholm bill, while leading the Ukrainians of Kholm from Polonoization, has the aim of leading them into Russification. It would win over the former Uniats from Catholicism and draw them into the Orthodox Church. But should these people resist, the bill promises to repeat past history by applying compulsion.'"³⁰

"So you see gentlemen," commented Bulat, "The Ukrainians fully expect the bill to initiate another round of atrocities of the same kind that we saw when the Uniats were persecuted until they became Orthodox. This same Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian), Bilousenko, in the Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) language says further: 'For us Ukrainians the present bill, the unsatiated child of the "true Russian union" and the bureaucrats has no appeal and we cannot support it whatsoever. Nor will it please us to see anyone else support it.'"³¹

"There you are, gentlemen!" exclaimed Bulat, "the 'true Russians' have forgotten about the Ukrainian nationality, according to what that nationality says to the extent that it is able to raise its voice."³²

²⁹S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 45 (January 13, 1912), col. 226.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

Voices from the right were heard to say, "Read on!
Read on!"³³

Bulat obliged and read on but not until he had stated that the Ukrainians would favor the bill only providing that their national rights were protected by it.³⁴

So when the opposition decides to vote against the bill, it should be criticized principally from the point of view of the just interests of the Ukrainian and Polish people in Kholm. In the course of parliamentary procedure, in committee and in the Duma tribune, the bill should be given such a form so that it would divide the two nationalities fairly and so that it would rid that long suffering country of the pains of a brotherly battle, which the people there have borne for so long a time.

If the bill indeed protected the rights of the Ukrainians then we would vote for it, said Bulat. But the bill has forgotten all about the Ukrainian nationality. It has the qualities of taking them out of the fire and putting them into the flames. Furthermore, it does not give the peasants any relief from their agrarian problem of land shortage. Switching landlords does not solve that problem. What the bill should include among its reforms is the apportionment of additional lands for the peasants from the estates of the landlords whether Polish or Russian. But the Duma would never pass a bill like that, insinuated Bulat.³⁵

"Indeed it would not," said Markov.³⁶

Of course if it was decided to buy lands for the

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid., cols. 226-27.

³⁵Ibid., cols. 227-28.

³⁶Ibid., col. 228.

peasants of Ukrainian nationality from the Polish or other landlords in Kholm, continued Bulat, then the prices would be preposterous so as to give that class tremendous profits. However since there is nothing concerning land reforms in the Kholm bill, there likely will be nothing more done about the agrarian problem there than hearing out the presentation of the little talk on the matter by Count Bobrinskii. Indeed, the land reforms were all talk and no action. The only action that was to be taken by the bill was nationalistic in nature.³⁷

"National," corrected Evlogii.³⁸

"It is aimed at Russifying the peasants," confirmed Bulat to indicate the correctness of his choice of the word "nationalistic" over Evlogii's suggested word, "national." Bulat then continued his speech by indicating the numerous new bureaucratic positions the bill would create. There would have to be new courts staffed. There would have to be a new Russian school board and a new system of Russian schools staffed. There would have to be new communication services opened to Zhitomir from where the Russian influence on Kholm would be expected to come. Of course, to maintain good relations with the bureaucrats in Lublin where the influence originated formerly, there would have to be respect paid to them too, insinuated Bulat. After the Ukrainian peasants of Kholm are chased from Lublin to Zhitomir and back to Kholm, from city to city, to city, undoubtedly they

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

will be very grateful to you for making them true Russians by nationality, mocked Bulat.³⁹

But Bulat was interrupted by Vasilii Konstantinovich Tychinin at this point. Tychinin was a Nationalist from Grodno and a policeman by occupation. Even before Bulat entered the rostrum to speak to the Duma, Tychinin asked him to speak on the Lithuanian problem in the province of Suvalki. This time Tychinin interrupted Bulat's speech on Kholm to ask him again to speak on the Suvalki question. Since Grodno was a neighboring province to Suvalki, it was natural for Tychinin to be familiar with and interested in the nationality problem in Suvalki. Certainly Bulat had already outlined a parallel between Suvalki and Kholm in his speech, but what Tychinin wanted was to have Bulat commit himself to a specific stand on the Suvalki question.⁴⁰

As Bulat obliged Tychinin with his opinion on the Suvalki question, he told the Duma what the problem was. Just as the Kholm bill intended to annex to Russia the Ukrainian areas of the Kingdom of Poland, so also the Suvalki question was concerned with annexing to Russia the Lithuanian areas of the Kingdom of Poland. Just as the Ukrainians of Kholm were regarded true Russians, so also the Lithuanians were considered Russians from primordial times. Because there was a Polonizing policy in effect in Suvalki just as there was in Kholm and because the Lithuanians resented that policy no less than the Ukrainians did

³⁹Ibid., cols. 228-30.

⁴⁰Ibid., col. 230.

in their own case, so also as in Kholm there developed in Suvalki antagonistic relationships between the Polonizers and the people to be Polonized. To capitalize on this situation for their own political ends, certain Russian newspapers had taken up the issue as if they were on the Lithuanian side in the dispute and had proposed annexing to Russia the Lithuanian parts of the province of Suvalki. The editorials in the newspapers Novoe Vremia (New Times) and Svet (The World) by the great champion of national rights, Men'shikov, in the former case, and by Count Bobrinskii and his cohorts in the latter, had even challenged me, said Bulat, to take sides on this issue. They either hoped to discredit me before my people or else they wanted me to support their nationalistic policies.⁴¹

The truth was that the Lithuanians had no desire to be annexed to the Governor-Generalship of the Northwestern Lands because national conditions for the Lithuanians there were even more severe than they were in the Kingdom of Poland. Nor did the Lithuanians wish to be annexed to the province of Grodno to become the victims of the Russifying policies there. In short, until all the Lithuanians have the right to self-determination and have their own autonomous state to which the Lithuanians of Suvalki could join, these people would be content to remain in the Kingdom of Poland. Until these people ask me to speak otherwise, this will be the stand which I will take on their behalf, said

⁴¹Ibid.

Bulat.⁴²

It was Bulat's opinion that the Ukrainians of Kholm were of similar convictions about their situation as were the Lithuanians of Suvalki over their fate. They would rather take their chances against the Polonizing policies found in the Kingdom of Poland than take their chances against the Russifying policies for the non-Russian nationalities found in Russia.⁴³

Inferences

As a Toiler and a Socialist Revolutionary, Bulat certainly emphasized his party's political principle of national self-determination in the form of autonomous national states within Russia. This matter dominated his entire speech. Even though he spoke of landlords and bureaucrats in a derogatory sense and mentioned the need for agrarian reforms--all of which could be expected of him as a Socialist Revolutionary and a peasant--yet he was most concerned with the higher ideals of national politics. He would prefer to see national boundaries drawn in accordance with the desires of the people as expressed through plebiscites. He would safeguard those boundaries of the autonomous national states by taking away the policy-making powers from the bureaucrats of a centralist type of governmental system and give them to the people. He had faith that the people

⁴²Ibid., cols. 230-33.

⁴³Ibid.

of any single nation were not interested in dominating, suppressing, assimilating or controlling the people of other nations. For that reason he expressed no animosity against the Russians or the Poles, but considered their oligarchic leadership at fault for the strife found in Kholm and in Suvalki. For that reason also, he felt that national self-determination coupled with the power of policy control in the hands of the people as expressed through plebiscites would be the means through which problems such as those found in Kholm could be resolved in a just and fair manner.

CHAPTER 13

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

Ideology

The Social Democratic faction in the Duma followed the political platform of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party as outlined by their Second Congress, July 17 to August 10, 1903 in Brussels, and London. While their platform included the principle of self-determination for those parts of Russia which were distinct from other parts and thereby had the necessity for special local governmental treatment, the Social Democrats were not in favor of a federation of autonomous national states for Russia. Unlike the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Social Democrats indicated their desire to have a single house of representatives to express the sovereignty of all the people from all over Russia. Nevertheless, the Social Democrats did propose local self-governing units which would allow the various nationalities of Russia to organize their own education and school systems to teach their own national languages. This plank in their platform was supplementary of course to their plank concerning the right of all the nationalities of Russia to assert themselves as national entities. This assertion, however, did not necessarily have to coincide geographically with the boundaries of the political administrative units that would be in existence in Russia. The Social Democrats tended to favor political sub-divisions within the state based on

factors of physical geography more so than on factors of national ethnography. But at the same time the nationality factor helped define a geographical entity.¹

Discourse

The Social Democratic interpretation of national self-determination and the geographic principles for sub-dividing Russia into political units must have been kept in mind by the Georgian Social Democrat, Evgenii Petrovich Gegechkori from the Province of Kutai, when he leveled the first criticism which the Kholm bill received immediately upon its introduction to the Duma on May 19, 1909. Of course Gegechkori did not say that Kholm must remain in the Kingdom of Poland, but he did say that the area could leave the Kingdom only after the initiative in this direction was taken by the local population and if it were verified by the outcome of a plebiscite held there. Gegechkori felt that the Duma was not in a position to alter geographical entities. Apparently the Social Democrats regarded the Kingdom of Poland as such an entity.²

Furthermore, Gegechkori felt that the Kholm bill was not a bill which was seriously intended to solve the nationality problem in Kholm. He considered the bill a reactionary blow

¹"Programma Rossiiskoi Sotsialdemokraticeskoi Rabochei Partii, priniataia na vtorom s"ezde partii," in Polnoe Sobranie Podrobnykh Programm Russkikh i Pol'skikh Politicheskikh Partii (Vil'na: Tipografiia Ruski Pochin', 1906), pp. 101-02.

²S. O., 3D., 2S., Pt. 4, M. 114 (May 19, 1909), col. 1442.

against the lawful requests of the Poles for autonomy. It was a cutting reply to the Poles and a demonstration of intended further suppression of their national rights. The bill would leave the Jewish population of Kholm with very much the same restrictions they had lived under to date. As for the Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) of Kholm, Gegechkori said that they would become the victims of a new administration which would govern them without their authority and consent. Nor could he see any gains for the Orthodox Church by the bill. The increased friction, both national and religious, that the bill would cause would only drive the local people into the Polish camp. Because the bill would not realize its intended purpose of solving the Kholm question, but rather aggravate the problem there, Gegechkori proposed a motion to the effect that the Duma not even consider the bill as presented by the government.³

But Gegechkori's motion was challenged. It was said to be unconstitutional. As a result of the challenge, the Duma vice-chairman V. M. Volkonskii never called a vote on it. The original motion presented by the government to have the bill sent to two Duma committees for further study and eventual resolvment in the Duma was voted upon and accepted, however. Thus it was that even before the Kholm bill was up for debate in the Duma, it was questioned by the Social Democratic faction.⁴

³Ibid., cols. 1442-43.

⁴Ibid., cols. 1443-44.

When the Kholm bill debate was eventually held, another Georgian Social Democrat, Nikolai Semenovitch Chkheidze from the Province of Tiflis, gave the faction's final say on the matter. Chkheidze said that class exploitation was synonymous with religious intolerance in Kholm. While each side has charged the other with exploiting the peasants for religious reasons, it can be said that the Poles have been exploiting the peasants in a Catholic way and that the Russians have been exploiting them in an Orthodox way. At one time in history the two sides struck upon a brilliant idea on how to have a monopoly on the exploitation of the peasants, so they formed the Uniat Church. "Now by my honest conscience," said Chkheidze, "I do not know which of these three forms of exploitation is better." Chkheidze felt that the people of Kholm were just as bewildered as he was, after they had been chased from religion, to religion, to religion.⁵

Because Father Iurashkevich and his cohorts had mentioned on a number of occasions that a national feeling was being awakened among the Russian people, Chkheidze wished to remind them that national feelings among the non-Russian peoples of Russia also were being awakened. Among these non-Russians were the Ukrainians, including those Ukrainians who settled Kholm. Since Iurashkevich was so quick to understand, to sympathize and to encourage the expression of the national feelings of the Russians because it was a natural and justified course of social

⁵S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 48 (January 18, 1912), col. 524.

development, Chkheidze asked if equally he was willing to allow the Ukrainians to develop their national feelings in the same way and for the same reasons.⁶ To date this was not the case, said Chkheidze, and he quoted professor Hrushevskii to prove it:⁷

All expressions of Ukrainian self-assertion were suppressed and are continued to be suppressed through acts of administrative purges. Ukrainian separatism is the result of the evil conscience of Russian bureaucracy which over the centuries has suppressed all kinds of political, cultural and national tendencies by the Ukrainians. These tendencies have now permeated all spheres of Ukrainian activity including their interest in their native language, their history, their enlightenment and their economic prosperity.

"So you see," continued Chkheidze, "the Ukrainian national feelings also have awoken. But you will say that Hrushevskii is only one of a small group of fanatic Ukrainophiles."⁸

He was interrupted with a shout of "That is right!" coming from one of the seats on the right side of the Duma.⁹

"But we know the truth of the matter, even without the research of Professor Hrushevskii," continued Chkheidze. "We know that the zealous Orthodox have this year threatened to expel any students from the Little Russian [*i.e.* Ukrainian] schools who are caught reading the Bible in the Little Russian [*i.e.* Ukrainian] language." He gestured to the seats in the center and the right in the Duma and asked, "Why are you so

⁶Ibid., cols. 524-25.

⁷Ibid., col. 525.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

surprised at this? Surely you all know that the fate of the Ukrainians was in the hands of the Russians and that their fate has become a frightful tragedy."¹⁰

"So there you are!" continued Chkheidze, "Since that is the nature of your relationship with the Ukrainians or the Little Russians, which you call Russians, then what can be expected from you in your relationship with the Ukrainians of Kholm? Your use of compulsion is better than the compulsion used by the Poles. If it is to be used to Russify the people according to the spirit of Timoshkin,¹¹ then as for myself, I would rather become Polonized than become Timoshkinized."¹²

Chkheidze then asked what the Jews and the Poles would gain from the Kholm bill? He answered that the Jews would get nothing more than more pogroms, while "the Poles would get cultured by Bobrinskii and Markov and other such people about whom the poet has said:

There are people who are beaten
And who have their faces spat upon;
Yet, even though they are spat upon and beaten,
They proudly display their selfish appearance."¹³

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Timoshkin was a Rightist extremist who was most intolerant of any national self-assertion by any of the non-Russian nationalities in the empire. It was his amendment to the original Kholm bill which eliminated the use of the words "Kingdom of Poland" from its text. Supra, p. 103.

¹²S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 48 (January 18, 1912), cols. 525-26.

¹³Ibid., col. 526.

Chkheidze got a laugh in the Duma at his poetry from among the leftist seats. He told the Duma that the nationalistic and the Orthodox philosophies of those like Bobrinskii and Markov were likened to the attitude of the people in the poem.¹⁴

If they were really interested in advancing the Orthodox faith, Chkheidze asked, why was it that the Orthodox Church in Georgia was not respected? He told the Duma that the Orthodox faith was spread throughout Georgia as early as the fourth century by a meek and weak woman known as Nina. The faith's proselytism was successful because Nina did not use a club to force her faith upon the people, said Chkheidze.¹⁵

At this point Petr Vasil'evich Novitskii, a Rightist from the province of Kherson, interrupted the speech with: "She was not very successful with you though was she?"¹⁶

"Oh," answered Chkheidze, "but the Orthodox Church succeeded to survive in Georgia throughout many centuries until certain gentlemen like Rasputin and Vostorgov appeared on the scene in 1852. They came to offer the Russian language as a means to convert the Georgians to the Orthodox Church, even though the Georgians had been reading the Holy Orthodox scriptures in their native language for fifteen centuries. What these men did, however, was confiscate the property of the Orthodox Georgian Church. So there you are gentlemen! That is how you treat the Orthodox

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

Christians of other nationalities. That is the way Father Iurashkevich intends to treat the Orthodox people of Kholm.¹⁷

In conclusion Chkheidze asserted that the Social-Democrats felt that the answer to the Kholm question would lie in the realization of autonomy for Poland. Not that autonomy alone solved all social evils, he said, but he felt that at least it had the possibility of preventing missionaries of Rasputin's type from expropriating the harvest of the people of Kholm. Furthermore, the Social Democrats knew that autonomy for Poland would not fall from heaven but could become a reality only after the abolition of the serfdom of the nationalities of Russia. This would come about only when Rasputin-type sermons would become transformed into sermons advocating self-determination for the nationalities of the country.¹⁸

Inferences

It may be concluded that the Social Democrats regarded the Kholm question to be largely an artificial issue created by reactionaries to undermine any political advances that were made by the Poles in the direction of gaining autonomy for Poland. For this reason the Social Democrats advocated Polish autonomy as the policy which in their opinion would expose the real motives of the initiators of the Kholm bill. While the Social

¹⁷Ibid., cols. 526-27.

¹⁸Ibid., col. 528.

Democrats did not deny the rights of the Ukrainians in Kholm to national self-determination, they likely considered the area to be a geographical part of Poland. Perhaps they considered the western oriented commercial ties of the Polish-owned large-estates to be the determining factor which geographically linked Kholm to Poland. In this respect the Social Democrats would be in agreement with the Polish Kolo. If so, then obviously economic factors were much more important in the ideology of the Social Democrats than were factors of language, religion and culture. It was only by language, religion and culture that Kholm could be linked with the Ukrainian nation. For the Social Democrats, however, these latter reasons for national self-determination apparently were very much subordinate to the principle of determining geographical political entities for reasons of economic convenience.

CHAPTER 14

THE RENEGADES

Definition

In the above chapters we saw the stand taken by every political faction in the Duma which participated in the Kholm debate. In this chapter we will study the stand taken by individuals who did not speak on behalf of any particular political faction. These are the renegades. These men, however, would not be considered renegades from their own political factions. Men like Naftal' Markovich Fridman and Ivan Vasil'evich Luchitskii spoke with the approval of their Constitutional Democratic faction; but they spoke on behalf of their own Jewish and Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) nationalities respectively. Panteleiman Viktorovich Sinadino and Dionisii Petrovich Gul'kin presented strictly their own independent opinions on the Kholm question. Sinadino was an Independent Nationalist of Greek nationality while Gul'kin considered himself a non-party Russian Old Believer. The national, the individual and the quaint opinions expressed by these men unite them in this chapter as the renegade deputies in the Third Duma in regard to the Kholm question.

Discourse

First let us see what the Jewish point of view on the Kholm issue was. Fridman was a lawyer from the Province of Kovno

so he did not represent the Jewish population in Kholm. But he was certainly aware of the conditions to which the Jews were subjected in Russia. He began his speech with a reference to a political question of the pre-Japanese War period. Fridman said that at that time it was often debated whether Manchuria was Russian or Chinese. This was indeed a debatable question, granted Fridman, until our state began exiling the Jews from Manchuria. That act settled the debate in the minds of the Jews. Once the Jews lost their individual rights in Manchuria, we were certain that Manchuria was ours, said Fridman. Similarly, he continued, he did not know at first whether Kholm was Polish or Russian until he read in the Kholm bill the restrictions that were to be imposed upon the Jews there. Now, Fridman said, he was certain that Kholm was Russian for where else but in Russia were the Jews restricted as to their individual rights?¹

What culture, asked Fridman, can the initiators of the bill bring to Kholm to replace the old established Polish culture there? They would undoubtedly only fill the country with automobile loads of literature published by the Union of the Archangel Michael, he answered his own question. Or perhaps Bishop Iliodor would be sent there to evangelize the population with one of his missions. In the end, nevertheless, not even the Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) of Kholm would appreciate that sort of culture.²

¹S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 68 (February 15, 1912), cols. 2172-73.

²Ibid., col. 2173.

As for the Jews there, said Fridman, they can only expect the same kind of lawlessness that existed for them in the rest of the Russian state. As a matter of fact, it would be better if the Kholm bill were worded to say that Kholm was to be apportioned from out of the Kingdom of Poland and annexed to the Kingdom of Lawlessness for the Jews, said Fridman. In that way you would not offend the Poles, he continued, and you would protect the Russian state in its entirety with its ideological purity.³

However, besides mocking the Kholm bill, Fridman made it clear that the Jewish stand on the issue was on the side of the Poles. He said that in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when the Jews were subject to persecution in Western Europe, the Poles showed more toleration and understanding for their plight in that backward and evil medieval era than the Russians had shown the Jews in the twentieth century. While the Poles allowed foreign Jewish refugees to enter their country to make a decent living without any restrictions being imposed upon them, you, Fridman accused the reactionary Russian deputies, have persecuted the Jews who have been living among you for centuries now.⁴

Another Jewish deputy, Lazar Nikolaevich Nisselovich from the province of Kurland verified Fridman's assertion that the Jews were on the Polish side of the issue. He felt the

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., col. 2174.

verification was necessary because there was doubt about this stand among some deputies after the question of Polish anti-Semitism was raised in the Duma. He said the Jews were aware of anti-Semitism among certain Polish circles but it was not as bad as that which came from among certain Russians such as Markov.⁵

Luchitskii from Kiev city spoke on the Kholm bill as a Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) historian. As a historian he complimented the work of the government and of the Duma committee for composing histories of Kholm. He could only criticize these histories for giving equal credit to all the documents which they used for their source material. However, in spite of their scholarly qualities, he said that these histories should not be used as influential factors in determining the Kholm issue. It is true, he admitted, that history could be an influential factor, but circumstances in the medieval period were too remote to be of any usefulness in deciding the Kholm question in the twentieth century. To use this remote history to settle the Kholm issue would be similar to using the ridiculous arguments which he overheard in Germany after the Franco-German war of 1870. At that time it was said that Germany's boundary should be extended westward to the Loire River because it was known from history that Germanic tribes settled those lands at one time. If any

⁵S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 70 (February 16, 1912), cols. 2384-85.

history should be taken into account in resolving the Kholm issue, argued Luchitskii, then the historical trends of the nineteenth century should be considered. At this time the greatest problem that faced mankind in the field of political structure of nations was the problem of minority rights.⁶

On the matter of minority rights Luchitskii spoke with the awareness that at one time the ideal nation constituted a single nationality and a single religion. Attempts were made to convert by compulsion any minorities that were found within the political control of that nation. But time and again forceful conversion of these minorities proved to be fruitless. As a matter of fact, those compulsive measures often created situations which undid the very foundations of the political structure of the nation. It was at last realized that some consideration must be given for minority rights. The importance of this problem however was not realized until the nineteenth century when a number of revolutions and uprisings by oppressed minorities occurred. Finally the granting of minority rights became the political trend of that century. That trend is expected to continue, argued Luchitskii, until the problem is resolved everywhere. We in Russia must face that problem and solve it also. It has been proven time and again that the problem cannot be eliminated by fighting it. Yet we are certainly fighting it rather than solving it when we give the Kholm bill those

⁶S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 48 (January 13, 1912), cols. 461-63.

clauses which levy restrictions against certain groups of the population, said Luchitskii.⁷

Gegechkori commented in agreement with Luchitskii. But Chikhachev and Iosif Iakovievich Pavlovich (another Nationalist from the Province of Minsk) asked where in the bill those restricting clauses were located.⁸

In answer to this inquiry Luchitskii gave pages 146, 177 and 179 in the bill in verification of his statement. He elaborated on the assertion that the restrictions unquestionably stifled all freedom of local cultural and political expression. Among these restrictions was the one about the use of local languages in the courts and the schools. While these people were allowed to use their primordial language for official purposes, this clause was loaded with the question of what language in Kholm would be considered primordial, the Russian or the Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) language?⁹ While some historians and linguists argued that at the time of Saint Vladimir, Kholm was settled by the "Great Russians," others have argued that the area was settled by the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians). This question bore no personal interest said Luchitskii, but when certain authoritative persons were

⁷Ibid., cols. 463-68.

⁸Ibid., cols. 468.

⁹Subsequently these clauses were re-worded to state clearly that the Russian language be used except for certain stipulated exceptions. But those exceptions had to be recognized as such by certain specified authorities. The matter of language use was therefore left to the discretion of those authorities. The arbitrary spirit of the bill therefore was not altered even though the clauses criticized by Luchitskii were. Supra, pp. 30-32.

accepting the former argument and were applying it as a rationalization for their policy of Russifying the population, this was a violation of the principle of minority rights because the people settling Kholm presently were not "Great Russians." Certainly those clauses in the bill which called for certain restrictions against certain groups of the population could be used to suppress the Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) language in Kholm.¹⁰

We have seen how similar clauses have been used elsewhere to suppress that language and culture for the entire Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) nationality, continued Luchitskii. In this case too, it was argued that the populace was "Great Russian" primordially therefore it was only proper to Russify them. Just as there were laws made in the Southwestern Lands forbidding plays to be dramatized publicly in the Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) language without performing these plays simultaneously in the Russian language after having the permission of the local Governor-General or the Minister of Internal Affairs, so also the Kholm bill has similar restrictions applicable when the Governor's permission is required to be given before plays can be performed in Kholm.¹¹ This is only another example of the kinds of restrictions that are to be applied by

¹⁰S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 48 (January 18, 1912), cols. 468-69.

¹¹This restriction was removed by the Duma but again inserted into the bill by the State Council. See Kholmskaia Guberniia, 1914 g. (Kholm City: Tip. Kholm. Gub. Pravl., 1914), p. 50. Also Supra, pp. 32 and 156.

the bill to the Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) People of Kholm.¹²

As a matter of fact, said Luchitskii, for a bill whose purpose it is to prevent the people in Kholm from becoming Polonized, there are remarkable few restrictions against the Poles. Most of the restrictions in the bill were definitely geared toward suppressing the Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) culture and language of the local population there. The development of that culture and language was part of a movement which was gaining considerable momentum, he said. From the great many articles which were being written about the movement in the current press, many were aimed at discrediting the movement. They called the movement "Mazepist" and cast aspersion upon those who were in sympathy with it. While other states such as France allowed local dialect literatures and cultures to flourish and to develop, we trouble ourselves with the question of how to fight the "Mazepists." Yet there would be no need to fear any "Mazepist" movement if we only allowed the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) to have those minority rights which would allow them to develop their culture and language freely. For this reason, the question of minority rights was so important. It was not only important for the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) of Kholm but for all the Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) people in Russia. As for the present issue, however, because the Kholm bill did not give any minorities in the Kholm area those rights which would satisfy their particular needs,

¹²S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 48 (January 18, 1912), col. 469.

Luchitskii said he was very much opposed to the Kholm bill in its present form.¹³

But not all the deputies from among the non-Russian minorities in Russia were so keen about minority rights that they would oppose the Kholm bill because of its lack of consideration for those rights. Sinadino, the Greek deputy from the Province of Bessarabia, abstained from voting on the Kholm bill. He voted neither for nor against it, he said, because he disagreed with the wording of both the government and the Duma committee versions of the bill. In both cases the bill was made to sound as though it concerned a question of nationality. But this should not have been the case. It should have been worded as if it was any other administrative reform, said Sinadino. There was no question about the state's right to alter its administrative internal boundaries at will, and that was all that was required to be done with the Kholm bill.¹⁴

Following a similar line of reasoning, Sinadino voted against adopting that part of the Kholm bill which referred to the Kingdom of Poland as the entity from which Kholm was to be apportioned. His vote in this case was due to his beliefs that the Kingdom of Poland no longer existed as a kingdom and that the Duma would create a problem by adopting a bill with reference to a non-existent kingdom. Someone might come back at the Duma

¹³Ibid., cols. 464-73.

¹⁴S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 66 (February 13, 1912), cols. 2071-72.

by saying that the Kingdom of Poland must exist since the Duma recognized it as such in the Kholm bill.¹⁵

The words "Kingdom of Poland" were of course replaced with "Governor-Generalship of Warsaw" by an amendment which was passed in the Duma, but Sinadino's stand on this issue in the Kholm bill only verified his reactionary attitude which prompted his refusing to vote on the Kholm bill in its all inclusive form.

Another reactionary extremist deputy in the Duma, also from Bessarabia, was Dionisii Petrovich Gul'kin. This self-educated winemaker of peasant birth voted against the Kholm bill not because he sympathized with the opposition, but because the initiators and promoters of the bill had made it too liberal. He said that he was a believer of a single and indivisible Russia from Kalish to Vladivostok, from the Bering Strait to the River Danube and from the River Araks to the River Torneo. Yet, he continued, even though those who have sponsored the Kholm bill claim that they too believe in an indivisible Russia, they have given the so-called Kingdom of Poland a separate political entity. "To me," said Gul'kin, "there is no Polish kingdom, only a Russian kingdom. . . . As for the Poles, the Georgians, the Armenians and the other Russian citizens, there are no kingdoms other than the one and indivisible Russian state."¹⁶

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶S. O., 3D., 5S., Pt. 2, M. 50 (January 20, 1912), col. 715.

Gul'kin called the initiators of the Kholm bill Pharisaic because they composed the bill against all principles of statehood, Christianity, and nationality. In the first place, he said, the bill is said to be based on principles of nationality. This was anti-Christian, said Gul'kin, and particularly so when a priest like Father Iurashkevich preached nationalism in face of the Holy Scriptures which said that one should love one's enemies and that one should be charitable to those who despise him. In the second place, nationality was synonymous with statehood, so if the bill recognized a Polish nationality it violated the very principles of nationality in light of realities, because there was no Polish state. In the third place, the purpose of a state was to keep the peace among its citizens, to unite them into a single entity, and to create among them a single loyalty so that they would act for the common weal like bees in a beehive. But, he asked, what did the Kholm bill do? It divided its citizens. It set them up as enemies of each other. It violated all the principles of statehood to the advantage of the foreign enemies abroad. For these reasons, said Gul'kin, the Kholm bill had elements in its context that were anti-statehood, anti-national and anti-religious.¹⁷

The bill was also most welcomed by the leftist deputies, said Gul'kin. This was a very important additional reason why the bill should be scrapped quickly. We should not allow these people to make political capital from it. In spite of what he

¹⁷Ibid., cols. 715-16.

calls himself, said Gul'kin, we know that Professor Luchitskii is Ukrainian. "I would not be at all surprised," continued Gul'kin, "if there were not a great many Ukrainians among the ranks of the Nationalist faction who were secretly working for the Ukrainian movement. If there would be established a Ukrainian state, the first among the likely candidates for Hetman of Ukraine would be Count V. A. Bobrinskii."¹⁸

Gul'kin continued his speech after the laughter which his statement aroused had died down. He said that he did not fear Polonization in Kholm. The people in the southwestern provinces including Kholm had come through the Polonizing process in their history as sparkling clean as panned gold. Furthermore, the Governor-General and the Governor over Kholm were both Russians. The court judges, the local governments, the policemen and the officials there were all Russian too. "What was there to be feared?" he asked. "Just because a new Catholic church was blessed in Opol'skii recently, that was no fault of the administrative arrangement for the area, but, I would say, the fault of such men as Father Iurashkevich and his followers."¹⁹

The Kholm bill was considered by Gul'kin to be a missionary bill and not a national one. If it was a national bill, then for similar reasons it would be necessary to annex the district of Khotin after its apportionment from the Province

¹⁸Ibid., col. 716.

¹⁹Ibid., cols. 716-17.

of Bessarabia. In Khotin the people were Russian (i.e. Ukrainian). Being next to Galicia they were of the same stock as the Galicians, and they were becoming Moldavianized. But no, a Khotin bill was not called for, but the Kholm bill was. The Kholm bill came into existence because this was the desire of Bishop Evlogii and Count Bobrinskii.²⁰

The bill was certainly not raised, said Gul'kin, because of any concern over the peasants in Kholm. These peasants, he said, were not interested in national questions. All they were interested in was having more land, said Gul'kin, expressing his sympathies for the matter as a former peasant. But the bill did nothing toward that end. Nor did it alleviate the sufferings of nearly a million starving stomachs. It did not give these peasants their own local courts nor their own local self-government. These were the only things that pained the souls of the peasants there, he said. Because the Kholm bill failed to meet the needs of the state and the needs of the people of Kholm, Gul'kin concluded that he would vote against that bill.²¹

Inferences

It may be concluded in this chapter that the opinions of the non-Russian nationalities, apart from the Poles, were expressed with particular weakness. That weakness primarily was due to the lack of any significant national representation

²⁰Ibid., col. 717.

²¹Ibid.

in the Duma. For example, apart from expressing their sentiments, the Jewish deputies were too few to carry out any significant campaign on behalf of their people. The historian Luchitskii was the only Little Russian (i.e. Ukrainian) deputy who regarded the Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians) a separate nationality. Yet, even he did not dare call himself a Ukrainian. Officially there were no Ukrainians and the Ukrainian deputies could only register themselves as "Little Russians." Whenever the term Ukrainian came up in the Duma, it always referred to people of a discredited movement outside of the Duma. It was nearly treasonable to mention the word Ukrainian, for it seemed to be synonymous with ideas of separatism and Mazepism. There was therefore no place for the Ukrainians in the Duma and therefore no first-hand Ukrainian point of view, in spite of the fact that it was their fate that was being decided by the Kholm bill. Luchitskii's speech was of course the exception to this rule, but only because he spoke of himself as a "Little Russian" rather than as a Ukrainian.

Among the other non-Russian deputies, the Muslim Group chose not to participate in the Kholm bill debates. Only Sinadino, a single Greek deputy, came forth with a point of view of his own on the Kholm issue. However, he chose to be an abstaining voter. How many other deputies abstained from voting on the Kholm bill is hard to say, but Sinadino, who was also mayor of Kishinev, told the Duma that he would abstain from voting on the Kholm bill and why. Perhaps he alone represented a third voting bloc on the question of the bill if the other two

blocs voted either for or against that bill.

Gul'kin, although last mentioned, is not the least important of the renegades. His assumption that Bobrinskii would be first among the candidates for Hetman of Ukraine should a Ukrainian state be established was not as wild a prediction as it seemed in the Duma at the time. Of course Bobrinskii did not become a Ukrainian hetman. But the Octobrist G. V. Skoropadskii who promoted the Kholm bill in cooperation with Bobrinskii had his relative, Pavlo Skoropadskii, become Hetman of Ukraine only six years later. At that time, in 1918, Kholm became an integral political part of the Ukrainian state. The boundary was established by the Treaty of Peace between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on one part and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other, on February 9, 1918 as follows:²²

Article 2. Between Austria-Hungary on the one hand and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, as far as these two powers border one another, those frontiers will exist which existed before the outbreak of the present war between the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and Russia. Further north the frontier of the republic beginning at Tarnegrad will in general follow the line of Bilgerey to . . . Wydozowskyesee. This will be fixed in detail by a mixed commission according to ethnographical conditions and with a regard to the desires of the population.

The boundaries fixed by this treaty were roughly those established by the Kholm bill. The province, as an integral part of a separate Ukrainian state therefore contributed toward

²²International Conciliation, No. 128 (New York: American Association for International Conciliation, July, 1918), pp. 14-15. Also see map. infra, p. 283.

a national dismemberment of the supposedly indivisible Russian Empire. Therefore Gul'kin's fears were justified that the Kholm bill would contribute to a political division of the Russian state into national entities. The bill had the potential of stirring those national separatist sentiments which its promoters had in mind to subdue. Perhaps then, if Luchitskii's proposal had been adopted, and minority rights in Russia had become guaranteed by law, the Duma's policy with respect to nationality might have been more rewarding than it was.

SECTION IV
CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 15

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE Kholm QUESTION AS A CASE STUDY OF DUMA POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NATIONALITY

The nationality policy of the Third Duma was very closely related to the nationality theories advocated by Stolypin's government and the Russian Nationalist faction. This faction's alliance with the Octobrists and the Rightists in the Duma, as in the matter of voting for the Kholm bill, compromised only slightly those theories before they were applied as principles of Duma nationality policy.

That alliance, however, enabled the Duma to arrive at a definite policy. Without the alliance there would have been no two factions in the Duma in agreement over the nature of the nationality policy which the Duma was to follow. Certainly every time a vote was taken in the Duma there was an allied expression either for or against the issue before the assembly; but had each faction proposed in a bill its own unique theoretical solution to the nationality problem and had a vote been taken on each bill, not one of these bills would have been accepted by the Duma. The very fact that three of the Duma factions agreed to vote together for a bill which was not entirely in agreement with their own particular theoretical political principles was a commendable action on their part for the sake of advancing the development of parliamentary practice in the Russian Empire. The principle of compromise and cooperation in this case gave promise that

the Duma indeed would become a useful institution for legislating laws in a democratic way.

However, the attitude toward the non-Russian nationalities, as demonstrated by the Kholm bill, was not at all commendable. The Duma took the already reactionary government proposed bill and made it even more reactionary.¹ Perhaps this was reflective of the influence of the Rightist faction. Certainly Stolypin's bill was nearly in line with the nationality principles advocated by the Nationalists and the Octobrists. Yet it was doubtful whether these two factions alone could have had that bill passed by the Duma. Even when the seats of the Octobrists and the Nationalists together were in a majority in the Duma, there was no means available to their leaders other than persuasion to insure that every member would vote for the bill. Furthermore, it was known that several deputies among their ranks, such as V. K. Fon-Anrep and V. A. Kariakin, would not vote for it. Therefore to insure a majority vote in favor of the bill the support of the Rightists was sought. Their support was gained; but only at the expense of composing the more reactionary Duma version of the Kholm bill. Because of this alliance with the Rightists, it is quite understandable why

¹The Duma bill was more reactionary than the government proposed bill because: (1) the area of Kholm was increased at the expense of the Kingdom of Poland, (2) the province was made directly accountable to the Minister of Internal Affairs rather than to the Governor-General of Kiev, and (3) the Russian nationality unquestionably was given a preferential position over all the other nationalities living in Kholm. Supra, pp. 29-32.

so many historians regard the Third Duma as a reactionary assembly even though the Octobrists, a more moderate element, had a plurality of seats in it.²

On the other hand, the opposition to the Octobrist-Nationalist-Rightist alliance also voted as a bloc. But by the very nature of their position, the opposition factions could each express their own particular theories on nationality without the necessity of compromising them in any way. The common denominator among the opposition factions therefore was not that there was a single nationality platform as a result of compromising their separate particular ideologies, but that there was a common disapproval of the nationality policy that was inherent in the Kholm bill.

Nevertheless, just as the Octobrist-Nationalist-Rightist alliance shifted the Duma's nationality policy to the right, the opposition factions in their reaction to the Kholm bill in a similar way tended to follow the nationality ideologies

²This view is presented not only by Soviet historians such as Pokrovsky, and by the left-wing writers such as Kerensky, Miliukov or Kizevetter; but also by such Russian nationalists abroad as Florinsky and by Kornilov, an academician of the pre-revolutionary period. See M. N. Pokrovsky, Brief History of Russia tr. by D. S. Mirsky (London: Martin Lawrence Ltd., 1933), Vol. II, 282-303; Alexander Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty tr. by G. Kerensky (New York: John Day Co., 1934), pp. 135-36; P. N. Miliukov, Vospominaniia (1859-1917) eds. M. M. Karpovich and B. I. El'kin (New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1955), Vol. II, 177-14; A. A. Kizevetter, Na Rubezhe Dvukh Stoletii (Vospominaniia 1881-1914) (Praha: Russkii Zagranichnii Istoricheskii Arkhiv, 1929), pp. 502-15; Michael T. Florinsky, Russia: A History and an Interpretation (New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), Vol. II, 1200-04; and Alexander Kornilov, Modern Russian History tr. from the 1916-17 editions by Alexander S. Kaun (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924), pp. 328-33.

of the leftist Socialist Revolutionaries. While the Polish Kolo was not socialist by ideology but a conservative group of deputies who represented the interests of the rich Polish landowners, nevertheless this faction applauded the national autonomy proposals of the Socialist Revolutionaries. Perhaps their attitude was in reaction to the Rightists who did not wish to acknowledge the very existence of the Kingdom of Poland. Because the Rightists supported the Kholm bill, the Poles may have feared that its passage would leave a case precedence abrogating the little legal respect which was still given to the Kingdom of Poland as a national political entity within the Russian Empire. Without that respect, there would be no right to have an official national homeland for the Poles in the Russian Empire and therefore no right for the official existence of the Polish Kolo as a group of deputies representing the Polish people of the Kingdom of Poland. In this sense, the fight against the Kholm bill by the Polish Kolo was tantamount to a fight for the survival of its national political characteristic in the Duma. In its battle for survival therefore, the Polish Kolo was not averse to ally itself, though rather loosely, with the leftist factions on the matter of nationality policy.

Thus there was a tendency for the Duma factions to be drawn toward either of two opposite concepts of nationality policy. One concept was based on the Rightists' principle of a nationally indivisible Empire. This principle, when supplemented by means of legislative processes by the Nationalists' principle

of "Russia for the Russians"³ formed a nationality policy which was very inconsiderate of the non-Russian nationalities in the Empire. On the other hand the principles of national autonomy and federation, advocated by the Socialist Revolutionaries, made possible a nationality policy most conciliatory to the non-Russian nationalities. Toward this latter policy the so-called opposition factions were drawn even though individually they were not in agreement over the degree of decentralization to be adopted with the measure nor whether the ideal form of state organization should be in the nature of a republic or a constitutional monarchy.

National autonomy therefore was not solely a leftist concept even though the Socialist Revolutionaries had developed its principles more elaborately than most of the other political parties. The Polish Kolo in the Duma was primarily a monarchist group of deputies since they wished to preserve the Kingdom of Poland as a political entity. But because they desired to see established an autonomous Polish government for that Kingdom, they had the political adroitness to ally themselves with the Socialist Revolutionaries on the concept of national autonomy in opposition to the pro-Kholm bill factions. For this reason national autonomy as an advocated policy common to the opposition parties became a means of dividing the Duma into the so-called factions of the Left or of the Right. The Octobrists, who were

³S. Iu. Witte, Vospominaniia: Tsarstvovanie Nikolaia II (Berlin: Slovo, 1922), I, 116.

willing to conciliate the non-Russian nationalities otherwise but not at the expense of national autonomy, were classed as right wing deputies even though some of them were quite liberal in their political outlook in many other respects. The deputies of the Polish Kolo were considered among the left-wing members simply because of their national-autonomy platform even though they were monarchists and perhaps more conservative in their political outlook than many of the Octobrists.

The Progressivists formed an exception to this rule since they were not favorable to the idea of dividing the Russian Empire into politically autonomous national states, yet they were considered among the leftist factions. Their place in the opposition was justified however, by the fact that they were not intending merely to conciliate the non-Russian nationalities by granting them certain concessions on the local level of government as was advocated by the Octobrist platform, but that they wanted all of Russia's component nationalities to be given equal treatment before the laws of the state. Furthermore, the Progressivists recognized the Ukrainians as a separate nationality, whereas the Octobrists were still holding out against granting that concession. But in keeping with the thesis that not all of the so-called leftist parties were in fact leftist in the sense of having socialist party platforms, the Progressivists were considered leftists although they were likely Russia's greatest advocates of free enterprise. Perhaps their commercial orientation accounted for that.

While the Kholm question as a case study distinctly

demonstrated where the dividing line lay between the left- and the right-wing factions in the Duma, and while the passage of the Kholm bill can be considered a triumph of the right wing over the left in the matter of nationality policy, in actual reality the end result of the Kholm bill was not satisfactory to any of the political factions. The Russian Nationalists wanted to define the boundaries of the central Russian provinces according to the criteria inherent in their concept of nationality. They wanted to do this in order to distinguish the non-Russian borderlands for special treatment as subjugated nations subservient to the Russians. Furthermore, they wanted to see in the administrative organization of the Empire a special treatment given the Ukrainians and the Belorussians so that these peoples would consider themselves loyal branches of a super-Russian nationality, which theoretically was supposed to have included all three of the East Slavic peoples.

Through the Kholm bill the Russian Nationalists hoped to gain a following among the Ukrainians so as to advance their party's political cause. They hoped to become considered the patriotic saviors of the Ukrainians of Kholm from the Polish yoke. Since they expected the loyalty of the Kholm Ukrainians to be first toward their brethren in central Ukraine, the Russian Nationalists planned to assign Kholm province to the Governor-Generalship of Kiev. Through this supposed concession, the Nationalists hoped to gain the cooperation of the Ukrainians as partners in the development of a united super-Russian nationality.

However the Nationalists' alliance with the Rightists and the Octobrists cancelled the primary points of appeal for the Ukrainians. Kholm's Governor was not made subject to the Governor-General at Kiev, but directly to the Emperor's Minister of the Interior. State centralism advocated by both the Rightists and the Octobrists took precedence over the appealing nationalistic theories of the Russian Nationalists. Still further, appended to the centralist channels of administration for Kholm were the educational and cultural sections of the bill, which harnessed that province to the Russian language. Russification by legislation therefore took precedence over Russification by appeal and political scheming. The only real gain for the Nationalists by the Kholm bill therefore was the establishment of an eastern boundary for the Kingdom of Poland more or less according to lines of nationality so that indeed the faction could claim that they saved the Ukrainians of Kholm from the Polish yoke.

But that boundary was the primary disappointment in the Kholm bill for the Rightists. The Rightists wished to disregard national areas in the administrative arrangement for the Russian Empire. They regarded everyone in the Empire to be of Russian nationality by virtue of his citizenship. There were to be no distinctions made among Polish-Russians, Ukrainian-Russians or Great Russian-Russians since all were citizens of the same Russian state. If there were no such distinctions made, then there would be no necessity to draw Kholm's border according

to national lines. The province could be established over an area most suitable for purposes of administration. Nor were provinces to be established for purposes of giving them special national treatment. Since all the citizens of the Empire were Russians, they should all be treated as Russians, according to the Rightists. They should all be given the same education and all be offered the same cultural opportunities. This of course meant that both education and culture would have to be Russian if they were to remain the same for everyone regardless of his native heritage. In the Rightists' opinion, the establishment of the border for Kholm along national lines was a violation of their proposed nationality policy because indirectly it recognized a national homeland for the Poles west of that border.

The Octobrists however were willing to recognize a Polish population in the Empire and were willing to see special local treatment along national lines given to each province, but, like the Rightists, they desired to see the Empire administered according to principles of state centralism. National and cultural differences would be acceptable as local conditions in each province, but autonomous national entities involving several provinces were not tolerable. When faced with a choice between assigning Kholm to the Governor-Generalship of Kiev as a recognition of national political ties or assigning the province to the control of the Ministry of the Interior as a furtherance of administrative centralism, the Octobrists chose the latter course of action. The choice not only compromised one of the original

purposes of the Kholm bill, it compromised the Octobrists' political platform also. No longer were the Octobrists considered favorably inclined toward the non-Russian nationalities of the Empire, regardless of how conciliatory to those nationalities their party platform may have been. This breach of promise contributed toward lowering their political prestige at a time when they had hopes of forming a popular party government responsible to the Duma. Had the Octobrists succeeded in doing that, they would have initiated a new stage in the development of constitutional government in the Russian Empire. The Octobrists therefore disliked the Kholm bill because it forced them to make a difficult choice upon finding themselves in a dilemma. Their ultimate choice of action on the issue provided only one more instance where their middle-of-the-road political policies satisfied nobody. The end result therefore must have been equally disappointing to the Octobrists also.⁴

Of course the factions in opposition to the bill were not satisfied with the outcome of the Kholm question. The Constitutional Democrats were not opposed to the principle of separating the nationalities of the Russian Empire into national areas for administrative purposes, but they opposed the Kholm bill on the grounds that the Duma was not qualified to make the necessary divisions. The boundary between Kholm and the Kingdom of Poland should have been resolved by a plebiscite at the local

⁴A. A. Kizevetter, Na Rubezhe Dvukh Stoletii (Vospominaniia 1881-1914) (Praha: Russkii Zagranichnii Istoricheskii Arkhiv, 1929), p. 503.

level.

The principle of local treatment of local problems was elaborated more fully by the Socialist Revolutionaries of the Toilers' faction. They proposed national self-determination as a means of resolving the boundaries between neighboring nationalities. The plebiscite, in their opinion, should not be on the question whether or not the people of Kholm wished to remain in the Kingdom of Poland. The Socialist Revolutionaries would prefer to give the people the option of choosing their own local representatives to participate in the national government of their choice. Although the present example was not given in the Kholm debates, it was implied theoretically that if the people of Kholm wished to establish an autonomous national state of their own, it was their option to do so regardless of whether they were akin to the Ukrainians or to the Poles. In actuality the Socialist Revolutionaries believed that the people of Kholm would choose to join the Ukrainian nation if that nation were allowed to have political autonomy.

The Progressivists on the other hand felt that the Kholm question had nothing to do with nationality. It was a question of religion only. So if the Duma resolved to give these people their religious freedom they felt that any necessary administrative reorganization in the area could take place according to geographic convenience without regard to questions of national composition. With this point of view on nationality policy, the Progressivists therefore were not unlike the Rightists.

But unlike the Rightists, the Progressivists were not committed to a pro-government platform. They were free to oppose the government-sponsored Kholm bill without compromising their political convictions.

It is understandable of course why the non-Russian deputies opposed the Kholm bill. They saw in it one more opportunity to apply a Russifying policy against the local non-Russian population. There was no consideration in the bill for the Polish and Jewish minorities. Nor was there any consideration for the Ukrainian majority there. None of these nationalities were allowed to develop their separate national cultures. Emphasis was made on the use of the Russian language in the schools and in the official state agencies. Even public performances by drama groups were subject to official control to prevent the development of cultural activities other than those in the spirit of "Great Russian" nationalism.

For the reasons outlined above, there was dissatisfaction over the end product of the Kholm bill among the Duma deputies of every faction. Although the issue was resolved in a manner favorable in general terms to the Rightist-Nationalist-Octobrist bloc, the compromises made by each of these factions to satisfy their bloc position caused considerable regret among each of the separate factions. Whether the dissatisfaction over the Kholm bill was due to the necessary compromises in party ideologies which were made to have the bill passed or whether the dissatisfaction with the bill was over its nationalistic motives in the opinion of the

opposition factions, it can be concluded that in the long run the Kholm bill satisfied no one.

But as a case study of Duma policy with respect to nationality, the Kholm bill undoubtedly demonstrated that Russia was for the Russians,⁵ and that the Duma was only maintaining the policy expected of it by the Russian government in the spirit of the Emperor's Manifesto of June 3, 1907. In part the manifesto reads as follows:⁶

Convoked in order to strengthen the Russian Empire, the Imperial Duma must be Russian in spirit.

Other nationalities living in our Empire should have representatives in the Duma; but they must not and shall not appear in such numbers as to have a decisive voice in purely Russian questions.

The very nature of the election reform, which came along with this manifesto, indicated that the nationality problem in the Russian Empire was a major issue. If the election reform can be construed to have been a means of reducing the number of leftist deputies that could be elected to the Duma, then it must be remembered that the so-called leftist deputies were not necessarily all socialists by ideology. It must be remembered also that any possible reforms involving the social structure within the Russian Empire could not possibly have been achieved without considering

⁵Witte, op. cit., I, 116.

⁶Samuel N. Harper, The New Electoral Law for the Russian Duma (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908), p. 2. See also the untranslated version of this manifesto in F. I. Kalinychev, Gosudarstvennaia Duma v Rossii v Dokumentakh i Materialakh (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Iuridicheskoi Literatury, 1957), p. 273.

their results on the non-Russian areas with respect to questions of nationality. The Kholm question demonstrated how reforms concerning the structure of local governments could not take place in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Western Land without a prior solution to the nationality problems existing there. The Kholm bill debates disclosed how class relationships between landlords and peasants were not simply social questions of class structure. Often those relationships were made complex by additional factors of religion and nationality. Class oppression easily could be made synonymous with national oppression, while policies of national oppression easily could be channelled through the state's heirarchical social class structure. By discriminating against certain nationalities in the allotment of privileged positions in the state's social hierarchy, the two problems, class structure and national oppression, could not be distinguished as separate issues.

For this reason perhaps, the non-socialistic political parties, who were in any way opposed to national oppression, were therefore considered leftist. Perhaps for that reason also, both the non-Russian and the socialist elements were reduced drastically in the Duma by the Manifesto of June 3, 1907. The socialists in the Duma were not a desirable element by the Russian government. Among the undesirable reforms which they proposed, was the granting of more national freedom to the non-Russians in the Empire. In the case of some of these parties such as the Social Democrats, the policy of more national freedom

perhaps was intended to be only a means of disrupting the class structure of the state. But in the case of the non-socialist parties, their proposals for more national freedom for the non-Russians would not have prevented a disruption of the social order merely because they were making those proposals as non-socialists. The government therefore feared any such drastic reforms. Reforms allowing freedom to the non-Russian nationalities possibly could destroy not only the class hierarchy on which the Empire's social structure was based; but also might even destroy those cohesive factors which kept the Empire united as a single political state, according to government fears. The nationality question in Russia therefore was one of that state's most excruciating problems.

The Ukrainian and the Polish questions were most acute among those problems. The Ukrainians and the Poles composed the most populous and politically advanced non-Russian nationalities in the Empire. Both nationalities were settled in areas very wealthy with industrial and natural resources. Both had co-nationals settled beyond the Empire's borders and both inhabited those areas through which the Empire's border with Europe was drawn. Separatist movements among these nationalities were easily instigated from abroad. Yet both the Poles and the Ukrainians, as Slavic nationalities, were akin to the Russians. To assimilate them into the Russian political stream seemed possible. Russifying policies were therefore very tempting as a means of solving the nationality problem over a long run period. The Kholm bill was

the offspring of such a policy.

The debates on the Kholm bill demonstrated that the Poles had certain advantages over the Ukrainians in resisting such policies. They had a rich landlord class which was able to soften any oppressive policies against the Polish nationality. This buffer role was possible by the Polish rich landlord class because it was included in the Empire's privileged estates through which national oppression could be best applied. As a counter measure, this Polish landlord class also could apply Polonizing policies against their subjects who were not already Poles as in the case of the Kholm Ukrainians. Still further, the Poles were not linked with the Russians through their Church and could easily combine national sentiments along with their religious zeal. The Ukrainians had no significant rich landlord class, and their religion was not sufficiently different from that of the Russians for them to be able to combine any anti-Russian national sentiments along with their religious zeal. Although both the Poles and the Ukrainians had languages distinctively different from Russian, the Polish language was more distinctive because of its use of the Latin alphabet and by the fact that it was one of the Western Slavic languages whereas both Ukrainian and Russian were languages of the Eastern Slavic group.

On the surface it appeared that Russifying the Ukrainians was quite possible. As a matter of fact, many considered the process so well along its way by the time of the Third Duma that the government did not consider the Ukrainians as a separate

nationality and therefore did not legalize any Ukrainian political parties which might contest for seats in the Duma to present a Ukrainian national point of view before that assembly. Without a privileged class or a powerful religious organization to guard the national heritage of the Ukrainians in the Third Duma and without a legalized Ukrainian political party in that assembly to present a Ukrainian national point of view, the Kholm bill was introduced as a purely Russian question. That bill gave no regard whatsoever to the Ukrainians whose fate and nationality was involved.

The policy of the Russian government and of the Duma in this respect was extremely unfortunate. Because the Duma failed to recognize the reality of the national situation in Kholm and because it failed to give the various peoples of that area a voice in the resolvment of their own future course, it failed to meet its other purpose of convocation according to the Manifesto of June 3, 1907 which was to strengthen the Empire.⁷ This failure was unfortunate not only because it could stir a feeling of discontentment and reaction among the people of Kholm against the Duma, but because the otherwise proper parliamentary procedures and practices of the Duma in its course of legislating the bill became a mockery of democratic government. Still more unfortunate was the fact that this mockery was made obvious at a period in the history of the Russian Empire when democratic institutions such as the Duma itself were being introduced some-

⁷Supra, p. 260.

what experimentally into the social structure of the Empire after a long period of strictly autocratic rule. The consequences of the failure of that experiment were felt within five years after the establishment of Kholm province. The revolution, civil war and the violence which followed might well have been avoided had reforms been made in a peaceful democratic way without discrimination against any of the nationalities inhabiting the vast areas of the Russian Empire. Well planned peaceful reforms emancipating those nationalities might not have disrupted the political unity of the Empire any more than its social structure was disrupted in 1861, when the serfs were emancipated. Fear of bold reforms such as these were evident in both cases. But in the case of serfdom in 1861 the bold step was taken. However in the case of national oppression in the twentieth century, not only were there no suitable reforms, there were enacted laws which increased the intensity of that oppression. Those laws only prolonged and aggravated the problem rather than solved it.

The nationality problem in the Russian Empire therefore had a very important effect upon the last decade of its history. The unity and strength of the Empire was dependent upon the satisfactory solution of that problem. The Russifying policies of the Duma failed to achieve that satisfactory solution. With the Kholm question as a specific example of the problem of nationality in the Russian Empire, the Kholm bill is an example of the nationality policy of the Duma, which proved to be unsatisfactory. Regardless of how weak the Ukrainian position was against resisting the

Russifying policies inherent in that bill, that position was enhanced by a natural human reaction to resist a compulsive act. Perhaps it may be concluded that in regard to feelings of national ties, human nature is in accord with the law in physical nature, whereby every action creates an equal and opposite reaction.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ADDENDUM

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON
SIGNIFICANT SELECTED ITEMS

The main source of documentation for the above thesis came from Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Stenograficheskie Otchety (The State Duma Stenographic Records), 1906-1917. Although this source gives a record of every word spoken in the Duma while it was in session, the Stenograficheskie Otchety alone present a serious handicap to the scholar attempting to make any substantial or comprehensive study of the legislative process or the political implications involved with respect to any significant issue before the Duma. The usefulness of these records is extremely limited because they do not include the printed material which was utilized by the deputies in the assembly. Among the material that was available to the deputies but is not included in the records are: (1) the wording of the bills that were undergoing debate, (2) the government and Duma committee reports on the bills that were to be legislated upon, (3) the minutes of the committee meetings, (4) the existing state laws which were or could be applicable to the bills at issue, (5) the rules of parliamentary procedure that were utilized by the Duma and (6) the names of the factions to which belonged the deputies who were speaking in the tribune at any particular time. With the exception of providing the information for the last point after requiring research through special lists of members accord-

ing to factions in the index to the Stenograficheskie Otchety as edited by Frederick Rodkey for the Readex Microprint firm, his Gosudarstvennaia Duma on microform cards, as part of the Russian Historical Sources series, provides none of the necessary information mentioned above in points one through five. The Stenograficheskie Otchety on microprint therefore are indeed a very limited source of documentary material for a study of an issue before the Duma such as the Kholm question.

Supplementary to the Stenograficheskie Otchety the following documents in their original published forms were used: (1) Ukazatel' k Stenograficheskim Otchetam (The Guide to the Stenographic Records), (2) Prilozhenia k Stenograficheskim Otchetam (The Supplement to the Stenographic Records), (3) Obzor Deiatel'nosti Komissii i Otdelov (The Survey of the Activities of the Committees and Departments), and (4) Obzor Deiatel'nosti Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Tret'iago Sozyva 1907-1912: Chast' Vtoraia: Zakonodatel'naia Deiatel'nost' (The Legislative Procedures volume in the Survey of the Activities of the Third State Duma). These four titles with their numerous volumes not only supplement the Stenograficheskie Otchety, they supply the information which is vital to an understanding of the Duma's legislative process or to an insight into the political and legal implications that any issue before the Duma would have.

Vital to an understanding of the Kholm question in particular was the Report on Bill 440 by the Duma Committee for Directing Legislative Bills as found in the Prilozhenia k

Stenograficheskimi Otchetami, 1910-1911. In this report is found a 160-page account of the Kholm question. The discourse includes an outline of the area's history and its ethnography. It explains the religious and nationality problems involved in the issue and gives the motives for the proposed bill. In an additional 22 pages the published report gives the text of the two versions of the Kholm bill, that of the government and that of the Duma committee. Another 11 pages of national and religious statistics are given in this report which is complemented with a map 12 by 20 inches in size denoting the two western boundaries for Kholm as proposed by the government and by the Duma committee. A further 217 pages of laws, both published and unpublished previously for public use, completed the 426-page entire report. These laws were either incorporated into the Kholm bill or could have been incorporated in it because they were already applicable in some areas of the Russian Empire. Of course the Kholm bill itself added new laws to this already impressive list. But without being able to refer to this list of laws and to the other material found in the report, such as the bill's initial two versions, the reader of the Stenograficheskie Otchety would find the Kholm bill debates extremely difficult to follow.

For both a chronological survey of Kholm's history in 40 pages and the ultimate promulgation of the Kholm bill with the Tsar's approval, the book Kholmskaia Gubernia, 1914 g., published in Kholm by the new provincial authorities is good. It gives the final version of the Kholm bill after the completion

of its legislative process through both assemblies, the Duma and the Supreme Council.

Of documentary significance to questions of legality for the Duma and its factional composition is F. I. Kalinychev's publication of documents on the Russian State Duma. For a political study of the Duma, it is necessary to supplement Kalinychev's jurisprudential study with a knowledge of the political ideologies behind each of the Duma's factions. Polnoe Sobranie Podrobnykh Programm Russkikh i Pol'skikh Politicheskikh Partii (The Complete Collection of the Various Platforms of the Russian and Polish Political Parties) provided the ideology of all the parties involved in the Kholm debate except the two right-wing parties. By 1906 (the publication date for the above collection) these two parties had not yet participated as official political parties in the Empire's community of political forces even though they were the most dominant political pressure groups in governmental circles. Their political ideologies were found in A. Chernovskii's Soiuz Russkago Naroda (Union of Russian People) and in the issues known by the title Sbornik Kluba Russkikh Natsionalistov (Congeries of the Club of Russian Nationalists).

The Polish point of view and political position on the Kholm issue was well expressed in L. Dymsha's Kholmskii Vopros (The Kholm Question) and in the book Materialy k Voprosu ob obrazovanii Kholmskoi Gubernii (Material Pertaining to the Question of Establishing a Kholm Province). The section on Kholm (Chełm in Polish) in the 1924 edition of the Polish Encyclopaedia is

worth reading for a Polish interpretation of the Kholm issue from a historical point of view as expressed by the National Polish Committee of America.

For an excellent scholarly account of nationality problems in general in Eastern Europe the symposium edited by A. I. Kastelianskii is worthy of note. His Formy Natsional'nago Dvizheniia v Sovremennykh Gosudarstvakh: Avstro-Vengriia, Rossiia, Germaniia (Forms of National Movements in the Sovereign States: Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany) was quoted from by deputies of the Duma in regard to the Kholm question. This book was considered an important and timely study since it was published in the period of the Third Duma when the matter of national movements by minority nationalities within the three multi-national states mentioned was considered to be a very important social political problem. For a historical study of that problem, Kastelianskii's book still remains a very valuable source of information.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

POLITICAL ALLEGIANCE AND NATIONALITY OF DEPUTIES

THIRD DUMA, FIRST SESSION

| | Rightists | Moderate Rightists | Nationalists | Octobrists | Pol.-Lith.-Belorussian | Polish Kolo | Progressivists | Peaceful Rejuvinationists | Muslim Group | Constitutional Democrats | Toilers | Social Democrats | Others | Totals |
|--------------------|-----------|--------------------|--------------|------------|------------------------|-------------|----------------|---------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|---------|------------------|--------|--------|
| Russian | 42 | 46 | 23 | 133 | | | 21 | 3 | | 43 | 9 | 15 | 2 | 337 |
| Ukrainian (Lit.R.) | 4 | 10 | 1 | 10 | | | | | | 1 | | | | 26 |
| Belorussian | 3 | 6 | 2 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 12 |
| Polish | | | | | 6 | 11 | | | | 1 | | | | 18 |
| Georgian | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 2 |
| Armenian | | 1 | | | | | | | | 2 | 1 | | | 4 |
| Bashkir | | | | | | | | | 4 | | | | | 4 |
| Tatar | | | | 1 | | | | | 3 | | | | | 4 |
| German | | | | 13 | | | | | | 1 | | | | 14 |
| Latvian | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | | 2 |
| Lithuanian | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 3 | 1 | | 5 |
| Greek | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 |
| Estonian | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | 2 |
| Turkic Azerbaijan | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| Abkhazetan | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 |
| Vyrinianian | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| Lezginian | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Moldavian | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 |
| Jewish | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | 3 |
| Totals | 51 | 67 | 26 | 158 | 7 | 11 | 23 | 3 | 8 | 53 | 13 | 20 | 2 | 442 |

APPENDIX II

CHANGES IN MEMBERSHIP OF FACTIONS FROM SESSION TO SESSION IN THE THIRD DUMA

| NAME OF FACTION OR GROUP | 1st Ses | | 2nd Session | | 3rd Session | | 4th Session | | 5th Session | |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | No. of Deputies | % of Duma Total | No. of Deputies | + or - Prev. S. | % of Duma Total | + or - Prev. S. | No. of Deputies | + or - Prev. S. | No. of Deputies | + or - 1st Sess. |
| Rightists Faction | 51 | 11 | 49 | -2 | 11 | +2 | 53 | +2 | 52 | +1 |
| Group of Nationalists | 26 | 6 | 21 | -5 | 5 | | | | | |
| Moderate Rightists Faction | 70 | 16 | 76 | +6 | 17 | | | | | |
| Russian Nationalist Faction | | | | | | | 91 | -13 | 77 | -14 3rd |
| Independent Nationalist Group | | | | | | | 16 | | 16 | 4 |
| Rightist Octobrists Group | | | | | | | 11 | | 11 | 2 |
| Union of 17th of October Faction | 154 | 35 | 141 | -13 | 32 | -18 | 122 | -1 | 121 | -33 |
| Polish-Lithuanian- Beloruss. Faction | 7 | 2 | 7 | | 2 | | 7 | | 7 | 2 |
| Polish Kolo | 11 | 2 | 11 | | 2 | | 11 | | 11 | 2 |
| Progressivists Faction | 28 | 7 | 36 | +8 | 8 | +3 | 39 | | 37 | +9 |
| Mussulmans Group | 8 | 2 | 8 | | 2 | +1 | 9 | | 9 | +1 |
| Constitutional Democratic Faction | 54 | 12 | 53 | -1 | 12 | -1 | 53 | +1 | 53 | -1 |
| Toilers Faction | 14 | 3 | 15 | +1 | 3 | -1 | 14 | | 11 | -3 |
| Social Democratic Faction | 19 | 4 | 19 | | 4 | -4 | 14 | -1 | 13 | -6 |
| Non-affiliated | | | 6 | | 2 | +11 | 15 | -2 | 23 | +17 2nd |

A NOTE ON APPENDIXES I AND II

The figures for Appendix I were compiled from the registration lists of deputies elected to the Third Duma according to the index to the Stenograficheskie Otchety (Stenographic Records). Appendix II is taken from pages 98 and 99 Part II of Obzor Deiatel'nosti Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Tret'iago Sozyva 1907-1912 (A Survey of Activities of the Third State Duma, 1907-1912). Any discrepancies found among the number of members listed for each faction for the First Session in these two charts may be explained as follows: The first source bases its figures on the initial registration of the deputies as they first came into the Duma for the First Session after their election to the assembly. The latter source bases its figures on the account of deputy members made by the executive office of the Duma. This office was not functioning until after the Duma met and elected its officers. They in turn made their own register of deputies from the information submitted to them by the Duma Committee for Personnel Composition (Komissia po Lichnomu Sostavu). The purpose of this committee was to verify the election of each deputy and to ratify his membership in the Duma. From the time of the first entrance registration of deputies in the Duma to the time of the first report by the personnel committee, there was ample time for some of the deputies to alter their factional allegiance and to regroup themselves into different factions. It is for

this reason that the faction composition figures issued by the Duma Executive Office are different from the figures issued by the government's civil servants who were in charge of registering the Duma deputies upon their first arrival in the White Hall of the Tauride Palace for the First Session of the Third Duma in 1907.

MAPS

POLAND'S EASTERN BOUNDARY, 1945



Scale in miles
0 100 200

STATE BOUNDARIES ———
SOVIET REPUBLICS ·····




POLAND, S. EASTERN BOUNDARY, 1945

STATE BOUNDARIES
SOVIET TERRITORIES

0 100 200
miles

THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK, 1918




Boundaries before World War I ———

Boundaries as of Feb. 9, 1918:

Russian-German front ———

Ukrainian National Republic ———



Boundaries before the war

Boundaries after the war

Ukrainian People's Republic

Poland

Regency Kingdom of Poland

Soviet Federated Republics


Baltic Sea

Since Dec. 11, 1918

Since Nov. 7, 1918

Since Nov. 30, 1918

THE KINGDOM OF POLAND (1912)
AND THE PROVINCE OF KHOLM (1913)



Only regional
and provincial
capitals are shown.
Regional capitals
are underlined, e.g. Kiev

EMPIRES

Regions

Provinces

Kholm, 1913

Крош, 1913

Provinces

Regions

EMPIRES

—
.....
--

are underlined, e.g. Kiev
Regional capitals
capitals are shown
and provincial
only regional

АВСТРО-УКРАИНА ИМПЕРИЯ

GERMAN EMPIRE

Kingdom of Poland

РУСЬКА ИМПЕРИЯ

Беларусь

Беларусь

Беларусь

Беларусь


Беларусь

Беларусь


БАЛТИЧЕСКОЕ МОРЕ

AND THE PROVINCE OF Kholm (1913)


THE KINGDOM OF POLAND (1913)




POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH (POLISH REPUBLIC), 1771



- EMPIRES
- STATES
- REGIONS
- palatinates.....



POLAND'S EASTERN BOUNDARY, c. 1200 A.D.



--- STATES ---
..... Palatinates

B29836